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ABSTRACT  
   
In the face of increasing anthropogenic threats to marine systems, marine reserves 
have become a popular tool to promote sustainable fisheries management and protect 
marine biodiversity. However, the governance structures that determine marine reserve 
success are not well understood. The response of resource users to reserve establishment, 
as well as the socioeconomic, institutional, and political contexts in which they occur, are 
rarely considered during reserve implementation. I use the Coupled Infrastructure 
Systems (CIS) framework to better understand the interdependencies between social, 
economic, natural, and institutional processes affecting reserve implementation and 
performance efficacy in the Gulf of California, Mexico. I used a combination of 
interviews, qualitative case study comparisons, and systematic conservation planning 
tools to evaluate the role of different infrastructures, institutions, and governance for 
marine reserve efficacy in the Gulf of California, Mexico. At a local scale, I assessed 
stakeholder perceptions, preferences, and knowledge on reserves in the Midriff Islands 
sub-region of the Gulf. My results show differences in fisher perceptions about the use of 
reserves for biodiversity conservation and fisheries management, misconceptions about 
their location, and non-compliance behavior problems. At the regional scale, I explored 
the trajectories of reserve implementation and performance. I show that capacity-building 
programs and effective collaboration between non-profit organizations, environmental, 
fisheries, and other government authorities are essential to coordinate efforts leading to 
the provisioning of infrastructure that enables effective marine reserves. Furthermore, 
these programs help facilitate the incorporation of fishers into diversified management 
and economic activities. Infrastructure provision tradeoffs should be carefully balanced 
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for designing scientifically-sound reserves that can achieve fisheries recovery objectives 
and incorporating stakeholder engagement processes during the planning phase that allow 
fishers to include their preferences in a way that complements proposed reserve network 
solutions. Overall, my results highlight the importance of multiple infrastructures in 
understanding the dynamics of interacting action situations at various stages of marine 
reserve implementation and operation. I identify strengths and weaknesses within marine 
reserve systems that help understand what combinations of infrastructures can be 
influenced to increase marine reserve effectiveness and robustness to internal and 
external challenges, as well as delivering benefits for both nature and people. 
  iii 
DEDICATION  
   
 
In loving memory of my grandparents Maria del Socorro and Claudio. 
 
To my parents Maria del Mar and Héctor for being my inspiration, for being exemplary 
role models, and for always supporting me in my decisions and my journeys. 
 
To my grandparents Pompeya and Miguel Ángel for always believing in me, for 
encouraging me to enjoy the arts and sciences, and for cultivating my desire to always 
continue to learn.  
 
To my sister Frida for being my best friend and the best sister anyone could ever ask for.  
  iv 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  
   
I am immensely grateful to so many people for being alongside me throughout this 
journey. To my advisor, Leah Gerber for always being incredibly supportive and always 
taking the time to talk, for all your advice, and for believing in me. I am grateful and 
privileged to have Dr. Joshua Abbott and Dr. Marty Anderies in my committee, thank 
you both for all your help and advice. I am also incredibly grateful and fortunate to have 
Dr. Jorge Torre in my committee, for helping me ground my research within the context 
of Mexico and the Gulf of California, for allowing me to collaborate with COBI A.C. all 
these years, and for all the support and advice you have given me from the beginning. 
 I am also immeasurably grateful to everyone in the COBI A.C. for hosting me 
during those summers and for allowing me to collaborate with you. Without COBI’s 
support, my research would not be where it is today. Special thanks to Maria Jose 
Espinosa-Romero and Álvin Suarez Castillo for all your help and support. Special thanks 
to the fishers of Bahía de Kino, Bahía de los Ángeles, and Puerto Libertad for allowing 
me to carry out my interviews and participatory mapping sessions, and for providing me 
with valuable insights into the world of Mexican fisheries. Also, thank you to the many 
academic, non-profit organization and government representatives for allowing me some 
of your valuable time to carry out my interviews and for sharing amazing stories.  
Thank you to everyone in the Gerber Lab for providing emotional and intellectual 
support throughout these years, Jose Anadón, Tara Crawford, Robert Wildermuth, Eric 
Johnson, Yaiyr Astudillo, Sarah Geren, Andrea Noziglia, Tiffany Lewis, and Miranda 
Bernard. Special thanks to Tom Jan, Manuel Valtierra, and Roberto Torres for all your 
help. Thank you to everyone in the EcoSERVICES lab during my early years, especially 
  v 
Ted Gilliland, Marie Fujitani and David Shanafelt. Thank you to everyone in the CBIE 
Graduate Student Coding Team for the many fun and intellectually stimulating hours of 
mapping nerd-outs on CISs, institutions, and infrastructures. Special thanks to my good 
friends Cathy Rubiños, Mady Tyson, Ute Brady, and Sechindra Vallury for the study 
sessions at Lux or via Skype, the many brainstorming hours, and for all your feedback. 
Thank you to my ELS cohort Heather Kropp, Owen McKenna, Francesca De Martini, 
Israel Leinbach, and Jorge Ramos, as well as all my SOLS friends, for always being 
awesome and supportive. Thanks to my friends Trevor Fox, Travis Rusch, Jason 
Borchert, Jacob Campbell, and Leslie Dean for all the fun times. Thank you, Jesse Senko 
for being my good friend and for all your amazing support, encouragement, and advice. 
Thank you to everyone in the Ballet Fusion Fitness family, especially Lisa Juliet and 
Hallie Edmonds for the opportunities, for helping me stay sane, and for the great times 
dancing and working out. Thank you to all my friends from Austin and the Blue House 
for being patient with me throughout these last six years. Thank you to ALL my 
girlfriends in Saltillo and to my friends from the tennis days for staying with me all these 
years, and for letting me be a part of your lives even when I have been away for so long, 
especially Ebert Cordova, Hugo Vázquez, Oliver Guadarrama, and Milton Aguilar.  
Finally, I would not have been able to accomplish this without the love and 
support of my whole family. Special thanks to my grandparents for always encouraging 
me and inspiring me to continue to grow. Thank you, Mom and Dad for being my 
constant source of inspiration, encouragement, emotional support, and for being fantastic 
role models. And special thanks to my sister Frida, for always being there for me. I love 
you all very much. Oh and of course, Johnny for the unconditional love!  
  vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
          Page 
LIST OF TABLES .................................................................................................................. v  
LIST OF FIGURES ................................................................................................................ vi  
CHAPTER 
1     UNDERSTANDING EFFECTIVENESS OF MARINE RESERVES THROUGH A 
COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS LENS ............................... 1  
1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................... 1  
1.2 Efforts to Address Marine Reserve Efficacy ..................................... 2  
1.3 Socioeconomic Characteristics and Human Dimensions of Marine 
Reserves......................................................................................................... 4  
1.4 Common Pool Resources, Social-Ecological Systems, and Coupled 
Infrastructure Systems.................................................................................... 6  
1.5 The Coupled Infrastructure Systems Lens ....................................... 12  
1.6 A Hypothetical Example Using the CIS Framework in the Context of 
Marine Reserves ..................................................................................... 17  
1.7 Conclusions ....................................................................................... 21  
1.8 References ......................................................................................... 22  
 
2     GOVERNANCE OF NO-TAKE AREAS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
.....................................................................................................................28  
2.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 28  
  vii 
CHAPTER              Page 
2.2 Methods ............................................................................................ 30  
2.3 Governance Mismatches and Delayed Feedbacks ........................... 44  
2.4 Discussion ......................................................................................... 61  
2.5 References ......................................................................................... 64  
 
3     THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MARINE RESERVE EFFICACY IN THE MIDRIFF ISLANDS 
REGION, GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO ...................................... 70 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................... 70  
3.2 Materials and Methods ..................................................................... 73 
3.2 Results ............................................................................................... 80 
3.2 Discussion ......................................................................................... 98 
3.2 Conclusion ...................................................................................... 106 
3.2 References ....................................................................................... 107  
 
4     INTEGRATING STAKEHOLDER AND SCIENCE-BASED APPROACHES TO 
NO-TAKE AREA DESIGN IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA,  
MEXICO................................................................................................... 113  
4.1 Introduction ..................................................................................... 113  
4.2 Methods .......................................................................................... 116  
4.3 Results ............................................................................................. 128  
4.4 Discussion ....................................................................................... 144  
  viii 
CHAPTER              Page 
4.5 References ....................................................................................... 150  
 
REFERENCES.................................................................................................................... 155 
APPENDIX  
A      RESEARCH PROTOCOL FOR CHAPTER 2 ......................................................... 163  
B      INTERVIEW TO IDENTIFY THE ESSENTIAL SOCIO-ECOLOGIC FACTORS 
FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION AND SUCCESS OF A MARINE 
RESERVE IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO..................... 168  
C     ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2 .......................................................... 179  
D     RESEARCH PROTOCOL FOR CHAPTERS 3 & 4 ................................................ 181 
E  INTERVIEW TO IDENTIFY THE DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE TOWARDS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NETWORK OF MARINE RESERVES IN 
THE MIDRIFF ISLANDS REGION, GULF OF CALIFORNIA, 
MEXICO................................................................................................... 186  
     F      ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 4 ......................................................193  
 
 
  ix 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1.1        Examples of Action Situations within the Context of Marine Reserves at the 
Different Levels of Analysis ...................................................................................9 
 2.1        General Characteristics of the Seven No-Take Area (NTA) Case Studies .......... 33 
 2.2        Theoretical Propositions Relevant for Implementation, Performance, or Both 
Outcomes and their Respective Coupled Infrastructure System Components .... 34 
 3.1        Respondents from Two Key Actor Groups for the Interview Process ................. 78 
 3.2        Natural Protected Areas (NPAs) in the Midriff Islands Region in the Gulf of 
California .............................................................................................................. 88 
 3.3        Percentage of Respondents Who are Aware of the Existence of NPAs and the 
Boundaries of the NTAs ....................................................................................... 93 
 3.4        NTA-Specific Perception Among Resource Users About Whether Existing NPAs 
Have Been Successful for the Conservation of Biodiversity and Fisheries 
Management ......................................................................................................... 96 
 4.1        Summary of Prioritization Scenarios....................................................................117 
 4.2         Current Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) and their NTAs in the Midriff Islands 
Region.................................................................................................................. 119 
 4.3         Overall Conservation Objectives for all Six Habitats and Sites Identified as 
Important for Spawning Aggregations ............................................................... 123 
 4.4         Existing NTAs’ Overlap with the Science-Based Approach Within the Midriff 
Islands Region..................................................................................................... 130 
4.5         Area Coverage of ‘Best’ Solutions for All Three Approaches........................... 136 
  x 
Table Page 
 4.6         Percent Habitat Included in ‘Best’ Solutions for All Three Approaches........... 140 
 
 
 
 
  xi 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure Page 
 1.1        An Action Situation for an Example on Stakeholder Committees Discussing 
Proposals for Marine Reserves.............................................................................. 10 
1.2        The Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) Framework ....................................... 13 
2.1        The Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) Framework ....................................... 31 
2.2        Existing No-Take Areas in the Gulf of California (GOC), Mexico ..................... 37 
2.3        Instruments Working as No-Take Areas Within the Mexican Context ............... 41 
2.4        No-take Area CIS for the Biosphere Reserve Isla San Pedro Mártir ................... 46 
2.5        No-Take Area CIS for the Fishing Refuge Zone Corredor San Cosme- Punta 
Coyote ................................................................................................................... 47 
2.6        No-Take Area CIS for the Biosphere Reserve Alto Golfo de California y Delta Río 
Colorado................................................................................................................. 49 
2.7        No-Take Area CIS for the National Park of Cabo Pulmo .................................... 54 
3.1        CIS Framework Depicted with a No-Take Area System in Mexico .................... 75 
3.2        Natural Protected Areas (NPAs) within the Midriff Islands Region (MIR) in the 
GOC ...................................................................................................................... 89 
3.3        No-Take Areas (NTAs) within NPAs of the MIR in the GOC ............................ 90 
3.4        Responses from Small-Scale Fishers .................................................................... 94 
3.5        Perception Among Public Infrastructure Providers per Sector About Whether 
Existing NPAs Have Been Successful for the Conservation of Biodiversity and 
Fisheries Management .......................................................................................... 95 
 
  xii 
Figure Page 
3.6        Perception Among the Government Agencies Sector About Whether Existing 
NPAs Have Been Successful for Fisheries Management .................................... 96 
3.7        Resource User Response to: Which NTA Tool Would be Your First, Second, and 
Third Choice for the Establishment of a Network of NTAs? .............................. 98 
4.1        Planning Domain Boundaries and Current Natural (Marine) Protected Areas 
Within the Study Area ........................................................................................ 118 
4.2        Existing NTAs Within the MPAs in the MIR .................................................... 120 
4.3        Procedure for Achieving a Science-Stakeholder Agreement Solutions ............ 126 
4.4a      Difference Map of the Central West Coast of the MIR Near Isla Ángel de la 
Guarda ................................................................................................................ 132 
4.4b       Difference Map of the Northern (Left) and Southern (Right) West Coast of the 
MIR ..................................................................................................................... 133 
4.4c       Difference Map of the Northern (Left) and Southern (Right) East Coast of the  
MIR ..................................................................................................................... 134 
4.4d       Difference Map of the Central East Coast of the MIR ...................................... 135 
4.5a       Selection Frequency of Planning Units for the A1 = Science-Based 
Approach...............................................................................................................137 
4.5b       Selection Frequency of Planning Units for The A2 = Stakeholder-Based Approach 
.............................................................................................................................. 138 
4.5c       Selection Frequency of Planning Units for The A3 = Science-Stakeholder 
Agreement Approach .......................................................................................... 139 
 
  xiii 
Figure Page 
4.6        Proportion of Habitat Conservation Features Represented in the Three Different 
Approaches Using the Best Solution Output ...................................................... 141 
4.7        Total Habitat and Spawning Site Area Represented in the Three Different 
Approaches Using the Best Solution Output ...................................................... 142 
4.8        Sum of Opportunity Cost for All Three Approaches .......................................... 143 
1.C        Procedure for Establishing (and Subsequently Modifying) NPAs Under Federal 
Jurisdiction .......................................................................................................... 180 
2.C        Procedure for Establishing Fishing Refuge Zones ............................................. 180 
1.F        Selection Frequency Histogram of Planning Units Selected by Fishers in the 
Stakeholder-Based Approach (A2) ..................................................................... 193 
 
 
  1 
CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING EFFECTIVENESS OF MARINE RESERVES THROUGH A 
COUPLED INFRASTRUCTURE SYSTEMS LENS 
1.1 Introduction 
Given the pressing challenge of maintaining fishery resources in the face of 
growing human population and anthropogenic threats, marine protected areas (MPAs), 
specifically marine reserves (or no-take areas), have become a popular fisheries 
management tool (Fraschetti et al. 2011). The growing literature on marine reserves 
includes ample data on the benefits they provide, what works with regards to their design 
and maintenance, and key challenges for achieving objectives. However, marine reserves 
occur within particular socioeconomic and historical contexts that limit what they can 
accomplished, and these dimensions are less swell-studied. Therefore, there is an urgent 
need to pay attention to the combinations of the ecological, cultural, institutional, and 
socioeconomic characteristics and operating conditions of marine reserve systems to 
ensure acceptance by stakeholders and successful outcomes. 
Marine reserve goals, objectives, and implementation processes vary within 
sociopolitical and geographical contexts. Some are motivated by conservation of 
biodiversity and critical habitat protection whereas others focus on the achievement of 
sustainable harvest of important species for traditional, subsistence, or commercial use. 
Large-scale MPAs can also be part of ecosystem-based management strategies, in which 
they may be designed to achieve a broad range of objectives (Fernandes et al. 2005). 
Marine reserves can be designed via top-down initiatives (i.e. through the federal or state 
government), bottom-up initiatives (i.e. via local community arrangements), or a 
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combination of both, and their decision-making can also vary from centralized to de-
centralized systems. This variability in needs and strategies is a product of the biological, 
socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural site-specific conditions surrounding every 
particular ecological system. In other words, context matters.  
Given the diversity of marine reserve design and management strategies 
worldwide, it is clear that there is no single model for marine reserves that can fit all 
circumstances and be universally applicable (Agardy et al. 2003), and in continuing to 
search for such a model we risk conflict (Jentoft et al. 2007) and limited success if the 
context in which marine reserves function is not carefully considered. In this chapter, I 
explore the potential for using existing frameworks from the governance and institutional 
analysis fields to understand what are the main drivers of efficacy of marine reserves at 
achieving their objectives and providing benefits to both nature and people. I first review 
the literature on effective marine reserve design from the perspective of multiple 
disciplines. I then summarize the efforts made by the common pool resource and 
institutional analysis literature to understand outcomes of collective action, followed by a 
description of the Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) framework as a conceptual 
model to understand effective outcomes of shared resource governance in the context of 
marine reserves. Finally, I conclude with a hypothetical example of how the CIS 
framework can be applied to any marine reserve system. 
1.2 Efforts to address efficacy in marine reserves 
Up until the last decade, marine reserve goals were often stated under ecological terms 
with social and economic goals and human benefits listed as secondary consequences of 
achieving the former (Jentoft et al. 2007). From a biological perspective, there is a 
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growing literature on guidelines for designing effective marine reserves to achieve 
multiple objectives with regards to fisheries management, conservation of biodiversity, 
and adaptation to changes due to climate change simultaneously (Green et al. 2014). 
These guidelines includes a combination of established criteria for achieving a successful 
marine reserve: habitat representation (diversity/complexity), habitat replication, risk 
spreading, protecting critical, special, and unique areas, reserve size, reserve spacing 
between reserves (connectivity), life history and ecological traits, location (activities 
taking place outside of the reserve), and duration (Fernandes et al. 2009, Fernberg et al. 
2012, Saarman et al. 2013, Green et al. 2014).  
Efforts to identify clear guidelines on how to design marine reserves that address 
economic, social and governance considerations simultaneously with biological effects 
have been less streamlined. Jentoft et al. (2007) define MPAs from a governance 
perspective as “complex social institutions that aim to influence human behavior”, and as 
such, they are part of a larger social system with institutions, rules, norms, and values of 
its own. Furthermore, two of the main challenges include identifying how to we define a 
“successful marine reserve”, and how can we understand and assess the importance of 
contextual variables for marine reserve efficacy. Furthermore, the state of contextual 
variables (i.e. those that remain constant for a given analytical study but not across 
studies) can affect the impact of the variables being explicitly studied in real world 
situations (Agrawal 2003). 
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1.3 Socioeconomic characteristics and human dimensions of marine 
reserves 
Consideration of incentives driving fisher behavior and how fishers are likely to 
respond to marine reserve establishment has been recognized within the literature on the 
economics of fisheries as highly relevant for marine reserve establishment (Sanchirico 
and Wilen 2001, Sanchirico et al. 2006). Econometric modeling approaches in 
conjunction with spatially explicit biological population models show how fishers 
respond to differences in expected returns across different patches, as well as responding 
negatively to weather risk and travel distances and positively to expected returns (Smith 
and Wilen 2004). These studies highlight the importance of fisher spatial and 
economically motivated behavior to prevent biased predictions of marine reserves toward 
optimistic harvest gains and net economic costs of implementing reserves (Smith and 
Wilen 2003). Furthermore, discrete choice models of fisher behavior have demonstrated 
the importance of considering the short-run and long-run opportunity costs of NTAs to 
fishers, which depend on the availability of fishing opportunities in alternative sites and 
other sources of income (Smith et al. 2010). Whether these costs are outweighed by 
perceived long-term benefits also depends on ecological (e.g. habitat quality, stock 
abundance, dispersal) and fisher-specific considerations (e.g. non-fishing income, fishing 
skills) (Smith et al. 2010). These results support the idea that if the current opportunity 
costs of fishing are high (i.e. if there are good opportunities elsewhere) and if fishermen 
perceive longer term benefits (e.g. stock growth outside the reserve), fishermen would be 
less likely to oppose the implementation of the marine reserve. 
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Much of the research on the human dimensions of marine reserves consists of 
small-scale case studies over a specific geographical area. There is a great body of 
literature that focuses on examining the social context in which long-enduring 
sociocultural institutions (e.g. customary marine tenure systems that implement spatial or 
temporal closures) limit marine resource use in coastal communities. These small-scale 
studies have looked at questions on social processes influencing traditional closures 
(Cinner et al. 2005), the acceptance of marine reserves (Charles and Wilson 2009), the 
relationships between socioeconomic factors and marine tenure (Cinner 2005) as well as 
with community-based management participation (Gurney et al. 2006), the effectiveness 
of community-based resource management approaches to marine reserves (Aswani and 
Weiant 2004, Crawford et al. 2004, Cinner 2007), and informal institutions and 
traditional management practices (Colding and Folke 2001). Studies have also looked at 
issues related to compliance with marine reserves (e.g. in Costa Rica (Arias et al. 2015) 
and Australia (Arias and Sutton 2013)), perceptions of fisher displacement and reserve 
spillover in Kenya (Cinner et al. 2014) and of MPA livelihoods, governance, and 
management processes in Thailand (Bennett and Dearden 2014b), social inequity and its 
consequences for MPAs in Indonesia (Gurney et al. 2015), and success of “bottom-up” 
community-based fishery management with temporal fishing restrictions over “top-
down” government established marine reserves (Kareiva 2006, McClanahan et al. 2006).  
Large-scale studies systematically analyzing the marine reserve literature and 
multiple case studies have also made progress towards identifying important 
socioeconomic factors that relate to the efficacy of marine reserves on a global scale (e.g. 
Caribbean, the Philippines, and the Western Indian Ocean) Pollnac et al. (2010), 
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addressing solutions for bridging the divide between MPA management and fisheries 
sustainability (Weigel et al. 2014), compliance with marine reserves worldwide (Bergseth 
et al. 2015), clearer metrics for defining protection and assessing progress of marine 
reserves (Spalding et al. 2016), and local development, management, and governance 
inputs leading to effective MPAs through an Inputs Framework (Bennett and Dearden 
2014a), and a Marine Protected Area Governance (MPAG) Framework (Jones 2014). 
1.4 Common pool resources, social-ecological systems, and coupled 
infrastructure systems 
The literature on Common Pool Resource (CPR) management provides us with a 
numerous list of case studies on communities managing CPRs within a variety of 
institutional arrangements (i.e. clusters of rules specifying allowed or required actions, 
accessible information, and how costs and benefits are related to actions and outcomes, 
(Ostrom et al. 1994)) have successfully managed to solve social dilemmas in which two 
or more people can benefit collectively from cooperation but also benefit individually 
from freeriding (Ostrom 1990). The evidence provided by this body of literature was 
made possible with the development of the Institutional Analysis and Development 
(IAD) framework (Kiser and Ostrom 1982), originally developed as a way of 
understanding the process of policy-making, and analyzing institutions governing action 
as well as the outcomes of collective action arrangements Ostrom (1990).  
Following the development of the IAD framework, the concept of social-
ecological systems (SESs) became popular among CPR scholars to reflect the 
interactions between the biophysical elements of a resource system and humans (Berkes 
and Folke 1998), as well as more recently adding the role of human-made hard and soft 
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infrastructure (Anderies et al. 2004, Ostrom 2007, 2009, Anderies and Janssen 2013). 
Scholars continued to develop extensions of the IAD framework to further highlight the 
relationships between institutions and ecological systems in the face of uncertainty as 
well as the practical implementation of these ideas for interdisciplinary research. 
Anderies et al. (2004) developed the “Robustness for Social-Ecological Systems” 
framework to understand the broad structure of the components of a SES, their 
connections, and how their interactions affect the SES’s long-term robustness (i.e. it’s 
ability to cope with uncertainty and disturbances from both inside and outside of the 
system) from an institutional perspective (Anderies and Janssen 2013). The Social-
Ecological Systems framework (formally known as the “Multitier framework for 
analyzing SES” (Ostrom 2007) and the “Framework for Analyzing Sustainability” 
(Ostrom 2009)) were then developed within several iterations to equally consider the 
biophysical and ecological foundations of institutional systems through the identification 
of a large number of broadly applicable variables arranged in a nested tier system 
(McGinnis 2011). A significant number of valuable insights that have been gained from 
applying frameworks that stem from this concept towards understanding the importance 
of institutions (i.e. rules, norms, and strategies that humans use to dictate their 
interactions) to engage in collective action in order to avoid resource overexploitation 
(Becker and Ostrom 1995, Basurto and Coleman 2010). Finally, the CIS framework was 
introduced in 2015 (ADD Anderies 2015) as an extension of the IAD and the Robustness 
frameworks to redefine the basic unit of analysis (from action situations to CISs) to 
which institutional analysis is applied, highlight the complex web of interactions within a 
system and the feedbacks generated by its linked components, and emphasize the 
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importance of the concept of infrastructure for addressing governance of shared 
resources (Anderies 2015, Anderies et al. 2016). 
Before examining ways that the CIS framework can be applied to understand 
governance considerations in the context of marine reserve systems, some of the features 
of the components of the IAD framework are worth taking a closer look to exemplify 
their relevance within the marine reserve domain. The core component and basic unit of 
analysis of the IAD framework is defined by an action situation as a conceptual unit 
where two or more individuals (acting on their own or as members of an organization) 
are exposed to information, face a set of potential actions, and engage in patterns of 
interaction that jointly produce outcomes (Ostrom 2005, McGinnis 2011). Action 
situations have a specific structure that can be described and analyzed by a common set 
of variables and their respective institutional arrangements. Table 1.1 shows three 
examples of action situations related to marine reserves at different levels of analysis. To 
illustrate how an action situation is structured, I describe in detail the example at the 
collective choice level from Table 1.1 (Figure 1.1). 
While in practice collective choice processes in marine reserve planning are 
known for being substantially complex, involving numerous meetings, negotiations, and 
iterations of the processes occurring within, the following example describes a 
hypothetical case that aggregates these processes and summarizes the key structural 
variables of the action situation as a whole. Broadly speaking, individual actors can 
assume specific positions within the various stakeholder sectors that are active in that 
region, be somehow elected to participate in these meetings given their sector’s boundary 
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rules (i.e. specifics on how participants enter or leave a position), and the specific actions 
actors in such positions can take (i.e. through choice rules). 
 
Table 1.1. Examples of action situations within the context of marine reserves at the 
different levels of analysis. * = adapted from (Ostrom 2005). 
Level of 
analysis Description * Examples 
Constitutional 
choice 
Where higher level 
collective choice 
processes and rules are 
defined to structure other 
action situations and the 
collective choice rules 
they operate with. 
•   Federal legislators making decisions 
about:  
o   Procedures for officially decreeing 
marine reserves (e.g. who can 
participate in formal stakeholder 
committees, or what studies need 
to be made to justify the 
establishment of a marine reserve).  
o   Deciding whether current 
proposals for marine reserve 
become approved to become 
implemented. 
Collective 
choice 
Where institutions are 
constructed and decisions 
are taken among the set 
of actors authorized to 
participate in the process 
(according to the 
procedures established at 
the constitutional choice 
level. 
A formal stakeholder committee where 
representatives of each stakeholder sector 
come together to discuss and make 
decisions (e.g. zonation, uses allowed) 
over a proposal to implement a marine 
protected area with a number of marine 
reserves inside as well as areas for 
exclusive fishing rights to locals of the 
neighboring community. 
 
Operational  Actors interacting and 
implementing practical 
day-to-day decision 
within an action situation 
are influenced by the 
incentives they face to 
generate outcomes (as 
allowed by the collective 
and constitutional choice 
processes). 
Small-scale fishers withdrawing fish from 
a marine protected area where fishing is 
allowed but adhering to specific gear 
restrictions to avoid harming endangered 
species that inhabit the area. 
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For example, a fisher representative from the local small-scale fishing cooperative 
may have been elected given his/her local status and membership on the cooperative, and 
thus invited to participate in these meetings given his connection to the local small-scale 
fisher sector. A director of conservation management from the state conservation 
management agency may have been elected given his/her long trajectory within the 
public sector for conservation management, and thus invited given his authority to 
endorse marine reserve proposals for state or federal decree. A scientist from the local 
academic institution may be recognized for his/her academic achievements and 
publications, and thus be invited to provide technical and scientific information relevant 
for the marine reserve proposal. Finally, a chief manager of marine reserve affairs within 
a non-profit organization may have been elected to his/her position given his expertise in 
facilitating stakeholder meetings for marine reserve affairs. 
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Figure 1.1. An action situation for an example on stakeholder committees discussing 
proposals for marine reserves. Adapted from (Ostrom 2005).  
The positions of the actors and their actions lead to interactions and outcomes 
related to whether stakeholder groups in a community choose to endorse the 
implementation of a marine reserve in their region, and if so how they endorse it. These 
choices are linked to the potential outcomes through the level of information actors 
possess (e.g. how much access these groups have to information on fish stock trends and 
documented threats to fisheries so they can make informed decisions) and how much 
control these actors have over how their decisions can become outcomes (e.g. whether 
there are specific voting mechanisms within the stakeholder committee that may 
influence the final decision to implement the marine reserve). However, they are also 
bound by the potential set of outcomes that are realistic and feasible within the specific 
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context (e.g. whether the proposed marine reserve is temporary or permanent according 
to the region’s legal instruments for marine reserves). Finally, the actors’ choices are also 
related to how they perceive costs and benefits from potential outcomes (e.g. what are the 
incentives and restrictions of implementing a marine reserve). This characterization of the 
action situation can be used to describe, analyze, and explain the likely behavior of the 
actors in such a structure (Ostrom 2011) and can set the stage for further evaluation of the 
current institutional arrangements governing marine reserve management.  
The IAD framework also considers external variables (i.e. contextual factors 
within which an action situation exists) such as the biophysical conditions of the system 
(e.g. the type of habitat being proposed for protection within a marine reserve), the 
attributes of the community (e.g. heterogeneity, size, and cultural characteristics of the 
communities affected), and the rules of the current institutional context (e.g. official 
existing rules for fisheries management such as fishing permits, fishing concessions or 
gear restrictions, as well as unofficial rules such as fisher-proposed seasonal closures for 
a specific species). These external variables are processed within the action situation 
through recursive interactions to produce outcomes that can then be evaluated. These 
outcomes can produce both a fast feedback effect to influence how participants of the 
action situation implement practical decisions (influencing operational level action 
situations through the faster inner loop), and a slower feedback effect influencing how 
multiple operational level action situations that are related to management interact with 
collective choice level action situations related to providing public goods (Anderies et al. 
2016).  
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1.5 The Coupled Infrastructure Systems lens 
Within the CIS framework (Figure 1.2), infrastructure is defined as any “coherent 
structure[s]...that can manipulate mass, energy, and information flows...that combined 
can provide affordances [i.e. accessible possible outcomes to individuals] to produce a 
variety of mass and information flows we value...[and that] require investment...to [be] 
produce[d] or maintain[ed]” (Anderies et al. 2016). The CIS framework considers five 
different types of infrastructure that can directly map into the external variables identified 
within the IAD framework. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) framework. Adapted from 
Anderies et al. (2016). AS = Action Situation; S = Spillover (or links). See text for further 
explanation.  
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1)   Natural infrastructure (NI) is considered hard infrastructure that includes the resource 
itself (e.g. commercial fish and invertebrate species targeted by both small-scale 
fishers and industrial fishers) as well as the ecological (e.g. coral reef habitat patches 
or an enclosed bay harboring multiple habitats such sandy bottom, rocky reef and 
Sargassum forests within) and biophysical components (e.g. oceanographic patterns 
and ocean circulation resulting in asymmetric connectivity between patches) that 
characterize the ecosystem.  
2)   Hard human-made infrastructure (HHMI) includes human-made structures (e.g. 
fishing vessels and their motors, fishing gear such as nets and traps, processing and 
storage plants with freezer equipment, docks, equipment for biological monitoring 
and census data processing).  
3)   Soft human-made infrastructure (SHMI) includes human-made guidelines or 
instructions for using other types of infrastructures (e.g. the legal system allowing 
marine reserves to be established, legislative documents outlining fishing regulations 
or procedures for the establishment of a marine reserve, official federal decrees of 
marine reserves and their management programs, guidelines from experts with 
regards to best practices for designing marine reserves, unofficial agreements among 
fishers to avoid certain practices or not using certain gear to fish for a specified 
amount of time).  
4)   Human infrastructure (HI) includes the knowledge, levels of experience, and 
capacities of a particular group of people or community (e.g. fishers with over 40 
years of experience fishing in a particular area, education levels of fishers, individuals 
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demonstrating exceptional leadership skills and management capacities, or particular 
skills for finding and catching fish with specific gear).  
5)   Social infrastructure (SI) includes the web of relationships among individuals that 
allow them to communicate and exchange information or materials (e.g. shared 
values among a community of fishers, heterogeneity of the community, levels of trust 
among fishers). 
 
The remaining components of the CIS framework include two different types of 
actors: Resource users and public infrastructure providers. The Resource users (RUs) 
which include any appropriator of the resource within the system under study (e.g. small-
scale, industrial, or recreational fishers, individuals involved in fish processing or gear 
mending, indigenous groups of people living in the region, tourists, etc.). The Public 
infrastructure providers (PIPs) are intimately related to the type of different Public 
Infrastructures (PI) they can provide. For example, PIPs can include individuals or 
groups of individuals such as government organizations tasked with the responsibilities 
of fisheries and/or conservation management activities who can provide legislation 
changes for the implementation and establishment of marine reserves as well as endorse 
the elaboration of management programs that will dictate how the reserve is to operate 
(SHMI). Non-profit organizations active in the region are another type of PIP that can 
provide infrastructure for carrying out management activities in the form of funding for 
hard human-made infrastructure (HHMI) (e.g. biological monitoring equipment, 
conditioned rooms for holding stakeholder meetings) or for soft human-made 
infrastructure (SHMI) (e.g. capacity building workshops for fishers engaged in 
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conservation activities or for increasing fishers’ capacities for leadership, management, 
and conflict resolution). Academic researchers can provide information and data to help 
marine reserve management (e.g. scientific articles supporting the need for marine 
reserves in an area or the current success of existing reserves, another example of SHMI). 
Groups of resource users can also act as PIPs when engaging in specific collective choice 
activities, which can also provide some level of social infrastructure (SI) (e.g. social 
networks of fishers engaged in specific similar activities).  
The CIS framework emphasizes the importance of the characteristics of each type 
of infrastructure within a CIS, but it also highlights the relationships between the 
different groups of actors within a CIS and the infrastructures, as well as their 
relationship with outside disturbances or exogenous drivers (in previous instantiations of 
the CIS framework, these have been called links, now “spillovers”). These relationships 
represent the dynamic processes through which the different components of the CIS 
interact but that may be difficult to observe or predict (Anderies et al. 2016). In other 
words, the CIS framework spotlights the dynamic interactions between the exogenous 
variables identified in the IAD framework (i.e. the biophysical context, the actors, and the 
rules in use) that structure dynamically evolving action situations (Anderies and Janssen 
2013). Furthermore, it more easily addresses issues related to unintended consequences 
(i.e. externalities) that come with any productive activity (Anderies 2015), thus 
incorporating important design elements for robust CISs. 
Marine reserves occur within particular socioeconomic and historical contexts 
that limit what can be accomplished by using them as a tool for fisheries management. 
Human behavior is the focus of fisheries regulations as it is the resource users who are 
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the agents of change and will be directly affected by the regulations (Jentoft et al. 2007). 
Therefore, marine reserves regulate people directly by restricting their access to 
designated areas (Fujitani et al. 2012). We can think of many components of an SES that 
might affect whether a marine reserve is successful or not (e.g. as size and connectivity of 
the reserve, the habitats and species it protects, fisher communities it affects, opportunity 
cost to fishers, cost of enforcement of fishing regulations, or the static (e.g. benthic) or 
mobile (e.g. migratory) nature of the resource itself). Because the CIS framework 
considers the natural, governance, and human components and their associated 
infrastructures as a coupled system, it can facilitate understanding of how all these issues 
affect effectiveness by highlighting how the different types of infrastructure are 
interacting with each other and with the actors in the system. 
1.6 A hypothetical example of using the CIS framework in the context of 
marine reserves 
To illustrate how the CIS framework can be applied to look at the components of 
a generic case of a marine reserve, I will follow earlier hypothetical example #2 in which 
a formal stakeholder committee with representatives from each sector come together to 
discuss and make decisions over a proposal to implement a marine reserve. In CIS terms, 
a typical system can include patches of coral reef NI where fish stocks provide resources 
to a set of small-scale fisher RUs from at least two communities (one next to the fishing 
grounds and one farther away) that, at the operational level, engage in the extraction of 
those resources for a living but also can endure losses when stocks decline (link 1). A 
marine reserves is thus a management tool with specific spatial and temporal restrictions 
that are described through public SHMI produced by PIPs (through link 3) with the goal 
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of influencing how the RUs interact with the resource (through link 5). In some cases, 
RUs can interact with PIPs (through link 2) by requesting changes to PIPs, influencing 
decisions, or even becoming PIPs themselves to participate within action situations taking 
place at the collective and constitutional choice levels.  
The formation of a stakeholder committee would include PIPs that are 
representatives from all the relevant sectors that would be potentially impacted by the 
presence of a marine reserve (e.g. fisher RUs), or that are in a position where they can 
contribute to the discussion (e.g. academics, non-profit organizations), or enable future 
decisions to become actionable outcomes (e.g. government officials). This committee 
could then draft a series of guidelines, recommendations, or even a plan of action with 
regards to how the implementation of the marine reserve should take place (i.e. building a 
piece of SHMI) by incorporating relevant sources of information provided by the various 
PIPs involved. For example, members of the committee can discuss declining stock 
trends as evidenced by both local knowledge from fishers (HI) and academics collecting 
census data. They can also discuss specifics on the marine reserve design such as formal 
objectives, size, location, duration of the closure (e.g. 10-15 years or permanent) and 
whether fishers from the nearby community will have exclusive fishing rights to adjacent 
areas. Furthermore, the dynamics of the action situations within which the stakeholder 
committee makes decisions could be influenced by the different levels of local 
knowledge, experience, leadership, and other abilities that members of the committee 
have (i.e. HI) as well as prior social relationships (either positive or negative) among 
participants who may or may not have worked together in the past (i.e. SI).  
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An important aspect of the marine reserve design might involve the identification 
of specific biophysical indicators that can help monitor the state of the resource within 
the marine reserve, such as the collection of fish census data (through link 4) to assess 
trends over the years (or before the reserve is established if PIPs express a need to 
establish a baseline before the reserve is implemented). This action would require the 
availability of specific HHMI such as scuba diving gear, vessels, and gas money, that can 
be provided and maintained by some of the PIPs (through link 3) to carry out biological 
monitoring activities. Furthermore, the continued participation of all members of the 
stakeholder committee within recurring meetings would have to be maintained to achieve 
effectively working action situations. Therefore, the relationships between committee 
participants (i.e. SI) would also have to be preserved in a positive way to ensure 
continued participation, thus requiring effective leaders and highly skilled individuals 
with good facilitating skills (i.e. HI) to spearhead the efforts. Once the marine reserve 
were established, RU compliance with the no-take regulations within the marine reserve 
would have to be monitored (via link 5) either by existing PI that is charged with the 
responsibility of patrolling and enforcing compliance within the natural systems (e.g. the 
coast guard or park rangers for the marine reserve) or by other institutions that are formed 
and agreed upon by local PIPs taking on the responsibility of monitoring for compliance.  
The relationship between RUs and the PI (link 6) is of particular importance for 
marine reserve systems. While RUs can become PIPs by participating in these 
stakeholder meetings and engaging in the production of SHMI that dictates the specifics 
of the marine reserves (via link 3), they can also be involved in the process of 
implementation of the reserve in different ways without being directly involved in the 
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decision-making process (via link 6). For instance, official legal guidelines (PI) to 
establish marine reserves (or unofficial ones established by the stakeholder committee) 
may call for a public hearing in which RUs are presented with the proposal and asked for 
their opinion. In this way, RUs are part of the coproduction of infrastructure, and whether 
these opinions are incorporated into the proposal would be decided on the guidelines that 
were followed. Another example of coproduction of infrastructure is when the guidelines 
for designing the marine reserve call for a participative mapping process in which a large 
number of RUs are asked to design their ideal zonation for the marine reserve proposal.  
 
Once a marine reserve is established, it becomes imperative that all RUs within 
the CIS become aware of the location of the marine reserve, the restrictions it holds, and 
the sanctions of not complying with the regulations. This information is also provided to 
the RUs via link 6 as it is intended to educate the RUs and aid with the monitoring and 
sanctioning mechanisms. Finally, unofficial norms (PI) previously established among the 
RU fishers of the communities affected might be of help when mediating conflicts that 
arise between RUs and related to the presence of the marine reserve. These unofficial 
norms often occur within actions situations where organized RUs exhibiting cooperative 
behavior and are willing to reach certain agreements that are likely to benefit all. This 
kind of conviction is likely useful when expecting RU compliance with marine reserve 
regulations, especially if they were heavily involved in the process and supported the 
initiative. Therefore, it would be important to consider these norms during the discussions 
at the committee meetings.  
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The final components of the CIS framework to describe in the context of a 
stakeholder committee deciding on the implementation of a marine reserve are the 
include exogenous drivers. These factors can influence the NI itself, such as natural 
phenomena like hurricanes disturbing the sediment flow rate within the potential marine 
reserve, or climate change-induced thermal anomalies affecting the patches coral reef 
habitat within the reserve area, further affecting the fishery resources within. On the other 
hand, there can be exogenous drives related to major changes in the political system, such 
as the signing of an important international agreement calling adhering nations to 
increase the area within national waters under the protection of marine reserves by a 
specific year. International agreements like these can thus re-shape action situations at the 
constitutional level by having an impact on the way in which PIPs operate to proceed 
with the establishment of the marine reserve (e.g. the process may have to be accelerated 
to meet the treaty’s demand to the point which it excludes certain guidelines that called 
for a more RU-inclusive process). The same type of CIS analysis could be carried out for 
hypothetical examples 1 and 3, or all three examples could be considered as co-occurring 
under different time scales and analyzed at the different levels of analysis.  
1.7 Conclusions 
Understanding the barriers to marine reserve efficacy through the lens of the CIS 
framework allows identification of both the components of a system and the interactions 
between linked action situations that structure dynamic change within the CIS. In other 
words, we can more easily identify weaknesses within the system and understand what 
infrastructures (or combinations of infrastructures) can be influenced (or need to change) 
to increase effectiveness of marine reserves in a way that the CIS is robust to challenges 
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from outside the system and capable of delivering benefits for both nature and people. 
While other existing frameworks applied to addressing marine reserve governance issues 
consider the application of institutional analysis and concepts from the common pool 
resource literature being of little use to address practical operational mechanisms by 
which recommendations can be effectively applied to solve governance problems of 
marine reserve, the CIS framework provides a new way to understand the governing 
dynamics of marine reserve systems. The CIS framework can be applied to marine 
reserve contexts of multiple spatial and institutional scales of analysis (i.e. addressing 
spatial and human connectivity as well as multiple levels of institutional structures).  
 
This chapter has explored looking at marine reserves from a CIS perspective to 
better understand the interdependencies occurring between social, economic, natural, and 
institutional processes affecting marine reserve outcomes. I have highlighted attributes 
that make marine reserve systems a good study subject from a CIS perspective, and this 
type of studies can be extended to formal appraisal of the probability of success of a 
reserve system from a systematic analysis of existing case studies. I recommend both 
conservation and fisheries management scientists consider adopting the concepts of 
infrastructure and Coupled Infrastructure Systems as units of analysis for understanding 
problems associated with governing shared fishery resources through marine reserves and 
their effectiveness at solving overexploitation problems. Future applications of CIS 
analysis to marine reserve problems will provide a powerful mechanism to synthesize the 
existing body of work surrounding marine reserve efficacy and contribute towards better 
understanding the role of context influencing successful outcomes for marine reserves.  
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CHAPTER 2 
GOVERNANCE OF NO-TAKE AREAS FOR FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
2.1  Introduction 
In the face of increasing anthropogenic threats to marine systems, marine 
protected areas (MPAs), specifically no-take areas (NTAs), have become a popular tool 
to promote sustainable fisheries management and protect marine biodiversity. There is a 
huge diversity of NTA designs and strategies currently being implemented worldwide 
that vary that vary with respect to the type of NTA, the goals and objectives pursued, the 
biophysical design criteria, and the geographical, cultural, social and economic context 
within which it is implemented. Even NTAs within the same national jurisdiction and 
operating under the same legal systems but under different governance and institutional 
contexts have met various levels of success at achieving their objectives. In many cases, 
limited success of certain NTAs can be attributed to the lack of attention to stakeholder 
interests and human capacity building (Gill et al. 2017), as well as the socio-economic 
(McClanahan 1999, Christie et al. 2003, Christie 2004, Cinner 2007) and institutional 
(Bernstein et al. 2004) contexts within which NTAs are established. 
Given the diversity of NTA design and management strategies, as well as the 
wide variation in contextual factors that have an impact on the effectiveness of NTAs, no 
single model for NTAs can fit all circumstances and be universally applicable (Agardy et 
al. 2003). Multiple efforts have begun to explore methods through which the human 
dimensions of NTAs can be incorporated into the planning and implementation processes 
of NTAs, ranging from the consideration of incentives driving fisher behavior and their 
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response to NTAs, social context, community-based management, compliance, fisher 
perceptions, and social inequity within small-scale studies, as well as large-scale studies 
and new frameworks to analyze the governance of marine protected areas (see Chapter 1 
for a summary on these efforts). Focusing attention solely on governance, however, 
without entirely considering the ecological, social, economic, and institutional system in 
which a set of NTAs is embedded can be misleading (Anderies et al. 2016).  
I apply the Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) (Anderies et al. 2016) 
framework to provide a conceptual roadmap for identifying the contrasting approaches to 
implement effective NTAs in the GOC region and their likelihood to facilitate (or hinder) 
NTA implementation outcomes as well as effective performance. In this chapter, I 
examine the socioeconomic, ecological, and institutional contexts of NTAs in the GOC 
from a CIS perspective. I collected extensive empirical data on trajectories of NTAs in 
the GOC from expert and key stakeholder representatives over one year at the regional 
scale of the GOC spatial scale.  I use these data to describe a qualitative case study 
research methodology to appraise the use NTAs in the systems in the which they are 
embedded. I focus on the region of the Gulf of California (GOC), Mexico, to illustrate the 
different trajectories that existing NTAs in this region have followed. More specifically, I 
address three salient research questions: 1) What are the key factors that influence 
implementation and performance outcomes of NTAs in the GOC? 2) To what extent do 
feedbacks within the different components of an NTA CIS affect the two types of 
outcomes? 3) What are the implications for the policy structures that govern the 
implementation and operation of NTAs in Mexico?   
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2.2  Methods 
2.2.1   Conceptual framework for CIS analysis 
The CIS framework (Figure 2.1) is an extension of the well-known IAD 
framework among common-pool-resource (CPR) scholars (Ostrom 2005). The IAD has 
been used in the context of Mexican institutions to understand access regulation and 
resource use of small-scale fisheries in villages operating in the GOC (Cinti et al. 2010a, 
Cinti et al. 2014). Another IAD extension, commonly known as the SES framework 
(Ostrom 2007, 2009), has been applied to identify regions in the GOC that exhibit greater 
potential for contributing to sustainable resource use and management within a multiple 
locality, spatially explicit setting (Leslie et al. 2015). Following (Anderies et al. 2016), I 
adopt the concept of infrastructures to describe multiple sets of coherent structures (that 
can provide potential outcomes accessible to humans) present within a system (i.e. a 
Coupled Infrastructure System, or CIS). 
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Figure 2.1. The Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) framework, adapted from 
(Anderies et al. 2016). AS = Action situation, NI = Natural infrastructure, SI = Social 
infrastructure, HI = Human infrastructure, HHMI = Hard human-made infrastructure, 
SHMI = Soft human-made infrastructure. Hexagons indicate links between the CIS 
components, numbered for identification purposes only. 
 
The types of infrastructures include: Natural (NI) (e.g. the resource, ecological, 
and biophysical components of a system, within which lies a core component of the CIS 
framework known as “Resource”), Hard human-made infrastructure (HHMI) (e.g. 
includes human-made structures), Soft human-made infrastructure (SHMI) (e.g. 
guidelines for using other types of infrastructures), Human infrastructure (HI) (e.g. 
knowledge, levels of experience, and capacities of a particular group of people or 
community), and Social infrastructure (SI) (e.g. web of relationships among individuals 
that allow them to exchange materials and information). The remaining components of 
the CIS framework include two sets of actors: Resource users (RUs) and Public 
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Infrastructure Providers (PIPs), both interacting separately with a given set of Public 
Infrastructures (PI). Finally, the CIS framework highlights the connections (or links) 
between the different groups of actors within a CIS and the associated infrastructures, as 
well as their relationship with outside disturbances or exogenous drivers. These links thus 
represent the dynamic processes through which the different components of the CIS 
interact. 
2.2.2   Qualitative case study analysis through a CIS lens 
I implemented a qualitative case study analysis following an embedded multiple-
case design approach (Yin 2014) including seven individual cases of NTA 
implementation efforts throughout the GOC (Table 2.1). I individually analyzed each 
case study through a CIS lens where all components, their associated infrastructures, and 
their interactions were characterized for subsequent cross-case comparison and 
contrasting pattern matching with respect to a set of fourteen theoretical propositions 
developed prior to the study. These theoretical propositions are associated with how key 
variables (all within the different components and links of the CIS framework) are 
potentially related to the difficulties of implementing NTAs and their subsequent 
performance (Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.1. General characteristics of the seven NTA cases. FRZ = Fishing Refuge Zone. 
ARPEA = Refuge Area to Protect Aquatic Species.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case ID Name # of individual NTAs Year decreed 
MP  
publication 
NTA (km2) /      
% of MPA 
* RB-
AGCDRC 
Alto Golfo de 
California y 
Delta del Río 
Colorado 
1 Core zone 
1 ARPEA 
2-year gillnet ban 
zone 
1993 
2005 
2015 
1996 
2005 
NA 
2,552.94 / 45% 
1,263.85 / 80% 
>  5,000 
* PN-CP Cabo Pulmo 3 Core zones 1995 2006 24.76 / 35% 
* RB-ISPM Isla San Pedro Mártir 
1 Core zone 
 2002 2011 8.21 / 2.7% 
PN-AES Archipielago Espiritu Santo  
3 Core zones 
 2007 2015 486.55 
RB-BACBS 
Bahía de los 
Ángeles, 
Canal de 
Ballenas y 
Salsipuedes 
6 Core zones 2007 2014 2.07 / 0.05% 
* FRZ-San 
Cosme 
Corredor San 
Cosme-Punta 
Coyote 
1 FRZ 
 2007 NA 3,879.57 
FRZ-CB Cerro Bola 11 FRZs pending NA  
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Table 2.2. Theoretical propositions relevant for Implementation (I), Performance (P), or 
Both (B) outcomes and their respective CIS components.  
Outcome Theoretical propositions CIS component 
P 1.   Biophysical / ecological processes influencing implementation, zonation, or performance NI 
B 
2.   Attributes of the community (e.g. abilities, capacities, levels of 
experience, skills) influencing NTA implementation and/or 
performance. 
HI 
B 3.   Human-made (hard/soft) infrastructure influencing the implementation process and subsequent NTA performance 
HHMI 
SHMI 
B 
4.   Community-established unofficial norms demonstrating 
cooperative behavior among influencing compliance and support 
for NTAs 
SHMI 
B 5.   Participation of PIPs playing an role in facilitating implementation and/or performance 
PIPs 
through 
Link 3 
B 6.   NTA implementation efforts differing between bottom-up, top-down, and combination initiatives PI 
B 7.   Official legal procedure and guidelines through which NTAs are implemented and made operational Link 3/PI 
B 
8.   High levels of community involvement... 
a.   During the early stages of NTA implementation process 
b.   After the NTA has been implemented 
c.   Specifically for compliance monitoring of NTA 
regulations 
a/b.  
Links  6 or 
3 
 
c. Link 5 
I 9.   Initial support/opposition towards NTA implementation from the different stakeholder groups 
Link 6 B 10.   Information available to RUs 
P 11.   RUs implementing social sanctions towards non-complying individuals 
P 12.   Other economic activities taking place in NI Link 1 
I 13.   Exogenous drivers influencing the decisions made by PIPs with respect to NTA implementation processes 
Exogenous 
drivers 
P 14.   Exogenous drivers affecting the natural infrastructure where NTAs are located 
Exogenous 
drivers 
 
I identified two different types of outcomes to differentiate between factors that 
affect the implementation process of the NTA and those that are likely to affect the 
performance of the NTA. This also helps differentiate between temporal scales when 
looking at the status of a NTA-CIS prior to the implementation of the NTA as well as 
during its subsequent performance after implementation. The theoretical propositions 
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represent the differences I expected to find among the case studies, characterized by 
whether they were related to implementation or performance outcomes of NTAs. Given 
the nature of this chapter and the methodology employed, formal evaluations of 
successful and non-successful outcomes were not explicitly carried out. However, three 
criteria were taken into consideration when assessing whether experts perceived 
individual variables were as related to potentially successful outcomes: 1) the objectives 
of the NTA being met (relevant to both implementation and performance), 2) resource 
users not over-appropriating the fishery resources (relevant to performance), and 3) there 
are no critical conflicts between the actors due to the prospect (or presence) of the NTA 
(relevant to both implementation and performance). 
Each case study was intentionally selected in anticipation of obtaining contrasting 
results for anticipatable reasons (based on a literature search and expert opinion). 
Information on the different components CIS framework was collected through multiple 
sources including structured interviews among different key experts and primary and 
gray literature related to each single case study (e.g. reports, formal studies or evaluations 
of each case study, scientific publications, administrative documents including 
management programs and federal decrees, etc.). The interview process with key 
informants and local experts was carried out either in-person or via phone (Skype) call. 
The response ratio for interviewees was 54%, with 27 interviews carried out. For each 
case study, experts interviewed included at least one representative from each of the 
academic, non-profit, and the appropriate government agency sectors, when possible. 
Experts were carefully selected to include individuals recognized for having years of 
knowledge and experience within their sector and with the processes for implementing 
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the NTAs in each case study. They were asked a set of thirty structured questions based 
on their own experience with the case study. 
2.2.3   Study area 
The GOC includes 375,000 km2 of semi-enclosed sea bounded by the states of 
Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora, Sinaloa, and Nayarit in northwestern 
Mexico. In 2005, it became a UNESCO World Heritage Site due to its high levels of 
biodiversity, productivity, striking landscapes, and unique oceanographic processes 
(Carvajal et al. 2010). Given the high rate of primary productivity supporting complex 
food webs, the complex topography and oceanography enabling habitat diversity, and the 
warm and calm waters during the winter and spring, the Gulf harbors 80% of the marine 
mammals in Mexico (Niño-Torres et al. 2011), five of the seven sea turtle species 
(Seminoff 2010), over 4,900 invertebrate (Brusca and Hendrickx 2010) and over 900 fish 
(Brusca et al. 2005) species (with nearly 10% being endemic to the GOC (Hastings et al. 
2010) and over 80 importantly commercial species (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012)). The GOC 
currently has eight decreed MPA-type instruments of various categories and under 
different jurisdictions (explained below) (Figure 2.2).  
Economic activities include fisheries and tourism, with a growing aquaculture 
industry. Fisheries are the most important economic activity with 52% of Mexico’s 
fishery-related jobs are concentrated in the region (IMCO 2013). The main fisheries 
sectors are artisanal (small-scale fishers, SSFs), industrial, sport (recreational), and 
subsistence fishing (Cisneros-Mata 2010). SSFs work with hand-operated gear such as 
gill nets, hook and line, hand fishing line, traps, and longlines, that they use in small 6-
8m long small skiffs (pangas) made of fiberglass with outboard gasoline motors (55 – 
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150 hp) (Cisneros-Mata 2010). Industrial fishermen operate on diesel-run industrial 
vessels of ~15 metric ton capacity that can operate more mechanized gear such as purse 
seine nets, trawl nets (paired, bottom, and midwater), long lines, and gill nets. They 
generally target 6 main species guilds (Cisneros-Mata 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Existing NTAs in the Gulf of California, Mexico, including two NTA-type 
instruments established within the Mexican legal system: Natural protected areas (left) 
and Fishing refuge zones (right).  
2.2.4 Formal Public Infrastructure for environmental protection and 
resource management  
Environmental law (PI) guiding conservation and biodiversity management 
activities in Mexico is housed within the General Law of Ecological Balance and 
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Environmental Protection (Ley General del Equilibrio Ecológico y Protección al 
Ambiente, LGEEPA) (DOF 1988). Fisheries management law has a longer history, with 
initial guidelines decreed in 1925 defining fishing permits as the main management 
policy for harvesting marine species (Soberanes Fernández 1994), rebranded in 2000 as 
the General Law of Sustainable Fishing and Aquaculture (Ley General de Pesca y 
Acuacultura Sustentable, LGPAS), and introducing decentralization of management and 
administration of fisheries 2007 (DOF 2007) to allow states and municipalities to have 
participation in decision making and introduce new fisheries management tools (Cinti et 
al. 2010a), such as Fishing Refuge Zones (explained below). As such, the LGPAS 
provides the constitutional provisions to regulate, promote, and administer the use of 
fisheries and aquaculture resources within the national territory and areas under Mexican 
jurisdiction. Finally, the General Law of Wildlife Species (Ley General de Vida Silvestre, 
LGVS) coordinates the concurrence of federal, state, and municipal governments when 
taking actions related to the conservation and sustainable exploitation of wildlife species 
and their habitat within Mexican territory (DOF 2000b). 
Multiple government organizations (authorities) that act as PIPs to establish and 
maintain legal procedures for the implementation and performance of NTAs in Mexico. 
All environmental authorities are housed within the Secretariat of the Environment and 
Natural Resources (Secretaria del Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales, SEMARNAT) 
in charge of the protection, conservation, and harvesting of natural resources, as well as 
the development of environmental policy for sustainable development. SEMARNAT 
houses three important PIPs: 1) the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas 
(Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas, CONANP), 2) the Federal Agency 
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for the Protection of the Environment (Procuraduría Federal para la Protección del 
Ambiente, PROFEPA), and 3) the General Division of Wildlife Species (Divisón General 
de Vida Silvestre, DGVS).  
CONANP is the main PIP in charge of formally proposing and managing natural 
protected areas. CONANP also houses the Conservation Program for Sustainable 
Development (Programa de Conservación para el Desarrollo Sostenible, PROCODES), 
which seeks to promote the conservation of ecosystems and their biodiversity within 
priority regions through sustainable use, equal opportunity for men and women, and 
emphasizing local indigenous populations. DGVS is in charge of regulating the use of 
species listed under special protection by Mexican bylaws. PROFEPA is the main 
administrative agency in charge of monitoring compliance of environmental protection 
regulations and enforcing and sanctioning those who infringe on these regulations. 
CONANP and DGVS coordinate with PROFEPA with respect to natural protected areas 
and species under special protection, respectively. In the same way, PROFEPA supports 
CONAPESCA (described below) for fisheries regulations. PROFEPA officials can be 
solicited for enforcement support by community members, CONANP, CONAPESCA, or 
the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) (which also provides enforcement support to PROFEPA 
when requested). 
All fisheries management authorities are housed within the Secretariat of 
Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (Secretaria de 
Agricultura, Ganaderia, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación, SAGARPA) in charge 
of promoting commercial fisheries, among other things. Crucial to their operation are its 
objectives of integrating fishing activities within the production chain of Mexico’s 
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economy, stimulating collaboration within the production sectors, and creating 
employment opportunities conducive to the strengthening of production activities. 
SAGARPA houses two important PIPs: 1) the National Commission for Fisheries and 
Aquaculture (Comisión Nacional de Pesca y Acuacultura, CONAPESCA), and 2) the 
National Institute of Fisheries (Institutio Nacional de Pesca, INAPESCA). 
CONAPESCA is the main federal organization in charge of designing, implementing, 
and enforcing fisheries policy regulations specified within the LGPAS, and they mainly 
operate by issuing and managing fishing permits or concessions. INAPESCA is generally 
known as a federal research institution responsible for providing scientific and technical 
advice for the development of fishing regulations.  
2.2.5 NTAs as fisheries management tools within the Mexican context 
An explicit regulation to design, establish, monitor and evaluate NTAs as a whole 
unit has not been created within the Mexican legislation (CEMDA and COBI 2010). 
Therefore, fisheries and environmental laws for land protected areas are commonly used 
to extend protection to the marine environment. Multiple tools within both the 
conservation and environmental protection legislation realm (housed within the 
LGEEPA) and the fisheries legislation realm (housed within the LGPAS) can thus be 
considered to function as NTAs (Figure 2.3). This chapter focuses on three of these 
management tools: Natural Protected Areas (NPAs), Fisheries Refuge Zones (FRZ), and 
Refuge Areas to Protect Aquatic Species (ARPEASs). 
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Figure 2.3. Instruments working as NTAs within the Mexican context. Dotted arrow 
indicates the potential of a concession to become a voluntary marine reserve. Symbols:   
= types explored within this study, * = not applied yet in the GOC. 
 
The formal implementation of NPAs follows a well-drafted procedure described 
in the LGEEPA (DOF 1988) (Figure 1C, Appendix C). Some of the key elements of this 
procedure involve the elaboration of: 1) a Prior Justification Study (EPJ) that compiles 
all relevant technical and scientific biological and socioeconomic information needed to 
justify decree of the NPA, and 2) a Management program (MP), the main instruments 
used for planning, organizing, and coordinating management actions that are necessary 
for achieving the NPA’s objectives (which are often aided by the EPJ). MPs are 
technically required to be published a year after the NPA’s decree and evaluated every 
five years, though this does not often occur in practice for multiple reasons as evidenced 
by the case studies presented here. The LGEEPA also provides a scheme of different 
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zonation possibilities for each NPA, including no-take areas (called Core zones) with the 
highest levels of protection by prohibiting harvest of its resources. Core zones can be surrounded 
by buffer zones where harvesting is allowed with certain restrictions on gear, season, or 
preferential fishing rights to nearby communities (as established within the NPA’s MP).  
There are several different categories of NPAs, though only four of these have 
been implemented within the marine territory of the GOC and only two of these are 
explored in the case studies presented here: Biosphere reserves (RB) and National Parks 
(PN). The main difference between RB and PN is with respect to the buffer zones. 
Preferential harvesting access is given to fishers legally ascribed to communities adjacent 
(or near) a RB, but not in the case of PNs. Finally, NPAs fall under CONANP’s 
jurisdiction in terms of planning, designing, managing, and evaluating NPAs. However, 
enforcement for compliance with regulations within core zones falls under the 
jurisdiction of CONAPESCA (for fishing regulations, including no-take), PROFEPA, and 
SEMAR (at the request of CONANP’s park rangers or PROFEPA). 
The implementation of FRZs was initially suggested within the LGPAS in 2007, 
but it did not become formalized until 2014 (DOF 2014) (the case study FRZ-San Cosme 
illustrates the process that lead to their recognition). FRZs are administered by 
CONAPESCA as “areas within federal jurisdiction established with the main purpose of 
conserving and contributing, either naturally or artificially, to the development of the 
fishery resources within it...as well as preserving and protecting their surrounding 
environment” (LGPAS, Art. 4) (DOF 2007). FRZs can be established wherever there is a 
desire to support the development of fishery resources, including within NPAs (in which 
case the regulations from LGEEPA and LGVS also apply). FRZs can have four different 
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types of zonation schemes, which indicate whether a specific area is totally closed to 
fishing (NTA) or partially (restricted fishing), as well as whether the closure is temporal 
(pre-defined) or permanent (until new amendments). CONAPESCA, with technical 
support from INAPESCA, can establish FRZs via the procedure shown in Figure 2C in 
Appendix C.  
CONAPESCA, with support from INAPESCA, can also establish seasonal and 
spatial closures forbidding fishing activities for a specified period of time or in a specific 
zone, per species, geographical, temporal, or permanent zones, and with the purpose of 
safeguarding a particular species reproduction and recruitment processes (and in 
accordance to established official bylaws) (DOF 2007). However, there are no specific 
procedures or mechanisms for how they are determined or modified. Although species-
specific seasonal closures have been established in the GOC, no official spatial closure of 
the NTA-type have been implemented by CONAPESCA besides FRZs, yet have great 
potential for the establishment of NTAs (CEMDA and COBI 2010). 
Refuge Areas to Protect Aquatic Species (ARPEAs) seek the protection and 
conservation of native wildlife marine species (e.g. sea turtles, marine mammals, and 
endangered, threatened, or special protection species), as well as their habitats within 
federal jurisdiction (DOF 2000b). These areas fall under the jurisdiction of the General 
Division of Wildlife (DGVS) both for their implementation and subsequent management 
(Koch 2015). In case of overlap with a NPA, the ARPEA’s protection program should be 
compatible with the NPA’s general objectives and there should be coordination between 
CONANP and DGVS. The case study of RB-AGCDRC illustrates the use of this 
instrument and its consequences.  
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Voluntary Marine Reserves are areas with no legal backing within the Mexican 
environmental or fisheries legislation, and are thus subject to being managed by the fisher 
communities seeking their establishment. These areas are typically established via 
community agreements and maintained by particular fisher groups, cooperatives, or with 
the help of local non-profit organizations working in the area. Although not explicitly 
studied in this chapter, there have been cases within the GOC, as well as in the Mexican 
Pacific Northern coast, where fishers within a fishing cooperative who hold fishing 
concessions (i.e. exclusive fishing rights for a particular resource within a legally 
specified polygon and administered by CONAPESCA) become organized to design a 
Voluntary Marine Reserve within the polygons of their concession area, and to set it aside 
as a NTA for a period of time they themselves specify. In these cases, fishers from 
outside the cooperative (and not concession holders) can enter the area to fish other 
resources but not the resource specified in the concession. In this way, some concession 
areas can become voluntary marine reserves for specific species that are formalized 
through community agreements and operationalized by the concession holders 
themselves as NTAs (as illustrated in Figure 3). Some examples of these Voluntary 
Marine Reserves include the cases of El Rosario, Isla Magdalena, and Isla Natividad 
(Micheli et al. 2012, McCay et al. 2014). 
2.3  Governance mismatches and delayed feedbacks 
Understanding how individual components of a NTA-CIS system contribute to 
the NTA’s effectiveness in both implementation and subsequent performance requires a 
diagnosis of the different types of infrastructures and action situations interplay during 
the different processes. In practice, the CIS framework is particularly helpful for 
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understanding how these different components interact, what feedbacks are being 
generated, and how we can address changes needed to obtain effective outcomes. I 
present the results of a NTA-CIS analysis for all seven cases to illustrate key differences 
in four individual case studies (Figures 2.4 - 2.7).  
2.3.1   Action situations influencing PI provision for NTA design and 
implementation 
Across all case studies, complying with specific international agreements (e.g. 
CBD) was not a perceived as a motivation behind the implementation of NTAs within the 
Mexican context. Although ratified, many of these international treaties did not become 
officially part of the Mexican environmental legislation until 2013. Motivations for NTA 
implementation have historically arisen from the PIP sectors of federal government 
management agencies. Therefore, action situations taking place for the provision of 
guidelines and procedures of NTA establishment (i.e. in link 3) by organized PIP groups 
are extremely important for effective design and implementation. 
In 1999 there was a push to increase protection to marine areas adjacent to islands 
of the GOC formally decreed as part of the Área de Protección de Flora y Fauna Islas 
Golfo de California (Wildlife Protection Area-Islands of the Gulf of California, APFF-
IGC) (originally decreed in 1978 (DOF 1978) and later re-categorized as Wildlife 
Protection Area in 2000 (DOF 2000a)). The goal of these efforts was to extend the 
existing terrestrial conservation of the islands to their adjacent marine areas, thus 
achieving integral management of both terrestrial and marine ecosystems (CONANP-
SEMARNAT 2007). Three main priority areas within the APFF-IGC were identified for 
their biological importance and feasibility for implementation of new marine NPAs. 
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These prioritizations led to the implementation of RB-ISPM (Figure 2.4), PN-AES, and 
the National Park Archipelago de San Lorenzo (not included in this study).  
 
 
Figure 2.4. NTA-CIS for the Biosphere Reserve Isla San Pedro Mártir (RB-ISPM). BKI 
= Bahía de Kino; COBI = Comunidad y Biodiversidad.  
 
In the most recent case presented here (ZRP-San Cosme), experts believe there 
was interest from non-profit organizations (e.g. NIPARAJA, COBI, FUNDEA) and 
federal management government agencies (e.g. CONAPESCA) to implement a new legal 
instrument for NTAs (FRZs) incorporated into LGPAS, and to produce a model where it 
could be tested for fisheries management (Figure 2.5). The presence of non-profit 
organizations working in the southern Baja California Sur region of the GOC (i.e. 
NIPARAJA doing community work in search for incentives to align conservation of reef 
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areas with local fisher interests) led to its selection as a pilot project to implement the 
newer fishing regulations stated within the LGPAS in the form of a network of eleven 
FRZs that were heavily RU-inclusive (Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014). More importantly, 
it fueled the subsequent development of new SHMI in the form of an official bylaw 
detailing the legal standards, procedure, and guidelines for the implementation of future 
FRZs (DOF 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2.5. NTA-CIS for the Fishing Refuge Zone Corredor San Cosme-Punta Coyote 
(FRZ-San Cosme).   
 
The RB-AGCDRC (Figure 2.6) is one of the oldest examples of NPA (and NTA) 
implementations in the GOC (CONANP-SEMARNAT 1995), but also one with the most 
recent and rushed additions (i.e. the 2005 decree of an ARPEA area for the vaquita 
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recovery (DOF 2005), and the 2015 decree of a Temporal Exclusion Gillnet Zone 
(TEGZ) banning all gillnets for two years starting in 2015 (DOF 2015)). In this case 
study, three SHMIs have been decreed under clear official regulations but not properly 
implemented (rendering them highly ineffective) (Cisneros-Montemayor and Vincent 
2016). Most of the motivation for these initiatives has come from the pressing concern 
for the endemic, critically endangered porpoise species: the vaquita (Phocoena sinus), 
currently estimated at populations below 100 individuals (CIRVA-5 2014). This case 
represents the strong shortcomings of PI implementation exclusively under the flagship 
species vision without considering the consequences for important fisheries sector 
operating in the region. A sole focus on charismatic species protection is perceived as 
distracting focus from the serious problem of illegal fishing and impunity (either through 
NTA non-compliance or gear regulations), “when in reality the vaquita decline is only a 
symptom of the larger problem” (pers. comm.). Furthermore, the short temporal nature of 
TEGZ has created the expectation among the fishers two years will determine whether 
gillnets are indeed causing vaquita declines. As recognized by the International 
Committee for the Recovery of the Vaquita (CIRVA), it is unreasonable that it can 
recover within such a short time frame. 
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Figure 2.6. NTA-CIS for the Biosphere Reserve Alto Golfo de California y Delta Río 
Colorado (RB-AGCDRC).  
 
Finally, the process of publishing a MP for a NPA to become formally operational 
is considered a bottleneck for all NPAs in Mexico for two main reasons: 1) massive 
amount of information required and effort to collect it, and 2) long bureaucratic 
procedure for its publication once the final document is ready for revisions. Even when 
most of the work to collect all the necessary information has been done during the 
elaboration of the EPJ, delays almost always occur. In the case of the RB-ISPM, the 
MPA was published almost ten years after the NPA was decreed (CONANP-
SEMARNAT 2007). The process can easily get delayed during the multiple revision 
stages when it is subject to different interpretations by CONANP’s federal authorities, as 
well as when political changes within the federal organizations re-start the revision 
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process (Figure 1C in Appendix C). Similarly, the process to implement FRZs (Figure 2C 
in Appendix C) in the case of FRZ-San Cosme also had significant delays (e.g. efforts 
formally began in 2007, but it was not until 2012 when the FRZs were formally decreed) 
(a delay in link 3), and this was perceived to require further re-convincing for approval 
from local fishers to demonstrate their support for the initiative (leading to more work 
required to strengthen link 6).  
Experts also perceive a general lack of public infrastructure provision (link 3) 
from reduced government agency staff and massive amount of work they are given 
responsibility of, which undermines their capacity to continuously monitor existing 
infrastructure and follow-through with on-going programs. The non-profit sector is 
perceived as more limited from a financial standpoint since the projects they carry out 
often depend on external funding. 
2.3.2   The role of Human and Natural Infrastructures 
Full incorporation of human capacity and local knowledge into the design and 
implementation processes of NTAs was not the norm back in the early 1990s when NTAs 
were beginning to be implemented in Mexico. Their design process rested solely on 
academics and the federal government without needing to include local representatives 
throughout the process. As evidenced by the most recent case studies presented here, 
there is an increasing trend towards heavily incorporating local RUs into the 
implementation processes. PIPs from government and non-profit sectors have begun to 
recognize the strong value of community involvement practices to achieve successful 
outcomes. In cases like RB-AGCDRC, these lessons have not been fully applied. All 
three processes in this case study were carried out solely by the federal government and 
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without a RU involvement, except maybe for negotiating a compensation scheme to 
subsidize affected fishers by the vaquita ARPEA and the TEGZ. 
Local knowledge played an important role in six cases for the co-production of 
information required for the elaboration of various pieces of SHMI, sometimes prior to 
implementation for compilation of the EPJ (e.g. RB-ISPM, FRZ-San Cosme, PN-AES) 
and others after implementation for revisions to the MP or the zonation scheme (e.g. PN-
CP). In the case of RB-AGCDRC, local knowledge was not incorporated at all since there 
were no efforts to involve the RUs. Strong leadership from either RUs (e.g. PN-CP, FRZ-
CB, RB-BACBS) or PIPs (e.g. RB-ISPM, FRZ-San Cosme, PN-AES, RB-BACBS) has 
also played a pivotal role in pushing the implementation of NTA efforts. Non-profit 
organizations like NIPARAJA, COBI, and PRONATURA are among the most important 
PIPs mentioned by experts, in some cases with strong positive collaborative schemes 
with CONANP. An excellent example of PI provision from the non-profit sector is in the 
case of RB-BACBS in which PRONATURA sought to build a heritage fund for the 
operation of the NPA through the Mexican Fund for Nature Conservation (FMCN). This 
fund provided an annual sum of money to aid in the costs of operation for the park, but it 
was initially managed by PRONATURA until the NPA and the management plan were 
officially decreed. PRONATURA managed the funds from 2009 until 2012 when 
CONANP begins to control it after the management plan was published. 
Not surprisingly, trade-offs often have to be carefully balanced between 
proposing NTA designs that strictly align scientific data indicating potential population 
recovery and spillover effects to adjacent areas (strengthening link 5), and implementing 
NTAs through a community-supported participative process that empowers local fishers 
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and allows them to become stewards of their environment (strengthening link 6). In two 
case studies (e.g. FRZ-San Cosme & FRZ-CB), non-profit organizations had to prioritize 
allowing local fishers to actively participate and dictate most of the design for the 
proposed NTAs (avoiding highly conflicting areas for fishers) over heavily modifying the 
designs to suit biophysical and ecological conditions (backed by technical and scientific 
information).  
For example, Aburto-Oropeza et al. (2015)  identified two types of rocky reefs in 
the San Cosme-Punta Coyote Corridor that differ in terms of how much biomass they are 
likely to harbor. Reefs of complex geomorphology are characterized for being more 
oceanographically dynamic with more rocky topography, which is associated to high 
production of certain species (e.g. 50-300 groupers annually). Simple geomorphology 
reefs have less rocky topography, are less oceanographically dynamic, and are associated 
with producing much smaller biomasses (e.g. ~2 groupers annually). However, these 
distinctions were not fully taken into consideration for the design of the FRZ network, 
which may eventually have an impact for achieving significant fisheries recovery through 
spillover. Complex geomorphology reefs being potentially targeted by fishers because of 
better catches means they were likely avoided in the network proposal to avoid conflict 
with fishing activities. Some FRZs were also designed to be too small to provide 
significant benefits from a biological perspective. 
In a few cases, NTAs placed near the vicinity of clear, identifiable geophysical or 
geographical features (e.g. RB-ISPM, PN-CP, RB-BACBS, FRZ-CB, FRZ-San Cosme) 
is considered useful for increasing awareness of the location of NTAs among RUs, 
though not essential for preventing non-compliance. In ZRP-San Cosme, a lot of the 
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selected sites are located near the communities so they could also be more easily 
monitored.  
2.3.3   Motivations behind support for NTAs and the results of capacity-
building 
The motivations for fishers to support NTA implementation have varied among all case 
studies, but is strongly tied to the strengthening of link 6 in almost all cases. Not 
surprisingly, strong motivation enabling fisher support is the prospect of improving their 
livelihoods by switching the economic activity they traditionally practiced for new, 
tangible income-earning opportunities. In the case of PN-CP (Figure 7), a handful of 
local fishers recognized the value of the biophysical and ecological characteristics of the 
marine area adjacent to the village of Cabo Pulmo, and saw the potential for the 
development of an important local eco-tourism sector (e.g. scuba-diving, snorkeling, 
guided tours) that they themselves could manage. Furthermore, the looming threat of the 
establishment of large-scale tourism development corporations (e.g. Cabo Dorado and 
Cabo Cortez) further incentivized fishers to unite and become educated in the business of 
eco-tourism service provision. However, fishing activities were not too prevalent in Cabo 
Pulmo before the park was decreed, thus the MP is designed with fishing buffer zones 
that get very little use from fishing. Non-compliance arises mainly in the form of eco-
tourism operators allowing more scuba divers into the park than what is allowed, 
something the park’s administration is actively trying to resolve.  
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Figure 2.7. NTA-CIS of the National Park of Cabo Pulmo (PN-CP). 
 
Similarly, fishers of Bahía de Kino were not overly concerned with the 
implementation of the NTA because it was being planned in areas they did not consider 
essential to their fishing activity and was instead considered the “insurance area” (i.e. 
where they could go fish when harvesting was low elsewhere in their usual fishing 
grounds). Furthermore, the long distance (61 km) between Bahia de Kino and RB-ISPM 
makes it too far and to costly (both in terms of gas money and risk of traveling far by 
PANGA) for the average local fisher since they need good equipment resources to fish 
there profitably. Other fisher motivations for supporting NTAs are related to retaining 
exclusive fishing rights in the buffer zones of the NPAs of the RB category (a condition 
that does not apply with PNs) (e.g. RB-ISPM, RB-BACBS, RB-AGCDRC). However, 
this benefit also only applies to those fishers who are legally recognized as holding 
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fishing permits or as part of a registered cooperative with fishing permits, which often 
means a large number of fishers operating independently cannot enjoy these benefits. 
Capacity-building efforts stemming from programs established by PIPs have 
dramatically increased RU participation in NTA processes, increased awareness of NTA 
importance and objectives, and led to stronger communication between fishers, locals, 
and PIPs. The joint efforts from CONANP (through PROCODES programs) and non-
profit organization Comunidad y Biodiversidad A.C. (COBI) to implement capacity-
building programs for development of various skills and competences (HI, biological 
monitoring training, leadership skills, promotion of management efforts, education, 
health, risk management, restoration programs, etc.) were heavily praised in the case of 
RB-ISPM. Through these programs, community members and fishers of Bahia de Kino 
have been able to diversify some of their economic activities. These projects are funded 
yearly by the federal government, and besides providing an additional source of income 
to the community, “they provide social benefits for increasing well-being through 
community growth, self-esteem, and stewardship” (pers. comm.). Similar efforts 
strengthening capacity-building of RUs have been recognized in the cases of PN-CP 
(post-decree), and in other places where there is still a need for fishing cooperative 
organization skills (e.g. FRZ-San Cosme). These efforts are usually led by non-profit 
organizations acting as bridge organizations between the local RUs and the PIPs in 
charge of elaborating or modifying PI, though this seems be a more recent event (i.e. after 
2000).  
 
  56 
Some of these programs have even led to new entrepreneurial opportunities for 
local fishers. In 2007, a consortium of academic institutions and non-profit organizations 
(PANGAS) supported the organization of a group of diver-monitors composed of local 
commercial fishers belonging to a fisher cooperative from Bahia de Kino to carry out 
biological monitoring of the rocky reefs in the northern GOC as well as within existing 
NPAs. They are recognized for being the first fishing cooperative in Mexico to provide 
professional monitoring services and earning an additional 10 - 20% of their annual 
income from providing their services (Munguia-Vega et al. 2015). The operation of these 
types of efforts, however, is hindered by the need to continue maintaining these efforts, 
providing both HHMI and SHMI to follow through community projects until they 
become self-sustaining.  
2.3.4   Enforcement and community-compliance-monitoring 
Weak enforcement capabilities have been frequently identified within marine 
resource governance in the GOC (Rife et al. 2013, Cinti et al. 2014, Cisneros-
Montemayor and Vincent 2016). With regards to NTAs, CONANP officials and park 
rangers not having legal authority to ask for fishing permits or take enforcement action 
towards non-compliers (i.e. they need to be there with someone from PROFEPA, 
SEMAR, or CONAPESCA's fisheries inspector) is considered an important complication 
for monitoring NTA compliance. 
In some case studies (e.g. RB-ISPM, RB-BACBS), multiple efforts had been 
made to supplement enforcement capabilities by introducing community compliance 
monitoring programs. CONANP supports such groups called PROVICOM (Programa de 
Vigilancia Comunitaria) by providing subsidies for participation. Up until recently, RB-
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BACBS has had a PROVICOM group of ten people aiding in monitoring for compliance. 
In cases where NTA is geographically isolated from nearby ports (e.g RB-ISPM), and in 
conjunction with continued illegal activities which are more likely to occur widespread 
throughout the GOC (e.g. illegal fishing practices in general, drug trafficking-related 
activities) experts point out potential serious and undesirable risks to civilians attempting 
to report non-compliance.  
As noted earlier, the case of PN-CP shows how fishers can become motivated to 
support NTA initiatives once they see clear benefits of the alternative livelihoods they 
have access to. This process was particularly accelerated by strong leadership from the 
original supporters of the initiative who convinced the rest of the community that 
everyone could benefit from transitioning from fishing to eco-tourism service provision 
(a strong feedback generated by link 6). As a result of this feedback, community 
members themselves also took on the task of monitoring for compliance with park 
regulations (including no-take), and sometimes adopting social shaming attitudes even 
before the park had formal management on site (thus strengthening link 5). Nowadays, 
practically any local or tourism service operator who observes non-compliance behavior 
within PN-CP from others will take notice of the offense, take pictures, and report it with 
PROFEPA (pers. comm.). 
Unofficial fishing norms among fishers in various communities appear highly 
effective given clear incentives and tangible outcomes that are directly perceived by 
fishers (e.g. PN-CP, RB-AGCDRC). These norms often become part of the community’s 
culture and facilitate conflict resolution, but they can also damage trust relationships if 
such agreements are not respected. However, there are cases in which these norms are 
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selectively applied and guided by social ties (e.g. FRZ-San Cosme with respect to friends 
and family members being sanctioned or misuse of fishing ears). 
On the other end of the spectrum, experts perceived a general decrease in social 
shaming attitudes from fishers in FRZ-San Cosme towards non-compliant individuals. 
This phenomenon seems to be further exacerbated by a culture of apathy towards 
cooperation among all fishers to comply with no-take regulations, leading to continuous 
free-riding (i.e. as fishers observe others not complying, they worry less and less about 
complying themselves). Furthermore, people often rather avoid conflict (e.g. threats or 
aggressive behavior towards those who report). 
2.3.5   Hard infrastructure and information availability 
In almost every case study, lack of HHMI was identified as problematic towards 
addressing enforcement through compliance monitoring (e.g. lack of good patrolling 
vessels, resources to maintain them, gas money for patrolling trips, binoculars, 
infrastructure to follow up with non-compliance reports, etc.). In a couple of cases (PN-
CP and RB-BACBS), NPAs had no official management office on-site when the NPA 
became decreed and operational, nor staff. In the case of PN-CP, experts suggested the 
lack of a formal administrative office as a contributor to the delays for the publishing of 
the MP since there was no real pressure to finalize it if no one was on-site to effectively 
implement it (i.e. HHMI causing a delay effect on link 3 for the elaboration of important 
management guidelines). The provisioning of effective fishing technology HHMI was 
also identified as critical for addressing fishing threats to charismatic species in the case 
of RB-AGCDRC (a weakness in link 3). The lack of alternative fishing technologies that 
are as effective as the traditional gear does not incentivize fishers to stop using 
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destructive gear that leads to overexploitation (e.g. totoaba) or a threat to critically 
endangered species (e.g. vaquita) (i.e. fishers do not perceive clear incentives to modify 
their harvesting methods through link 1). Current prototypes for alternative fishing nets 
often require increased skills from fishers, and the slow progression of transition 
programs to increase their use (including technical studies demonstrating their success, 
expedition of fishing permits with new gear, training of fishers to use it), further 
exacerbates the problem (CIRVA-5 2014). 
Accessible information to RUs and other members of the community generally 
comes in the form of HHMI (e.g. pamphlets, signs, poster boards) and SHMI (e.g. social 
media, webpages or online platforms (Munguia-Vega et al. 2015)). However, continued 
meetings held with community members and social marketing campaigns (e.g. RB-
BACBS communication campaign and RB-ISPM’s pride campaigns via events, parades, 
wall-painting, t-shirts, talks on the beach, calendars, etc.) are perceived as important 
venues to transfer knowledge about existing NTAs (e.g. location, importance, 
restrictions, etc.).   
2.3.6   Other economic activities and exogenous drivers 
In almost every case study, experts recognize the problem of a large number of 
SSFs operating without legal fishing permits. These are known as “independent” fishers, 
and they are considered one of the most disadvantaged RU groups in cases where RB’s 
are implemented. Any exclusive fishing rights NPAs or FRZs can bring to the adjacent 
communities legally only applies to fishers registered under any sort of fishing permit. 
Furthermore, the participation of RUs in the processes of designing and implementing 
NTAs could be heavily biased towards legal fishers if independent fishers fear legal 
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sanctions. The lengthy and elaborated process of obtaining legal fishing permits from 
CONAPESCA (i.e. multiple requirements such as federal IDs, proof of gear purchases, 
and trips to large cities to process fishing permits) combined with unawareness of 
specific fisheries regulations by the fishers, contributes to this growing problem (Cinti et 
al. 2010a, Cinti et al. 2010b), which creates a negative feedback decreasing RU 
participation in NTA processes (link 6).  
Three major exogenous drivers were identified as having a considerable impact 
on the resource or NI components in several cases. First, climate change was pointed out 
as a pressing concern for concern for most NTA efforts in the GOC, and new efforts to 
improve existing NTAs and implementing new ones are beginning to take potential 
climate change effects into account (Morzaria-Luna 2016, Álvarez-Romero et al. in 
review). Increasing development of the Mexican tourism sector, partly fueled by the 
federal government’s promotion of the GOC as an important tourism attraction to further 
stimulate the tourism sector nationally and to encourage foreign investment for the 
development of tourism infrastructure has also added pressure to many ecosystems under 
NTA protection. For instance, the promotion of the PN-CP as a pristine, beautiful scuba-
diving site, and its subsequent growing popularity, has contributed to the increased 
pressure from eco-tourists visiting from all over the world, which often exceeds the 
park’s capacity and infrastructure to manage such pressure (especially given the lack of 
HHMI in the area). Finally, the presence of black markets such as that of the Totoaba 
species (Totoaba macdonaldi) continues to create conflicts in the case of RB-AGCDRC . 
Increased demand for the totoaba’s swim bladder comes mainly from Chinese markets 
due to their use for medicinal purposes, and it is believed that fishers may receive up to 
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$8,500 USD/kg for the totoaba bladders. This species is captured in large, anchored mesh 
gillnets that are set at night and left unattended for several days, and it is then illegally 
transported via the US-Mexico border (CIRVA-5 2014).   
2.4  Discussion 
Despite the efforts to implement and spotlight NTAs as strong fisheries 
management tools for the GOC in the last decade, NTAs in the region have had varying 
outcomes with respect to their implementation process and subsequent performance. In 
this chapter, I showed that a CIS-analysis of the social, institutional, and ecological 
contextual variables provides a powerful diagnostic tool to identify weak links and 
feedbacks in the different NTA systems of the GOC. In particular, I demonstrate the 
relevance of three key interactions that can severely impact the effectiveness of NTA 
implementation processes and performance outcomes.  
The first key interaction is associated with the provisioning of soft human-made 
infrastructure (through link 3) and the various ways in which collaboration and 
coordination schemes can effectively accelerate (or delay) the processes surrounding 
NTA implementation and swift operation. The role non-profit organizations play in 
creating spaces of dialogue, communication, and collaboration among different 
stakeholder groups has been crucial for various NTA systems of the GOC (and other 
fisheries management regulations (Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014)). Furthermore, 
coordination between the non-profit sector and the government environmental and 
fisheries authorities at the collective choice level also plays a key role in ensuring the 
provisioning of hard and soft human-made infrastructure has legal backing, thus 
providing clear regulations that can be implemented and followed at the operational level. 
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In some cases, this collaboration can even lead to positive outcomes at the constitutional 
choice level with the creation of new legal instruments for fisheries management (e.g. 
Fishing Refuge Zones). Effective infrastructure provisioning will certainly aid in the 
proper functioning of NTAs (a positive feedback influencing link 5) as regulators of 
fisher behavior towards resource exploitation (link 1).  
The second key interaction is associated with the feedbacks generated by effective 
provisioning (link 3) of hard human-made infrastructure (e.g. new fishing technologies 
for fishers in the Upper GOC) and mechanisms for transitioning to alternative livelihood 
strategies (e.g. eco-tourism service provision for fishers in Cabo Pulmo). Effective 
incentives for fishers to transform their harvesting activities (through link 1) strongly 
depend on the ability of public infrastructure providers to make these infrastructures 
directly available to the resource users (i.e. strong link 3) and on how resource users 
perceive potential costs and benefits (through link 6). If fishers perceive clear, tangible 
benefits to modify their modus operandi and adopt fishing strategies that reduce bycatch 
and/or are less harmful for the environment, or to transition into new ways to earn 
income, they are more likely to comply with NTA-type regulations.  
Finally, the relationship between the resource users and the different types of soft 
and hard human-made public infrastructures (link 6) is essential for enabling NTA-type 
fisheries management tools to effectively regulate the interaction between fishers and the 
resource they harvest (link 1). The results of multiple capacity-building programs, 
resource user participation schemes, and increased access to suitable and practical 
information with respect to fisheries and conservation management strategies clearly 
demonstrate a positive feedback for the co-production of knowledge and the development 
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of new soft human-made infrastructures in which resource users are heavily involved in. 
A strong link 6 can create mechanisms by which resource users feel empowered, become 
stewards of their environment, and even become public infrastructure providers. This 
process is facilitated by positive and collaborative relationships and occurring through 
link 2, but it subsequently affects the ability of public infrastructure providers to produce 
and maintain effective infrastructures (through link 3), as well as engaging in action 
situations at the collective choice level where decision-making affects the design and 
operation rules of NTAs.  
My results have broad implications for improving the efficacy of NTAs in the 
GOC by explicitly accounting for governance and socioeconomic objectives of in 
conjunction with biological objectives. First, capacity-building programs are essential to 
facilitate the incorporation of resource users and community members into diversified 
conservation, fisheries management, and economic activities that enable them to engage 
in alternative livelihoods and become stewards of their environment. Second, public 
infrastructure provision tradeoffs must be balanced between designing scientifically-
sound NTAs with the potential of effectively achieving population recovery objectives 
and allowing resource users to become co-producers of public infrastructure by fully 
incorporating their preferences into the design (at the risk of losing ecological 
effectiveness). Third, a strong and effective collaboration between environmental, 
fisheries, and other government authorities (e.g. social development authorities, 
municipal and state governments) is needed to ensure that NTA objectives becomes a 
clear, shared responsibility among all authority public infrastructure providers equally. 
Fourth, continued collaboration between non-profit organizations working in different 
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parts of the GOC and government conservation and fisheries management authorities are 
needed to coordinate efforts leading to the provisioning of SMHI. Finally, the academic 
sector has a strong role in providing useful information and data in a timely matter so that 
it becomes readily available for management efforts and NTA initiatives.  
While previous work has identified the need for adequate staff and budget as core 
criteria of effective MPAs at a global scale (Gill et al. 2017), my analysis highlights the 
importance of multiple infrastructures that can influence the dynamics of interacting 
action situations at various stages of NTA implementation and operation. Using a CIS 
lens to look at different components of the system in which NTAs are embedded aids to 
highlight the interdependencies between the different types of infrastructures and the 
multiple action situations that influence effective outcomes for NTAs. This type of 
analysis can be applied to any NTA-system in the world through the synthesis of 
qualitative and quantitative information depicting the multiple factors related to NTA 
implementation processes and performance outcomes. Furthermore, linked NTA-CISs 
can illustrate how different NTAs are contributing to overall performance outcomes at 
larger spatial and institutional scales. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDER PERCEPTIONS AND INSTITUTIONS FOR 
MARINE RESERVE EFFICACY IN THE MIDRIFF ISLANDS REGION, GULF OF 
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
3.1  Introduction 
The complex governance of marine resources exemplifies how ecological 
objectives for the conservation and protection of species and ecosystems can conflict with 
social, economic, and political objectives for maximum employment yield, economic 
efficiency, and livelihood support in small communities. Marine protected areas (MPAs), 
specifically no-take areas (NTAs) where all extractive uses are prohibited, are now 
widely-used to promote sustainable fisheries and protect marine biodiversity (Fraschetti 
et al. 2011). However, NTAs have met various levels of success on different countries 
and under different governance and institutional contexts. In many cases, harvest 
practices often do not adhere to the formal laws established, especially in developing 
countries with high levels of poverty and low enforcement capacities. Consequently, 
many NTAs become “paper parks” that fail to provide ecological and social benefits. 
NTAs regulate people directly by restricting their access to designated areas of 
no-harvesting (Fujitani et al. 2012). Failure to include local communities in the design 
and implementation of NTA management regulations as well as the resource users’ 
response to NTA establishment is a common oversight in the design processes of an 
NTA. Moreover, when these groups are included into the planning process, they are often 
treated as a homogenous group with respect to their views and actions, which can lead to 
a partial capture of information that can instigate resistance to implementation and 
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subsequent conflict (Ferse et al. 2010). Nonetheless, stakeholder involvement from the 
start is essential to foster long-term interest in NTAs (Lundquist and Granek 2005).  
Establishing NTAs without consideration of the institutional, social, economic, 
and political context and governance structure of the region where NTAs are being 
implemented can be a risky investment for appropriately managing marine resources as it 
can undermine its objectives and give a false sense of security that such areas will be 
enough to sustain marine resources (Fujitani et al. 2012, Rife et al. 2013). Moreover, the 
likelihood that through these efforts MPAs can contribute to providing benefits to local 
communities can also be compromised. Such “paper parks”, in which established NTAs 
fail to effectively restrict access and exploitation, do not contribute to the recovery of the 
protected resource (White and Courtney 2004, Rife et al. 2013). Furthermore, there is 
concern for indiscriminating support of NTA establishment despite the existing 
knowledge gaps in both the ecological and socioeconomic aspects of their design, which 
can raise unattainable expectations, lead to a neglect of other effective techniques for 
fisheries management, and allow inefficient financial expenses on reserve creation and 
maintenance (Hilborn et al. 2004, Sale et al. 2005).  
While there have been efforts to include socioeconomic and governance 
considerations into the planning and establishment of NTAs around the world in the last 
decade (Pollnac et al. 2010, Jones 2014), it is not yet clear what governance structures 
allow or contribute to the success of NTAs. Even though the social and economic 
benefits of NTAs have been recognized to improve community well-being via increased 
income from fisheries or tourism, there is a lack of research on governance structures 
allowing successful implementation of NTAs and how and when the benefits from NTA 
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establishment flow back towards the fishing communities (Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, little work has been done on the application of a systematic analysis that 
considers both the biology of the marine resources and the economic conditions in which 
the management strategies are being applied, as well as the governance and institutional 
contexts together.  
The design and implementation strategies for a NTA system are likely to be more 
successful when including the ecological, cultural, institutional, and socioeconomic 
characteristics and operating conditions of the system as a whole. Understanding these 
characteristics and operating conditions calls for a more holistic view of the process 
through which NTAs are socially perceived, legitimately implemented, and locally 
accepted by the actors within the Social-Ecological System (SES). In this chapter, we 
explore the application of the Coupled-Infrastructure Systems (CIS) framework 
(Anderies 2015) to a regional case study in the Gulf of California (GOC) in Mexico, to 
describe some of the common issues that might lead to the problem of NTA paper parks 
from a governance perspective and we identify where key institutional interactions of the 
SES are weak and require most attention to improve the effectiveness of existing and 
future NTA systems. These interactions are extremely important if we think of the set of 
attributes that affect the preferences, information, strategies, and actions of the natural 
resource users (Poteete et al. 2010).  
In addition to providing lessons on how the performance of formal NTAs within 
the Mexican context could be improved from a governance perspective, this chapter also 
addresses the question of whether the perceptions from the different stakeholders with 
regards to NTAs matches the expectations of what NTAs are expected to achieve in the 
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GOC, and whether certain strategies for NTA implementation and management are 
effective for achieving those expectations. There have been multiple studies of 
governance of marine resources by fishing communities in the GOC (Cudney-Bueno et 
al. 2009, Cinti et al. 2010a, Basurto et al. 2012, Cinti et al. 2014), yet none have 
addressed the problems that specific tools like NTAs face at local and regional scales.  
3.2  Materials and methods 
An understanding of the importance of institutions (i.e., rules, norms, and 
strategies that humans use to dictate their interactions) to engage in collective action and 
avoid resource overexploitation (Becker and Ostrom 1995, Basurto and Coleman 2010), 
as well as the infrastructure through which humans act on the environment (Anderies 
2015) is essential to effective resource management. We explore NTAs as a fisheries 
management tool within the context of the Coupled-Infrastructure-Systems (CIS) 
framework, where NTAs are a policy instrument (i.e. a piece of public infrastructure) 
within a SES, to describe how resource harvesters respond to NTA-type instruments and 
how this response is influenced by the interactions between the biophysical elements of 
the resource system or natural infrastructure (e.g. the habitats and food webs producing 
fish), the human-made “hard” infrastructure (e.g. private infrastructure such as the boats 
and fishing gear for harvesting, public infrastructure such as boats for patrolling NTAs), 
and the “soft” infrastructure (e.g. the human knowledge on where to fish or NTA 
boundaries) (Anderies 2015).   
The CIS framework aims to understand the broad structure of the components of a 
SES, their connections, and how their interactions affect the SES’s long-term robustness 
(i.e. it’s ability to cope with uncertainty and disturbances from both inside and outside of 
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the system) from an institutional perspective, which enables it to handle environmental, 
social, political, and economic shocks (Anderies et al. 2004, Anderies and Janssen 2013). 
The CIS framework is an extension of the Institutional and Development Framework 
(IAD), which was developed by Ostrom (1990) as a way of understanding the process of 
policy-making through a systematic approach for analyzing institutions governing action 
as well as the outcomes of arrangements of collective action. The IAD framework is 
designed as a conceptual map that identifies a common set of structural variables that are 
present but variable in different types of institutional arrangement (Ostrom 2011), but 
which can be extremely useful when evaluating the role of institutions in shaping 
decision-making processes and social interactions. The CIS framework highlights the 
dynamic interactions between the exogenous variables identified in the IAD framework 
(i.e. the biophysical context, the actors, and the rules in use) and emphasizes the 
interactions between the operational and collective-choice levels of an SES over time 
(Anderies et al. 2004). 
Assessing the problem of paper park NTAs through the lens of the CIS 
framework allows us to dissect the components and their interactions within a SES 
affected by the presence of a NTA, identify weaknesses, and understand what 
components or interactions need improvement to achieve NTA effectiveness within a 
particular SES. Figure 1 shows a description of each of the components of the CIS 
framework using a hypothetical example of a NTA system within the Mexican context 
(Figure 3.1). 
  75 
 
Figure 3.1. Coupled Infrastructure Systems (CIS) Framework depicted with a 
NTA system in Mexico. The arrows depict the different links between the components of 
the system (the numbers serve identification purposes only). SSF = Small-scale fishers, 
IFS = Industrial fishers, RF = Recreational fishers, LGPAS = General Law of Sustainable 
Fishing and Aquaculture, LGEEPA = General Law of Ecological Balance and 
Environmental Protection, CONANP = National Commission of Natural Protected Areas, 
CONAPESCA = National Fisheries and Aquaculture Commission, INAPESCA = 
National Fisheries Institute, SEMAR = Mexican Navy, PROFEPA = Federal Agency for 
the Protection of the Environment, CSOs = Civil society organizations, FDNs = 
Foundations, IsHM = soft infrastructure, pvIhHM = private hard human-made infrastructure. 
Adapted from Anderies et al. (2004), Anderies (2015). 
 
Using a multi-method approach including document analysis and structured 
interviews with relevant stakeholders, we apply the Coupled-Infrastructure Systems (CIS) 
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framework to a regional case study of three NTAs in the MIR in the GOC to explore and 
identify potentially relevant variables and interactions to address NTA efficacy within the 
GOC context. We obtained information on formally established NTAs and the current 
legislation regulating their establishment and operation in Mexico by examining legal 
documents and reports elaborated by various federal institutions and Civil Society 
Organizations (CSOs). Legal documents included environmental and fisheries legislation, 
and official information (e.g. presidential decrees for national protected areas, 
management programs). The information obtained from the empirical study on 
stakeholder perceptions through structured interviews was used to further support the CIS 
framework analysis and provide more specific insights into where the main barriers to 
NTA efficacy lie from an institutional perspective.  
3.2.1   Study area 
Our study area is the MIR within the GOC, Mexico, which is well known for its 
high levels of biodiversity and productivity in terms of fisheries. The region has been 
identified as a priority conservation site in Mexico (CONABIO et al. 2007), with 
29,898.01 km2 of territory including 45 islands and islets, which include two of the 
largest islands in the country: Isla Tiburón (1,224 km2) and Isla Ángel de la Guarda (936 
km2). The MIR is well known for its diversity of habitats, which include rocky reef 
systems, sargassum forests, rhodolith beds, sand and rocky bottoms, seagrass beds, 
mangrove forests, and on to a smaller extent sandy beaches and estuaries along the coast. 
The region has also been recognized for its importance to both small-scale (artisanal) 
fishing (SSF) and large-scale (industrial) fishing (IFS) (e.g. sardine fishing). Recreational 
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fishers also visit the region frequently, predominantly from the United States and Canada 
(Fujitani et al. 2012). Most of the SSF activities in the region occur in the rocky reef 
ecosystems, which are predominantly found all over the coasts of the states of Baja 
California and Sonora as well as around the islands and islets. There are eight SSF 
communities in the region, three in the state of Baja California (Bahía de los Ángeles, 
San Francisquito/El Barril, and San Luis Gonzaga) and five in the state of Sonora (Puerto 
Libertad, Bahía de Kino, Puerto Lobos, Punta Chueca, and Desemboque de los Seris). 
Punta Chueca and Desemboque de los Seris are the only two communities in the MIR 
that are home to the group of indigenous people called the Comcaac (Seri), who possess 
exclusive fishing rights over the use of natural resources on the 91,000 ha of coastal area 
as well as the coastal waters off Isla Tiburón (including the strip of water known as Canal 
del Infiernillo), granted by presidential decree in 1975 (Carvajal et al. 2010). 
3.2.2   Stakeholder perceptions 
To better understand the dynamics of the NTA system at a local scale, we carried 
out an empirical study on stakeholder perceptions towards the use of NTAs for 
conservation of biodiversity and management of fisheries in three local communities in 
the MIR. Between the months of October 2014 and March 2015, we conducted structured 
interviews based on previously identified potential caveats within the NTA systems, 
according to the CIS framework.  Interviews were implemented for three local 
communities in the GOC: the Sonoran communities of Puerto Libertad (pop. 2,782) and 
Bahía de Kino (pop. 6,050), and the village of Bahía de los Ángeles in Baja California 
(pop. 800) (INEGI 2010). A total of 184 interviews were carried out to members of the 
most relevant stakeholder groups in the Midriff Islands Region (Table 3.1) from two key 
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actor group categories: 1) Direct Resource Users (RUs), which included SSF and IFS 
who are active, retired, registered, independent (non-registered), permit holders, and 
representatives of fishing cooperatives, as well as members of the general community 
(GC) whose source of income is to a lesser extent linked to fishing activities (e.g. catch 
processing, gear mending); and 2) Public Infrastructure Providers (PIPs), which 
included representatives from fisheries management (GFA) and environmental agencies 
(GCA) as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) and foundations (FDNs) that 
frequently sponsor research and conservation programs in the region. A pilot study was 
implemented in Bahía de Kino in July 2014 with representatives from the general 
communities, conservation agencies, and SSF to test and adapt the interview process. 
 
Table 3.1. Respondents from two key actor groups for the interview process.  
Stakeholder Group n 
Public Infrastructure Providers (PIPs) 48 
Conservation agencies (GCA) 19 
Fisheries agencies (GFA) 13 
Civil Society Organizations (CSO) 8 
Foundations (FDN) 8 
Direct Resource Users (RUs) 136 
Small-scale-fishers (SSF) 124 
Industrial fishers (IFS) 4 
General community (GC) 8 
 
Data from interviews were used to characterize stakeholder perceptions about 
NTAs, including the level of understanding and support for NTAs among the key actor 
groups, and how this support vary among these groups. The structured interviews 
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included: demographic information about respondents (age, sex, place of birth); 
employment (for RUs: history of fishing, method of fishing, species targeted, alternative 
livelihood options or sources of income); organization (membership in formal or informal 
groups, and attendance to capacity-building workshops related to NTAs); and perceptions 
on current state and threats for biodiversity and fisheries management, benefits from 
NTAs, compliance with NTA regulations, and the process and performance of existing 
tools for NTAs in Mexico and their regulations. Out of the 136 RU respondents, 46 
belonged to a given conservation or capacity-building working group (e.g. community 
biological monitoring teams, fishing committees, and regulation monitoring groups). 
Fifty-five RU respondents had also been involved in recent capacity-building workshops 
with respect to NTAs, how they work, and what has been learned through the use of 
NTAs for both biodiversity and fisheries management in Mexico and around the world. 
We assessed perceptions through open-ended questions and statements with a five-point 
Likert scale (strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree).  
RUs were on average 40 years of age (17 – 70 age range) employed in the 
fisheries sector an average of 22 years (up to 58 years) of and a male/female ratio of 33:1. 
PIPs were on average 45 years of age (25 – 71 age range) in their respective 
employments as members of environmental or fisheries management agencies an average 
of 15 years (up to 40 years) of and a male/female ratio of 2:1.  
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3.3  Results 
3.3.1   No-take areas through the lens of the Coupled-Infrastructure-
Systems Framework 
In using the CIS framework to evaluate a SES affected by the presence of a NTA, 
the framework includes four components, including two sets of actors (RUs and PIPs; 
circles) and two sets of infrastructure (natural and public; rectangles) (Figure 3.1). Within 
the actors, the RUs include SSF, IFS, recreational fishers (although not included in this 
study) individuals involved in fish processing and other fishery-related activities on land, 
community members as consumers (GC), indigenous groups living in the region nearby 
the NTAs, and tourists. SSF are the most important source of income for the majority of 
inhabitants of the coastal communities in the region (Ulloa et al. 2007), and multiple 
communities converge on their fishing activities year-round, mainly around the MIR 
(Moreno-Báez et al. 2012). Due to its strategic geographic position as a close access point 
to the sea for U.S. residents from Arizona, California, and other southwestern states, 
recreational activities are common among foreign recreational angler fishers. Many of 
these RFs become semi-permanent residents in the region, particularly in towns like 
Puerto Peñasco and Bahía de Kino (Fujitani et al. 2012). The Comcaac, who live in 
villages on the state of Sonora, hold exclusive fishing rights of some of the coastal 
territory in the Sonoran coast as well as in Isla Tiburón (Basurto et al. 2000, Basurto et al. 
2012). 
In terms of private hard human-made infrastructure (pvIhHM), SSF work with 
hand-operated gear such as gill nets, diving, hook and line, hand fishing line, traps, and 
longlines, that they use in small 6-8m long small skiffs (pangas) made of fiberglass with 
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outboard gasoline motors (55 – 150 hp). IFS operate on diesel-run industrial vessels of 
~150 metric ton capacity that can operate more mechanized gear such as purse seine nets, 
trawl nets (paired, bottom, and midwater), long lines, and gill nets (Cisneros-Mata 2010). 
In the northern GOC, including the MIR, some communities are known for having the 
capacity to travel long distances to reach their fishing grounds (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012). 
For instance, fishers of Bahía de Kino have been reported to travel the farthest within the 
MIR, with travel distances between 180 and 200 km for certain species caught via dive 
fishing, gill nets, and longline fishing, whereas near shore fishing grounds reach up to 60 
km from the shore for trap crab fishing (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012). Bahía de Kino is also 
the oldest fishing town in the northern GOC, operating since the 1930s, thus having a 
long history of resource harvesting and depletion of nearby fishing grounds which 
requires fishers to travel longer distances to find suitable fishing grounds. Furthermore, 
Bahía de Kino is located near (100 km) the state capital Hermosillo and 400 km from the 
USA-Mexico border, thus having access to better public hard human-made infrastructure 
(pbIhHM) such as good access to major roads and processing plants.  
With regards to soft infrastructure (IsHM), the fisheries’ dynamics in the Gulf are 
driven by seasonality and de facto open access, and fishery catch data and statistics are 
highly uncertain in Mexico (Cisneros-Montemayor et al. 2013), which make actual 
fishing effort difficult to evaluate. However, it is estimated that ~50,000 SSF operate 
25,000 pangas in the region. In terms of effort, nearly 18,000 pangas operate in a given 
year in the Gulf, with nearly 90% operating during the shrimp season (September to 
March) to then shift to other resources or stop fishing at the end of the season. Local SSF 
have vast knowledge on ecological processes responsible for spawning seasons, which is 
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of great value for determining the spatial and temporal dimensions of fishing activities in 
the northern GOC as fishers base their decisions of where and when to fish on said 
knowledge (particularly for the shark, rays, and swimming crab fisheries) (Moreno-Báez 
et al. 2012). In terms of industrial fishing, some 10,000 IFS work on approximately 1,300 
industrial vessels with crews ranging from five (on shrimp trawlers) to eleven people (in 
squid and sardine vessels) (Cisneros-Mata 2010).  
The PIPs include GCAs & GFA, monitoring and enforcement government 
agencies, CSOs working in the region and scientific researchers from both Mexican and 
International academic institutions. PIPs provide support for legislation changes, 
conservation and management programs, capacity-building programs and organizational, 
communication, and collaboration support for conservation and management activities as 
well as for scientific research.  
In Mexico, the management of marine resources is shared between two sets of 
federal authorities, the SAGARPA (Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural 
Development, Fisheries and Food) and the SEMARNAT (Secretary of the Environment 
and Natural Resources), each of which house several federal agencies in charge of 
fisheries and environmental issues, respectively (Cinti et al. 2010a, Cinti et al. 2014). 
SAGARPA houses the National Aquaculture and Fisheries Commission (CONAPESCA), 
which is the primary agency in charge of designing, implementing, and enforcing 
fisheries and aquaculture policy regulations, as well as the National Research Fisheries 
Institute (INAPESCA), which is the scientific backbone of CONAPESCA. 
CONAPESCA operates mainly by issuing and managing fishing permits, concessions, or 
authorizations, in accordance with the General Law of Sustainable Fishing and 
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Aquaculture (LGPAS). SEMARNAT houses two federal agencies relevant for the 
functioning of NTA: the National Commission of Natural Protected Areas (CONANP) 
who is solely responsible for the establishment and management of federal NPAs in 
accordance with the General Law of Ecological Balance and Environmental Protection 
(LGEEPA), and the Federal Agency for the Protection of the Environment (PROFEPA), 
the main administrative agency in charge of monitoring compliance of environmental 
protection regulations.  
In addition to the conservation and fisheries federal authorities, national and 
foreign academic and scientific institutions have provided most of the information and 
knowledge about the ecosystems of the GOC since the 1950s (Carvajal et al. 2010). The 
GOC is considered one of the most well-studied regions in Mexico in terms of its natural 
history and biodiversity, and it has gone through seven marine planning exercises in the 
past 18 years (Álvarez-Romero et al. 2013). However, despite of a long tradition of 
conservation planning, it also has a history of lacking effective fisheries governance, 
which has led to highly uncertain catch data and fishery statistics (Cisneros-Montemayor 
et al. 2013).  
Finally, the GOC has had a strong presence of Mexican CSOs as well as 
international non-governmental organizations funded by both national and international 
foundations (FDNs) for projects related to both conservation and management of natural 
resources within Mexico since the 1980s (Herman 2004). These CSOs have not only 
provided some of the infrastructure to aid in the application of conservation and fisheries 
management actions in the region, but they have also have supported scientific projects 
and compiled much of the local knowledge coming from the local users in the region. 
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The Mexican Fund for Nature Conservation (FMCN) is one of the main national 
organisms responsible for organizing and distributing funds from various international 
foundations to support protected areas in Mexico (Rife et al. 2013). Some of the CSOs 
promoting marine conservation and sustainable fisheries are Comunidad y Biodiversidad 
A.C. (COBI), Sociedad de Historia Natural Niparajá A.C. (NIPARAJÁ), Noroeste 
Sustentable (NOS), Pronatura Noroeste (PNO), SuMAR, and Voces por la Naturaleza, 
while international NGOs include Conservation International (CI), Environmental 
Defense Fund (EDF), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), and World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF).  Furthermore, CSOs also began to expand their work from having mostly 
focused on environmental issues (e.g., protection and recovery of endangered species, 
habitat protection, and natural protected areas) to also working on issues of sustainable 
fisheries management (Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014), promoting the use of traditional 
knowledge (Basurto et al. 2012), improvement of scientific information (García-
Hernández et al. 2015) and its integration with traditional knowledge (Cinti et al. 2010b, 
Moreno-Báez et al. 2012), supporting the development of new management plans for 
commercial species (Cisneros-Mata et al. 2014, Zepeda-Domínguez et al. 2015), 
supporting environmental education as well as education on existing fisheries 
management tools and regulations (Meza-Monge et al. 2015), and promoting community-
oriented processes (e.g. strengthening fishers’ organization and participatory processes, 
local capacity-building, etc.) (Basurto et al. 2000, Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014).  
Within the two sets of infrastructure, the Natural Infrastructure (NI) includes the 
resource itself (e.g. commercial fish and invertebrate species targeted by both SSFs and 
IFs) and the biophysical components and conditions that comprise the ecosystem and 
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habitats where the resource resides. In the GOC, the combination of unique 
oceanographic and physiographic features, along with high year-round nutrient levels that 
support exceptionally high rates of primary productivity and complex food webs (Díaz-
Uribe et al. 2012), render it one of the most biologically productive and diverse seas in 
the world (Brusca et al. 2005, Lluch-Cota et al. 2007). In the MIR, SSFs target at least 80 
importantly commercial species in the region, ranging from ray-finned fish (e.g. leopard 
grouper, yellow snapper, spotted sand bass), to cartilaginous fish (e.g., hammerhead 
shark and diamond stingray), to crustaceans (e.g., swimming crab, blue shrimp, and spiny 
lobster), to mollusks (e.g., octopus and rock scallop), to echinoderms (e.g. sea cucumber). 
IFs generally target 6 main species guilds, including squid, anchovy, skipjack, sardine, 
tuna, and shrimp, with the latter three being the most important (Moreno-Báez et al. 
2012). These species thrive in the region due to the presence of rocky reef habitat as well 
as mangroves, non-mangrove wetlands, sargassum forests, and seagrass beds acting as 
nursery habitat for the growth and reproduction of many species.  
The Public Infrastructure (PI) includes any formal or informal arrangement that 
establishes a NTA and all the regulations that come with them. While NTAs have been 
established in Mexico, an explicit regulation to design, establish, monitor and evaluate 
NTAs as a whole unit in the marine realm has not been created within the Mexican 
legislation (CEMDA and COBI 2010). Therefore, it is the tendency in Mexico that the 
environmental laws of land protection be used as an extension to the marine environment. 
There are thus multiple tools within both the conservation and environmental protection 
legislation realm and the fisheries legislation realm that can be considered to function as 
NTAs. Currently, there are four distinctly different types of tools and schemes that are 
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commonly used in the GOC that act as NTAs: Core Zones within Natural Protected Areas 
(NPA), Fishing Refuge Zones (FRZ), Voluntary Marine Reserves (VMR), and NTAs due 
to national security (NTANS) (which indirectly become NTAs since no fishing activity is 
allowed within due to national security reasons) (Torre et al. 2016). These three tools are 
established and managed by different agencies and governing bodies.  
NPAs are defined as “zones within the National territory where the original 
environment has not been modified significantly by human activity or that require 
preservation and restoration” (LGEEPA, Art. 44). There are four different types of NPAs 
containing a zone called a core zone which would be considered NTAs, two of which 
exist in the MIR: Biosphere reserves (RB) and National Parks (PN), which mainly differ 
by the RB’s inclusion of community participation and exclusive fishing rights for the 
nearby local communities on zones where sustainable fishing is allowed (called buffer 
zones) within the NPA. NPAs are permanently decreed areas under the jurisdiction of 
CONANP as far as their design, establishment, management, patrolling on-the-grounds, 
and biological monitoring and evaluation activities. Although enforcing and sanctioning 
those who infringe on NPA regulations lies within PROFEPA’s jurisdiction, CONANP 
can summon both PROFEPA and the Mexican Navy (SEMAR) when needed to 
participate in enforcement activities.  
FRZs are a relatively new instrument for the establishment of NTAs in Mexico. 
FRZs are defined as “areas within federal jurisdiction established with the main purpose 
of conserving and contributing, either naturally or artificially, to the development of the 
fishery resources within it (based on their reproduction, growth and recruitment), as well 
as preserving and protecting their surrounding environment” (LGPAs, Art. 4). These 
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areas, which are decreed for two to 6 years and managed by CONAPESCA, have both 
temporal and permanent NTAs that are established for the protection and recovery of 
commercially important fishery species (including their various reproductive stages and 
spawning aggregations) considered to be overexploited. Some FRZs are also decreed to 
complement other existing conservation measures, including those within NPAs. The first 
network of FRZ was established in 2012 in the Baja California Sur peninsula (Corredor 
San Cosme-Punta Coyote) south of the MIR, where eleven areas where closed to all 
fishing for a duration of 5 years after its decree. The establishment of this network of 
FRZs prompted the formal publication of the official decree that determines the legal 
standards and procedure for the establishment of FRZs in 2014 as the NOM-049-
SAG/PESC-2014 (DOF 2014), followed by the establishment of other five FRZs in 
Mexico by 2016. Nonetheless, FRZs present an example of another NTA-type 
management tool with a shorter duration, a stronger emphasis on fish stock recovery, and 
under a different management agency’s jurisdiction (CONAPESCA) that is currently 
being sought-after by other communities within the GOC (e.g. in Puerto Libertad, 
Sonora, and in some communities in the Upper GOC) as an alternative to NPAs.  
VMRs represent the third commonly used tool to establish fully protected marine 
areas in Mexico. While strong in these areas are robust in terms of stakeholder buy-in and 
social acceptance, they have no legal backing within the Mexican environmental or 
fisheries legislation, and are thus subject to being completely under the jurisdiction of the 
fishing communities that seek their establishment. These areas are typically established 
via community-agreements and maintained by particular fishing groups, cooperatives, or 
with the help of local NGOs working in the area. Although no VMRs remain currently 
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active in the GOC, there are other examples of VMRs that have had certain levels of 
success in other communities within the Baja Pacific Region and other parts of Mexico 
(Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009, Micheli et al. 2012, Revollo-Fernández 2012 ).  
Finally, No-Take Areas for National Security reasons (NTANS) are areas decreed 
by the SCT (Secretariat of Roads and Transportation), and other dependencies, where no 
fishing is allowed surrounding oil drilling platforms managed by Petróleos Mexicanos 
(PEMEX) or electrical infrastructure managed by the Federal Commission of Electricity 
(CFE) (e.g. NTA adjacent to a CFE plan in Puerto Libertad) (Torre et al. 2016).  
Public Infrastructure (PI) includes all these different types of tools and their 
regulations, though it can also include others within the environmental and fisheries 
legislation that may not be directly related to the NTA’s but that can affect their 
establishment, management, and functioning. Three NPAs have been decreed within the 
MIR (Figure 3.2, Table 3.2), each with their own NTAs (Figure 3.3). 
 
Table 3.2. Natural Protected Areas (NPAs) in the Midriff Islands Region in the GOC 
(Bourillon and Torre 2012, Moreno-Báez et al. 2012, Rife et al. 2013). MP = 
Management Program.  
NPA RBISPM PNASL RBBACBS 
Name Reserva de la 
Biósfera Isla San 
Pedro Mártir 
Parque Nacional 
Archipiélago de 
San Lorenzo 
Reserva de la Biósfera 
Bahía de los Ángeles, 
Canal de Ballenas y 
Salsipuedes 
Total NPA area 
(km2) 
298.76 584.42 3,879.57 
Total no-take area 8.21 km2 
2.74 % 
88.05 km2 
15.06 % 
2.07 km2 
0.05 % 
Year NPA decreed 2002 2005 2007 
Year MP decreed 2011 2014 2014 
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Figure 3.2. NPAs within the MRI region in the GOC. RB = Reserva de la Biósfera, PN = 
Parque Nacional. 
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Figure 3.3. NTAs within NPAs of the MRI region in the GOC. 
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The CIS framework also considers exogenous drivers that can affect human and 
social infrastructure (e.g. political initiatives for establishing protected areas, changes in 
government offices, new legislation, etc.). In the last couple of decades, NPAs within 
Mexico had been implemented opportunistically when political will and current agendas 
facilitated the process (Rife et al. 2013). Nowadays this trend seems to be changing with 
more and more participation from CSOs and other organizations in the process of 
establishing NTAs that protect marine ecosystems without affecting local stakeholders. 
Finally, exogenous drivers that can affect the natural and human-made infrastructure are 
also considered (e.g. the effects of climate change or climate phenomena like El Niño and 
La Niña). Recent studies on the interaction of climate change effects with the spatially-
explicit restrictions of marine NPAs in the GOC suggest regional variation on their 
resilience to climate change, with some areas closed to fisheries ameliorating the negative 
effects on biomass (Morzaria-Luna 2016), while other studies attempt to identify Gulf-
specific effects of rising sea surface water temperatures on important fishing commercial 
species (Précoma de la Mora 2015, Ayala-Bocos et al. 2016). Consequently, federal 
environmental agencies (including CONANP) and many conservation CSOs in the GOC 
are now including strategies for incorporating ecological connectivity and planning for 
climate change adaptation within their management plans and long-term programs.  
Finally, the CIS framework considers the different types of interactions or links 
among all components of the system (numbered 1-6 in Figure 3.1). This way we can 
identify where weaknesses or strengths are occurring in the system and what 
consequences it can bring to the long-term robustness of the system. The purpose of these 
links is to allow the exploration of how different possible policy processes might function 
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in a dynamic policy context, and assess the fit between the biophysical context, the 
actors, and the rules and regulations in the system  (Anderies and Janssen 2013). 
3.3.2   Stakeholder knowledge, perceptions, and preferences 
3.3.2.1  Resource User knowledge on local NTAs  
For each individual NPA, fishers were asked if they were aware that such NPA 
existed, and if so, if they knew the location of the NTA within the NPA. Fishers were 
also asked if they believed that such NPA had been successful for the conservation of 
biodiversity as well as for fisheries management. RUs showed critical gaps in their 
knowledge on NTAs within the current established NPAs in the region, with 15.4 % of 
respondents not knowing about the existence of any of the three NPAs, yet of those who 
knew about them 44.4 % of them did not know the precise location of the NTAs. Only 
21.3 % of respondents knew about all three NPAs, yet only 7.5% of them knew the 
location of all three NTA systems.  
The NPA of RBISPM was the most well-known NPA, while PNASL was the 
least well-known despite having the largest area with no-take regulations (Table 3.3). 
However, these results may be related to sampling sizes from each community and to the 
fact that Sonoran RUs are known for being more mobile than those of Baja California. 
The NTA of RBISPM was decreed after the establishment of the terrestrial NPA as an 
extension of the terrestrial NPA, and the process was accompanied by a large 
community-involvement campaign in the community of Bahía de Kino with the goal of 
empowering the community members as stewards of their environment. Although the 
NPAs of PNASL and RBBACBS, were decreed at different times and each has its own 
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Management Program, they are jointly managed by CONANP’s administrative offices, 
and they are considered to serve different objectives. The NTAs within RBBACBS 
harbor mainly coastal and mangrove habitat that work as nursery grounds for important 
commercial species, but these areas are usually not harvested by fishers. The NTAs are 
also within proximity of the nearby villages, including Bahía de los Ángeles. The NTAs 
within PNASL surround four of the islands harboring some of the most important seabird 
breeding colonies in the GOC.  
 
Table 3.3. Percentage of respondents who are aware of the existence of NPAs and the 
boundaries of the NTAs. PNASL = Parque Nacional Archipiélago de San Lorenzo; 
RBBACBS = Reserva de la Biosfera Bahía de los Ángeles, Canal de Ballenas y 
Salsipuedes; RBISPM = Reserva de la Biosfera Isla San Pedro Mártir. 
 RBISPM PNASL RBBACBS 
Aware the NPA exists 63.2% 37.5% 52.9% 
Knows NTA location 44.1% 15.4% 22.1% 
 
3.3.2.2  Non-compliance with the restrictions of no-fishing within NTAs 
In terms of perceptions of non-compliance with NTA regulations by RUs who 
knew the location of NTAs, 83.2 % of respondents believed there were problems of non-
compliance within one, two, or three of the NTA systems in the region (10.6 % 
responded to not believe there were issues of no-compliance, and 6.2 % were not sure). 
Figure 3.4 shows responses when fishers were asked what their usual reaction to the 
observation of non-compliance to no-fishing restrictions within known NTAs was.  
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Figure 3.4. Responses from SSFs, who did observe non-compliance with no-take 
regulations in any of the NTAs of which they knew the location, to the question “What 
action do you usually take when you observe non-compliance within the NTA?”. 
3.3.2.3 Perceptions on levels of success of current NTAs in the region and 
preferences for NTA-type tools 
RUs and PIPs had different levels of agreement on the level of success that 
existing NPAs have had for the management of biodiversity and fisheries within the 
region. PIPs stated more confidence in NPAs in the region being successful for the 
conservation of biodiversity (60.4 % stating they are successful, 12.5 % stating they are 
not, and 27.1 % unsure) than for fisheries management (43.8 % stating they are 
successful, 22.9 % stating they are not, and 33.3 % unsure). Among the different key 
actor groups within the PIPs, both government agencies and foundations seemed most 
optimistic than CSOs about the level of success NPAs had for both conservation of 
biodiversity and fisheries management, although CSOs seemed to be less optimistic about 
the ability of the current NPAs in the MIR to achieve successful outcomes with respect to 
fisheries management (Figure 3.5). Within government agencies, representatives from the 
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fisheries management agencies generally did not perceive current NTAs as successful or 
were unsure about their current achievement or potential for effective fisheries 
management, whereas environmental agencies were more optimistic (Figure 3.6).  
 
Figure 3.5. Perception among PIPs per sector about whether existing NPAs, in general, 
have been successful for the conservation of biodiversity (striped) and for fisheries 
management (solid). Green = Yes, Red = No, Yellow = Unsure. 
 
Figure 3.6. Perception among the government agencies sector about whether existing 
NPAs, in general, have been successful for fisheries management (right). 
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RUs were specifically asked about their perceived level of success for each of the 
NPAs that they were familiar with since their harvesting activity is very localized and 
they can provide direct feedback on the effects of conservation and management actions 
in the area. Fishers who were familiar with the RBISPM seemed more optimistic about 
the level of success of the NTA with regards to conservation of biodiversity, and to a 
lesser extend to fisheries management (Table 3.4). On the other hand, fishers familiar 
with the PNASL seemed most skeptical about the success of NPAs for conservation, but 
even more greatly about their success for fisheries management (only 9.3 % of 
respondents perceived the NPA successful for fisheries management). Nonetheless, 79 % 
of RU respondents recognized the benefits of NTAs in general include higher 
reproduction rates of commercially important species, more catches and thus higher 
economic benefits for fishers. 
 
Table 3.4. NTA-specific perception among RUs (mostly SSF) about whether existing 
NPAs have been successful for the conservation of biodiversity and for fisheries 
management. 
 PNASL RBBACBS RBISPM 
NPA 
successful for: Conservation Fisheries Conservation Fisheries Conservation Fisheries 
Yes 28.8% 9.3% 49.3% 38.9% 60.9% 45.5% 
No 19.2% 29.6% 11.3% 22.2% 12.6% 22.7% 
Unsure 51.9% 51.9% 39.4% 38.9% 26.4% 31.8% 
 
In general, RU respondents had little knowledge with respect to the process for 
establishing NTAs in Mexico, but they had a similar perception to the PIP respondents on 
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the usual timeline for the establishment of NTAs. Among both RUs and PIPs, most 
respondents believed the establishment of NTAs would take between two and five years 
(42.1 % of RUs, 60.4 % of PIPs), although more RUs expressed uncertainty with this 
estimate than PIPs (33.9 % of RUs, 10.4 % of PIPs). Half of the RU respondents also 
expressed that the establishment of NTAs should only take a year or less, and the other 
half believed it should not take more than 5 years.  
In terms of the RUs preference with respect to which NTA-type tool would be 
most appropriate for the establishment of future NTAs in the MIR, VMRs was the tool 
preferred to be the first choice for 58.9 % of the RU respondents, with 26.6 % preferring 
NPAs and 18.5 % preferring FRZs, whereas FRZs were chosen as 2nd choice by 45.2 % 
of the respondents (Figure 3.7).  
 
Figure 3.7. RU Response to question: Which NTA tool would be your first, second, and 
third choice for the establishment of a network of NTAs? NPAs = Natural Protected 
Areas, FRZs = Fishing Refuge Zones, and VMR = Voluntary Marine Reserves. 
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3.4 Discussion 
Over the last decade, studies on the knowledge and perceptions of resource users 
in the GOC towards formal fisheries management policies that exclusively regulate 
harvesting activity have shared important lessons to improve stewardship of fishery 
resources. The need to formally recognize fishers as key stakeholders in local fisheries 
and include them in the cooperative design of management strategies and regulations has 
been shown to be critical for effective fisheries management (Cinti et al. 2010b). 
However, the formal institutional structure of Mexican fishing regulations may not be the 
most effective strategy to promote responsible fishing behavior (Cinti et al. 2010a). 
Insufficient government support for the provision of secure fishing rights, effective 
enforcement and sanctioning mechanisms, and the recognition and incorporation of local 
arrangements and capacities into management actions has all been shown to undermine 
sustainable fishing practices in the GOC, and especially in the MIR (Cinti et al. 2014). 
More importantly, higher levels of governance have also been shown to be a major 
impediment to sustainable fishing practices among SSF when disconnected from local 
practices, realities, and needs of the local communities (Cinti et al. 2014). Our results 
build on this foundation and contribute to the understanding of NTAs as fisheries 
management tools within the Mexican policy context. 
Previous institutional analyses for some of the communities in the GOC have 
suggested potential weak interactions (links on Figure 3.1) on how RUs and PIPs behave 
with respect to the establishment of NTAs, and how it has led to shortcomings when 
using NTAs for fisheries management (Mancha-Cisneros and Gerber 2015). My results 
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narrow down these weaknesses to (a) different levels of knowledge and support for NTA-
type tools in the region; (b) non-compliance and apathy among the community members 
towards NTAs; and (c) differences in perceptions between the RUs and the PIPs with 
regards to the success of NTAs and what they can accomplish. Additionally, all NTA-
type tools are vulnerable to external ecological (e.g. climate change) or political 
disturbances (e.g. new legislation, changes in government office). These weaknesses, 
likely occurring due to insufficient consideration of social buy-in processes during the 
design and establishment phases for NTAs, can interfere with NTA performance to 
achieve fisheries management objectives.  
With regards to levels of knowledge and support for NTAs, there are still 
information gaps with regards to NTAs in the region despite strong efforts from CSOs 
and some GFAs and GCAs to provide workshops, organize working groups, and 
disseminate relevant information among the various fishing communities. In other words, 
there is a weak presence of soft human-made infrastructure that leads to knowledge on 
no-fishing restrictions, boundaries, and the consequences of noncompliance. While many 
RUs are actively involved in community-based programs hosted by environmental 
authorities like CONANP or local CSOs working in the region, many are still 
misinformed about the boundaries of current NTAs in their region and the restrictions 
around them. However, the value of NTAs for fisheries recovery seems to be increasingly 
recognized (Suárez-Castillo et al. 2017). Over two thirds of the direct users included in 
my study acknowledged the value of NTAs for species reproduction, higher abundances, 
and in general higher catches. 
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Previous studies have also shown how NPAs in the northern GOC are often used 
by fishing communities from all different communities within the region (e.g. 83 % of 
RBBACBS is used by six communities, 38 % of PNASL is used by five communities, 
and two communities use RBISPM), with some fishers even traveling long distances to 
reach the NPA (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012). While it is possible that local fishers who have 
preferential use of permitted fishing grounds within the NPA know the boundaries of the 
NTAs, fishers from outside communities may not. Not having enough information about 
existing NTAs shows a weakness in the relationship between the resource users and the 
potential support for a no-fishing restriction within NPAs (link 6), an interaction that is 
crucial for proper effectiveness of NTAs.  Link 6 determines whether RUs can comply 
with regulations. Simply stated, resource users are unlikely to comply with regulations if 
they are not aware of the boundaries of NTAs.  
With regards to noncompliance and apathy issues, even when RUs have a good 
understanding about the boundaries of NTAs, they can easily choose not to comply with 
the restrictions of no-fishing inside the NTA. Reasons for noncompliance may include a 
lack of other employment alternatives (the most commonly cited response by RUs when 
asked if they had other livelihood alternatives besides fishing), skepticism about whether 
NTAs can work in providing them with benefits in the short or long term, or the fear that 
others will free ride on the efforts of a few to comply and will this take advantage of the 
situation. Although varied by NTA, my results shows high levels of perceived non-
compliance behavior among RUs, even from the local public infrastructure provider 
perspective. This also represents a weakness in link 6 as groups of fishers become 
divided in their expectations on what NTAs can accomplish and comply accordingly with 
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NTAs, which can lead to conflict between complying and non-complying groups, or they 
all adopt non-complying behaviors.  
Recent studies have hypothesized that the problem with noncompliance begins 
with the complicated division of monitoring and enforcement responsibilities among the 
appropriate federal agencies, which undermines their ability to properly ensure 
compliance (Rife et al. 2013).  However, while most respondents in my study indeed had 
a perception that there is a lack of monitoring and enforcement by formal authorities in 
the region, I also show that the practice of reporting non-compliance activity to the 
appropriate federal authorities is also not prevalent in the region since most fishers opt for 
talking about it or doing nothing rather than reporting it (Figure 4). Furthermore, my 
results also show a lack of belief in the system and the perception that corruption is 
constantly present when it comes to proper monitoring and sanctioning of NTA 
restrictions, thus leading to a culture of apathy towards both complying with NTA 
regulations and reporting noncompliance of others (a weakness in link 6). While 
understaffing and underfunding on the PIPs side are real issues (a weakness in link 3), 
there is little that can be done to increase efforts for monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms via the federal government and PIPs are already operating at capacity. 
Moreover, strengthening link 3 may not necessarily contribute to solving noncompliance 
issues unless the RUs perceive a change in the perception of corruption and 
noncompliance that has permeated the system, or unless the prospect of alternative 
livelihoods provides fishers with other choices that allows them to comply with 
regulations without affecting their livelihoods.  
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The negative perceptions towards the monitoring and sanctioning systems for 
NTAs sometimes change when RUs are actively engaged in the process of monitoring 
and sanctioning. In some communities (e.g. Bahía de los Ángeles), community-based 
surveillance groups have proved successful for certain periods of time (i.e. the RUs 
become PIPs by being agents of monitoring and enforcement of regulations). These 
programs, however, should be carefully implemented and on a voluntary basis rather than 
as subsidies programs for them to remain effective and functioning in the long-term and 
without the need of continuous funding to keep the programs running. The attributes of 
the community (e.g. community-dynamics, historical context, and social conflict) should 
also be carefully considered though since some communities may have different levels of 
conflict with other communities in the region that would undermine the operation of 
these programs.  
Finally, the difference in perceptions between RUs and PIPs with respect to how 
NTAs have been successful and what the best way to implement them has been a 
significant setback for NTAs in the region. Since NTAs have only been established as 
NPAs managed by CONANP in the MIR, most RUs associate them with the concepts of 
conservation and preservation of ecosystems and threatened species. Our results also 
show how the current NPAs are perceived to be more successful for the purposes of 
conservation of biodiversity than for fisheries management (a weakness in link 6 if NTAs 
are to be employed as a strong fisheries management tool). The increased skepticism 
towards the success of current NPAs for fisheries management by the CSOs echoes a 
reflection on the history of planning efforts and management actions that have taken 
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place in the region without many tangible outcomes, whereas the rest of the PIPs tend to 
base their perceptions on a shifting baseline.  
We find that there is little collaboration between the different conservation and 
fisheries management PIPs due their seemingly opposing mission statements (i.e. 
SEMARNAT’s mission is to protect and conserve biodiversity and marine resources, 
whereas SAGARPA’s mission is to support the development of harvesting, albeit through 
sustainable practices). The need for collaboration platforms and strategies between the 
relevant PIPs become even more relevant for the appropriate implementation of the 
higher-level mandates to local-level management actions. Consequently, new routes and 
strategies for the establishment of new NTA networks are currently being proposed by 
CSOs and supported by larger FDNs and federal PIPs (including CONANP and 
CONAPESCA) that involve an inclusive, transparent, and participative process through 
the recognition of all stakeholder (i.e. RUs and PIPs) positions towards NTAs, the 
adoption of strategies to increase stakeholder buy-in for the NTAs (coming from the 
stakeholders themselves), and the incorporation of the SSF sector’s input towards the 
design and planning of future NTAs (Suárez-Castillo et al. 2017). 
Different NTA-type tools represent different types of soft human-made public 
infrastructure, each with its own set of processes, rules, and responsible parties. While 
VMRs were often preferred over all other NTA tools, FRZs were the second most 
popular choice, which shows a great deal of interest for this new policy for establishment 
of NTAs managed by CONAPESCA. VMRs have had significant failures in other 
regions of the GOC in the past due to the lack of formal recognition from the federal 
authorities (e.g. San Jorge Island as part of a community-
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Puerto Peñasco, which although an initial success, unachieved expectations and changing 
directorship of local fisheries offices led to its dissolution to avoid free-riding problems 
(Cudney-Bueno et al. 2009). However, the example of a voluntarily-proposed FRZ in the 
village of Puerto Libertad showed how a bottom-up process involving local SSF of all 
different types of organizations (e.g. independent fishers and cooperatives) can bring 
about positive social interactions and strong support for the establishment of NTAs for 
fisheries management (Espinosa-Romero and Torre 2012, Espinosa-Romero et al. 2014). 
VMRs seem like a good way to begin the process of community-participation in 
the establishment of a NTA, although we recommend that the non-governmental PIPs 
aiding these efforts (e.g. CSOs working with the communities) seek the federal 
recognition of these areas via FRZs or NPAs (or extensions of NPAs to include NTAs). 
This would improve the credibility and acceptance of the NTA as well as the operational 
capacity of its management. Furthermore, we urge PIPs to carefully consider the 
governance context and history of the region where NTAs are being proposed (e.g. are 
the fishers formally organized into cooperatives or fishing committees vs. mostly 
independent fishers; have the communities had good experiences and involved 
participation in previous NTA efforts; is there trust between RUs and local PIPs working 
in the region, etc.) to identify the most appropriate NTA-type tool for each specific 
region. In other words, the choice of which type of soft public infrastructure will be more 
effective on the long-run highly depends on the careful consideration of the history of the 
region, the attributes of the community, the interactions between the different actors in 
the system (link 2) and the characteristics of the NTA-type tool being proposed. 
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Furthermore, close attention to the relationship between RUs and PIPs (link 2) 
would ensure that trust issues do not become a problem on the long-run, that there is 
sufficient and constructive communication between the two groups, and that 
collaboration and cooperation between and among RUs and PIPs happens in a conducive 
manner towards the successful establishment and subsequent functioning of the NTA. 
Timelines and continued engagement with the communities and all the relevant 
stakeholders are critical for the success of future NTAs. Past exercises that have 
attempted to establish NTAs in the MIR or elsewhere in the GOC have struggled to 
maintain the stakeholders and RUs engaged in the process to establish NTAs (a 
weakening of link 6) when it becomes too lengthy, which consequently can undermine 
the prospects for the acceptance of the NTA within the fishing community (pers. comm.). 
As shown in my results most stakeholders expect the process of NTA establishment to 
delay for no more than five years, on average, in order to ensure the expectations are met 
and that the establishment of NTAs remains relevant in the face of ongoing resource 
overexploitation problems. Furthermore, my study recognizes the need to develop 
parallel strategies to implement alternative livelihood programs that can mitigate the 
negative impact on SSF communities’ livelihoods, and environmental education 
programs to strengthen knowledge about and support for NTAs at a local scale and 
increase stakeholder participation throughout the process (Bennett and Dearden 2014, 
Suárez-Castillo et al. 2017). Ultimately, important weaknesses in link 6, which are 
sometimes affected by weaknesses in link 2 and poor collaboration of PIPs, are what 
influence the ways that the soft infrastructure tools like NTAs affect the way in which the 
resource users interact with the resource (link 5). 
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3.5 Conclusion 
This study elucidates how incorporating the current level of stakeholder 
understanding and support for the use of NTAs into the establishment and management 
processes of NTAs is a crucial strategy for both biodiversity conservation and fisheries 
management in the MIR, highlighting important weaknesses in the way in which NTAs 
have operated in the region. My results suggest mechanisms for improvement of NTA 
effectiveness by taking a closer look at some of these caveats and how they impact the 
dynamics of the whole SES from a governance perspective.  
The shortcomings of current NTAs in the region occur due to major differences in 
levels of knowledge from the RUs and of perceptions between RUs and PIPs towards 
NTAs as tools for fisheries recovery zones, which is further hampered by a culture of 
apathy towards such management tools given the problems of corruption and free riding. 
In order for future NTAs to effectively succeed as fisheries recovery zones, I propose a 
careful consideration of specific NTA-type tools available within the Mexican context, 
such as VMRs, as an initial step towards the formal implementation of legal NTA-type 
tools. In this manner, RUs can have a first-hand experience with how NTAs work and 
why they are necessary, and potentially affecting their perceptions and subsequent 
support for these tools. I expect this analysis to set the stage for assessing putative 
management actions specific for each type of tool that can be applied as NTAs in the 
MIR as well as the rest of the GOC.  Collectively, this work demonstrates ways to 
incorporate appropriate contextual social, and governance characteristics into their 
planning processes to improve stakeholder response to these tools and policies. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTEGRATING STAKEHOLDER AND SCIENCE-BASED APPROACHES TO NO-
TAKE AREA DESIGN IN THE GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
4.1  Introduction 
Marine protected areas (MPAs) have become a widely-used approach in the 
sustainable management of marine fisheries (Fraschetti et al. 2011). However, no-take 
areas (NTAs) are often framed as a conflict between conservation and fishing objectives. 
A significant challenge in fisheries management is ensuring job security for fishers while 
also sustainably managing their fishing resources. Even though long-term benefits of 
stock recovery within and adjacent to NTAs has been demonstrated (Micheli et al. 2004), 
short-term costs are often argued as opposition to NTAs. In many cases, limited success 
of certain NTAs can be attributed to the lack of attention to stakeholder interests and 
human capacity building (Gill et al. 2017), as well as the socio-economic context 
(McClanahan 1999, Christie et al. 2003, Christie 2004, Cinner 2007) into the planning 
and management of NTAs. In this chapter, I demonstrate a process for stakeholder 
engagement in spatial conservation planning to show that fisher preferences can 
complement rather than compromise proposed NTA network solutions with minimal 
increases to size and cost. 
The systematic conservation planning (SCP) framework represents a practical and 
effective way to design NTAs by identifying areas for effective conservation actions 
while minimizing costs (Pressey and Bottril 2009, Álvarez-Romero et al. 2013). 
Incorporating socioeconomic criteria, such as single-species fishing data, fine-scale 
commercial fishing data, and even confidential sensitive commercial fishing data) for 
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NTA selection without compromising ecological goals using numerical optimization 
tools has been shown to produce networks of NTAs that reduce economic losses incurred 
by fishers (Richardson et al. 2006) while only slightly increasing their size compared to 
networks designed without consideration of commercial data (Stewart and Possingham 
2005), and resembling, or even exceeding, desired habitat representation with less impact 
on commercial and recreational fisheries than those devised by purely stakeholder-driven 
processes (Klein et al. 2008).  
An important step within the SCP framework is the identification and 
involvement of stakeholders, including affected fisher communities (Pressey and Bottril 
2009), which can occur at various stages throughout the planning and implementation 
process. On one end of the spectrum, stakeholder-based planning approaches ensure early 
participation of key stakeholder groups to provide key input in the design of the network. 
Most successful examples of this approach occur at small regional scales and for the 
implementation of single NTAs that can then scale-up to regional networks (White et al. 
2002). Stakeholder-based approaches have also been favoured especially in data-poor 
regions where local knowledge can be very valuable to the process of selecting relevant 
areas for conservation (Ban et al. 2009a).  
In contrast, science-based approaches seek to identify priority areas as part of the 
NTA network through a scientific design process and then engage with local 
communities to assess or improve network designs. This approach is often desirable in 
situations where there is concern for initially raising unreasonable expectations beyond 
the capacity to carry out the planning efforts, there is a strong interest in pursuing robust 
technical design approaches that may not make it practical to engage with community 
  115 
members, or spatial and socio-cultural scale of stakeholder groups becomes too large to 
reasonably involve all interested parties,  (Green et al. 2009). However, this approach 
requires significant investment in acquiring reliable, spatial data of every element going 
into the design process (e.g. biodiversity features, socioeconomic costs, etc.) (Ban et al. 
2009b), especially when used over large spatial planning regions (Gleason et al. 2010).  
In practice, most efforts result in a combination of science-based approaches 
incorporating a variety of tools and data sources, along with available opportunities for 
NTA network establishment facilitated by political will and stakeholder coordination. 
Studies where both science-based and stakeholder-based approaches are integrated (Ban 
et al. 2009b, Ruiz-Frau et al. 2015) using numerical optimization tools like Marxan (Ball 
et al. 2009) demonstrate how a more integrated approach can serve biodiversity 
conservation objectives while achieving community acceptance, thus leading to more 
effective conservation outcomes. However, the biophysical and ecological integrity of 
NTA network designs must be maintained throughout integration so that both 
conservation and socioeconomic objectives are efficiently met.  
Building on previous work in Canada and the U.K. (Ban et al. (2009b), Ruiz-Frau 
et al. (2015)), I developed an integrated stakeholder-based and science-based approach 
for NTA design.  With the Gulf of California, Mexico as a case study, I demonstrate a 
planning process to establish NTA network designs that incorporate stakeholder 
preferences while also achieving conservation objectives at low cost. My approach differs 
from previous work in that I integrate both approaches by constraining the selection of 
NTAs with areas that were heavily selected through both the stakeholder-based and 
science-based approaches. I first compare NTAs identified through a science-based 
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approach (biophysical and economic information) with those identified through a 
stakeholder-based approach (stakeholder preferences).  I then develop a network design 
that includes biologically-relevant hotspots, minimal opportunity cost to fishers, and 
socially-preferred NTAs of the network.  
4.2  Methods 
I followed a three-step methodology to designing networks of NTAs based on 
science-based and stakeholder-based approaches, both together and separately (Table 
4.1). First, the science-based approach followed the methodology outlined in (Álvarez-
Romero et al. in review) through a systematic conservation planning framework with the 
goal of designing a network of NTAs that represents biodiversity of fish and invertebrate 
commercial species and their associated habitats while minimizing costs to fishers. 
Second, I developed a stakeholder-based approach to design a network of NTAs by 
undertaking a participatory mapping exercise to gather information on local fisher 
knowledge and preferences for placement of NTAs within my study area. Finally, I 
further explore these fisher-driven selection methods to incorporate their preferences for 
NTA placement into the science-based prioritization effort to develop a science-
stakeholder agreement approach to designing networks of NTAs in the GOC. 
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Table 4.1. Summary of prioritization scenarios. 
Solution Scenario Description Features included 
A1 
Science-
based 
approach 
Goal of protecting 
areas important to 
safeguard ecosystems 
and species of 
conservation and 
commercial value 
using Marxan 
Rocky-reef associated: 
•   Ecosystems (6 
types) 
•   Species (103 fish, 
87 invertebrates) 
•   Spawning areas (10 
species) 
A2 
Stakeholder-
based 
approach 
Same as A1 but 
through a participatory 
mapping process 
Local user knowledge on 
location of reef-associated: 
•   Ecosystems 
•   Species 
•   Spawning areas 
A3 
 
Science-
stakeholder 
agreement 
approach 
 
Same as A1, using 
Marxan but 
constraining output 
solutions with 
stakeholder 
preferences from S2. 
Same as A1 and A2 
 
4.2.1   Study Area 
My study area is in the Midriff Islands region (MRI), which harbors 45 islands 
and islets of high levels of endemicity, biodiversity and biological productivity in terms 
of fisheries (Alvarez-Borrego 2007). The planning domain corresponded to the Midriff 
Islands Marine Priority Area (CONABIO et al. 2007), and was defined according to a 
combination of criteria, including its recognition as an important marine ecoregion and 
the bathymetry relevant to the distribution of rocky reef ecosystems (where most small-
scale fishing occurs) and their associated species and habitats. The MRI currently 
encompasses three individually-managed MPAs (Figure 4.1), each with their own set of 
NTAs within the MPA (Figure 4.2, Table 4.2).  
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Figure 4.1. Planning domain boundaries and current Natural (Marine) Protected Areas 
within the study area. 
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Table 4.2. Current MPAs and their NTAs in the MRI. RBISPM = RB Isla San Pedro 
Mártir, PNASL = PN Archipielago de San Lorenzo, RBBACBS = RB Bahía de los 
Ángeles Canal de Ballenas y Salsipuedes. 
 MPA NTA 
Name (year decreed) Area (km2) km2 % 
RBISPM (2002) 298.76 8.21 2.75 
Protection subzone   8.25 100.00 
PNASL (2005) 584.42 88.05 15.07 
Partido-Partida  36.01 40.99 
Rasito-Rasa  23.23 26.44 
Animas-San Lorenzo  28.61 32.57 
RBBACBS (2007) 3,879.57 2.07 0.05 
Campo Polilla  0.23 10.04 
Esteros de las Cahuamas Este  0.18 7.86 
Esteros de las Cahuamas Oeste  0.15 6.55 
Estero La Mona 
 
1.07 46.72 
Ensenada Los Choros 
 
0.58 25.33 
Estero San Rafael 
 
0.08 3.49 
TOTAL 4,762.75 98.33 2.06 
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Figure 4.2. Existing NTAs within the MPAs in the MRI region: RB Isla San Pedro Mártir 
(top), PN Archipielago de San Lorenzo (center), and RB Bahía de los Ángeles Canal de 
Ballenas y Salsipuedes (bottom).  
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4.2.2 Prioritizing NTAs with incorporation of stakeholder preferences 
4.2.2.1 Science-based approach 
I focused my analysis on rocky reef-associated species, which have high 
socioeconomic and ecological importance in the region (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012), as 
well as other ecosystems important for providing feeding, reproductive, and spawning 
habitat for these species during different life stages. Four types of conservation features 
were selected, including 190 species (103 fish, 87 invertebrates), 6 habitats (rocky reefs, 
mangroves, seagrass meadows, Sargassum beds, coastal wetlands, and rhodolith beds), 
and 10 spawning sites (4 fish species and 6 invertebrate species). Spatial information on 
all 190 species came from species distribution models generated with MaxEnt (Elith et al. 
2011) using occurrence records and 21 environmental parameters known to affect species 
distribution to predict climatic suitability and establish species coverage within the 
planning domain (these predictions were then corroborated by experts’ empirical 
knowledge). Spatial data on habitats and spawning aggregations came from existing 
planning exercises, previous studies, underwater censuses, satellite imagery, and local 
user information (see Álvarez-Romero et al. (in review) for detailed information 
regarding the spatial prioritization). Migratory and wide-ranging species (e.g. pelagic 
fish, marine mammals, sea turtles, seabirds) were excluded from my study given the 
different management strategies that they require (Anadon et al. 2011).  
To account for the potential economic loss to fishers associated with the exclusion 
of fishing activities within the NTA network, an ‘opportunity cost’ layer was estimated 
(following Adams et al. (2011)) as a function of targeted species biomass, potential catch 
by different fishing fleets (26 operating in the region), and market value of targeted 
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species (based on interviews with fishers (Suárez-Castillo 2014) and published data 
(CONAPESCA 2011)). Opportunity cost was calculated based on the Atlantis framework 
for the northern GOC (Ainsworth et al. 2011), a spatially-explicit ecosystem model 
framework simulating ecosystem dynamics (including fisheries activities). Opportunity 
cost was estimated per fleet (including small-scale, industrial, and recreational fishing 
fleets) based on a one-year forward simulation under modelled 2008 fishing mortality, 
predicted biomass, and percentage catch of each species per fleet. Distance to nearby 
ports was not incorporated into the opportunity cost calculations. Total opportunity cost 
(in Thousands of Mexican Pesos) was then obtained by summing opportunity cost across 
all fleets, scaling down to each planning unit, and weighted uniformly (given the lack of 
reliable information on number of fishers per fleet) (see Álvarez-Romero et al. (in 
review) for detailed information regarding the opportunity cost estimation and 
downscaling).  
Alternative networks of NTAs containing a selection of areas that achieve a set of 
conservation objectives whilst minimizing opportunity costs to fishers were generated 
using the decision-support tool Marxan (Ball et al. 2009). I used 1 km2 hexagonal 
planning units (n=11,097) covering marine areas and coastal features ecologically linked 
to rocky reefs below and including the 200m depth isobath. Marxan was run 100 times 
with 1,000,000 iterations each. The targets for the protection of each conservation feature 
incorporated information on threat and rarity scores, and ranged between 11 – 90% of 
desired protection for the selected habitats, between 0.6 – 43.5% for fish species, between 
0.5 – 21% for invertebrates, and between 68 – 100% for spawning aggregation sites 
(Table 4.3, see Álvarez-Romero et al. (in review) for more details how conservation 
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objectives were calculated). Spawning and rhodolith sites were represented as individual 
locations, with 68 spawning sites and 19 rhodolith sites in total within the MIR. 
 
Table 4.3. Overall conservation objectives for all six habitats and sites identified as 
important for spawning aggregations. The number next to each habitat represents the 
number of individual features for each habitat, which vary based on location, and each 
individual feature held its own conservation objective (see Table B1 in Appendix B).  
Conservation feature Total area in MIR (km2) Overall objective (%) 
Mangrove (2) 25.2 9.2 
Rocky reef (5) 74.8 7.7 
Sargassum forests (4) 13.3 9.8 
Seagrass beds (2) 88.1 5.4 
Wetland (5) 80.9 9.7 
Rhodolith sites (4) 0.6 29.2 
Spawning sites (10) 17.4 30.5 	  
 
4.2.2.2 Stakeholder-based approach through participatory mapping exercises  
In order to collect spatially-explicit preferences by small-scale fishers, I 
conducted a series of structured interviews during the summer of 2015 to small-scale 
commercial fishermen from the communities of Bahía Kino (n=49), Puerto Libertad 
(n=25), and Bahía de los Ángeles (n=11). Respondents were given sub-sections of the 
study area indicating the spatial domain under consideration with the planning unit grid 
on each map. The interview implemented was also part of another study on the 
perceptions of different stakeholder groups with respect to the use of MPAs for 
conservation of biodiversity and management of fisheries in the region (Mancha-Cisneros 
et al. in review).  
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The spatially-explicit portion of the interview included three participatory 
mapping questions using the same spatial domain and planning unit grid used for the 
science-based approach. Out of the 124 fishermen, 87 responded to the spatially-explicit 
portion of the interview, which gives us a response ratio of 0.7. Respondents were asked: 
Within the spatial domain provided: (1) which areas did they consider most important for 
biodiversity conservation and fisheries management; (2) of those chosen in (1), which 
were considered in need of any sort of protection (e.g. seasonal closure, NTAs, gear 
restrictions); and (3) of those chosen in (2), which were considered necessary sites to be 
included as part of a network of NTAs. The purpose of the three-fold spatially-explicit 
approach was to obtain the smallest possible area in which fishers were willing to give up 
fishing, and to allow fishers to distinguish between what is important from a management 
perspective and what they are willing to comply with as a no-fishing area. For the 
purposes of this analysis, I utilized the responses from the (3) interview question as the 
main output for stakeholder-based preferences. The mapped output responses were then 
georeferenced, compiled and collated as a spatially-explicit dataset representing small-
scale fisher preferences for placement of a network of NTAs and the selection frequency 
of each planning unit (i.e. how many times a planning unit was selected by fishers).  
4.2.2.3Science-stakeholder agreement approach 
Marxan provides a summed solution called “selection frequency map”, which 
corresponds to a spatial display of the number of times each planning unit has been 
selected amongst the ‘best’ solutions. Selection frequency thus summarizes which areas 
might have a higher priority for protection based on the features it contains to achieve the 
set objectives. These maps can also be interpreted as a measure of the likelihood that a 
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given planning unit will be required/included in the system of NTAs. Higher values 
indicate high irreplaceability whereas lower-value areas represent areas that, although not 
necessarily unimportant, can more easily be replaced to achieve conservation objectives. 
The value of units with lower selection frequencies can change significantly if other units 
(e.g. currently identified as highly irreplaceable) become unavailable due to 
socioeconomic constraints or their ecological features are irreversibly or significantly 
affected by anthropogenic or natural causes. 
To design a combined science-based and stakeholder-based approach, planning 
units most frequently selected by fishers in the stakholder-based approach that were also 
most frequently selected in the science-based approach were locked-in to generate new 
science-stakeholder agreement solutions. In other words, the most frequently selected 
planning units from both outputs were locked-in on Marxan so that they are automatically 
included in the ‘best’ solution for the integrated approach, thus constraining the science-
based approach to also consider frequently-selected planning units by fishers that were 
also highly irreplaceable. My approach to achieving a science-stakeholder agreement 
solution comprised 3 steps: (1) isolating planning-unit selection frequency ranges from 
the science-based and stakeholder-based approaches separately; (2) re-running Marxan 
using both science-based and stakeholder-based outputs for each selection frequency 
range to obtain output solutions for the integrated approach; and (3) identifying a 
planning unit lock-in proportion by comparing Marxan’s best solution outputs from the 
combined approach to the outputs from the science-based approach (Figure 4.3). 
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Figure 4.3. Procedure for achieving a science-stakeholder agreement solutions. An 
example for using the 50% and 70% selection frequency ranges is shown here, but the 
method applies to all selection frequency ranges between 30% and 100%. PU = Planning 
unit. A1 = Science-based; A2 = Stakeholder-based; A3 = Science-stakeholder agreement. 
 
In Step (1), I compared selection frequencies of fisher spatially-explicit 
preferences in the stakeholder-based output to the selection frequency output from the 
Marxan solutions in the science-based approach by first identifying planning units that 
were within specific selection frequency ranges in each approach (e.g. planning units that 
were selected between 30 and 100 times, or having above a 30% selection frequency), 
including 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 and 90% selection frequencies), separately. As Ruiz-Frau 
et al. (2015), I considered areas with selection frequencies above 25 % as areas 
considered priority for conservation, hence areas below 30% were considered too low to 
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be included in the analysis. In Step (2), I ran Marxan while locking-in planning units that 
were selected at and above each of the selection frequency ranges for both the science-
based and stakeholder-based approaches (i.e. I only locked-in planning units that were 
selected as at least as many times in the stakeholder-based approach as well as the 
science-based approach) to obtain the combined outputs. This step yielded seven science-
based output solutions that were in a way constrained by stakeholder preferences. In Step 
(3) I identified a planning unit lock-in proportion for the combined approach by 
comparing the best solution outputs in terms of resulting number of NTAs, habitat 
representation within the network, and total area of the network.  
My science-stakeholder agreement approach presents the novel quality of 
systematically incorporating stakeholder preferences into an optimization planning 
framework that ensures the selection of socially-accepted planning units for the NTA 
network by members of a representative sample of the small-scale fishing community 
that also contribute to a science-based solution for achieving all conservation targets.  
4.2.3   Assessment of NTA networks under different approaches 
In order to assess the differences between the science-based approach (A1) and 
the stakeholder-based approach (A2), I first compared the level of overlap in planning 
unit selection between the two selection frequency percentage maps by building a 
“Difference of agreement” map, and I then cross-compare it with habitat conservation 
features. The “Difference of agreement” map shows a Disagreement Index that was 
created by obtaining the difference between the stakeholder-based approach relative 
selection frequency output and the science-based selection frequency output. No single 
planning unit was selected by all 85 fishers interviewed, and the highest selected planning 
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unit was one selected by only 19 fishers. Therefore, I used the relative selection 
frequency percentage for A2 in order to compare with the science-based approach 
selection frequency percentages (in which more than one planning unit was selected 
100% of the time during Marxan runs).  
I then compared the output best solutions for all three approaches in terms of 
achievement of conservation targets, size (i.e. total number of NTAs within the network), 
spatial coverage and habitat representation (i.e. percent of each habitat feature included in 
each solution), and total opportunity cost. I also compared the science-based output with 
the current network of existing MPAs and their respective NTAs to assess the current 
gaps for NTAs with the goal of improving fisheries management in the region. 
4.3  Results 
4.3.1   Identification of planning-unit lock-in proportion 
Given the large size of the planning region of the MIR, and the high mobility of 
small-scale fishers in the communities of Bahía de Kino, and to a lesser extend Puerto 
Libertad (Moreno-Báez et al. 2012), the stakeholder-based approach yielded a widely-
varied selection of areas for a NTA network design. Of the 11,097 1-km2 planning units, 
5,928 were chosen at least once by a small-scale fisher during the interviews (Figure B2 
in Appendix). In contrast, the best solution map for the science-based approach included 
only 285 planning units clumped into a total of 70 patches (i.e. individual NTAs).  To 
appropriately incorporate fisher preferences into the final network design and prevent 
easily replaceable planning units from being automatically included in the science-
stakeholder agreement design, identifying an optimal lock-in proportion for the 
stakeholder-selected areas becomes necessary since not every planning unit is essential 
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for a network that efficiently achieves conservation objectives and minimizes opportunity 
cost.  
Sensitivity analyses of locking-in different selection frequency ranges within 
Marxan in Step 3 indicate that the combined approach (A3, Science-stakeholder 
agreement approach) was most similar to the science-based approach when I locked-in 
planning units that were above the 50% selection frequency in both A1 and A2. Out of 
the 5,928 planning units selected by fishers, 362 were selected by more than half the 
fishers in my sample, and seventeen of those 362 were also selected amongst Marxan’s 
‘best’ solutions more than 50% of the time. These seventeen planning units would be 
considered the most irreplaceable given that they were frequently selected by both 
Marxan (in A1) and stakeholders (in A2). Therefore, I present the results for the science-
stakeholder agreement integrated approach (A3) when these 17 planning units were 
locked-in to develop the final solution.   
4.3.2   Comparison of approaches 
Given that both fish and invertebrate species coverage within the MIR was 
determined via species distribution modelling approaches throughout a large region rather 
than extensive on-site distribution assessments, I only present the results for how 
different approaches achieve habitat and spawning site conservation objectives (Table 
4.3). Although assessing the percentage of species conservation features included in the 
selected solutions is beyond the scope of this study, both the science-based (A1) and 
science-stakeholder agreement (A3) approaches met all conservation objectives, 
including those for the 190 species. 
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The existing NTAs in the MIR are small in terms of total area and do not overlap 
by more than 60% with the science-based scenario (Table 4.4), especially with Parque 
Nacional Archipielago de San Lorenzo (PNASL, Figure 4.2b). Although these NTAs are 
permanently decreed, they were not initially designed with the same goals and 
methodology as my science-based or stakeholder-based approaches, nor did they 
incorporate extensive consideration of opportunity cost or other spatially-explicit 
socioeconomic impacts of the selected areas. Therefore, comparison of my results to 
existing NTAs should interpreted with caution. 
 
Table 4.4. Existing NTAs’ overlap with the science-based approach (A1) within the MRI. 
Existing NTAs RBBACBS (n=6) 
PNASL 
(n=3) 
RBISPM 
(n=1) 
Total 
overlap 
Area overlap (km2) 1.34 4.39 4.70 10.43 
% overlap 58.48 5.00 56.95 10.60 
 
The differences in the full selection frequency maps from the science-based (A1) 
and stakeholder-based (A2) approaches are shown in the “Difference map” in Figures 
4.4a-d. In these maps, the Disagreement Index distinguishes between areas of high 
priority for the science-based approach (A1) only (i.e.  negative large numbers in blue), 
areas of high priority for the stakeholder-based approach (A2) only (positive large 
numbers in red), and areas of agreement between the two approaches (small numbers in 
neutral light yellow in the middle) beyond the 10% selection frequency for both 
approaches (i.e. excluding areas that would be in high agreement due to the fact that 
neither approach selected them frequently).  
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I identify major areas of agreement and disagreement between the two approaches 
in six geographically distinct locations within the MIR. On the western side of the MIR, 
fishers heavily prioritized 12 km2 of rocky reef area along the eastern coast of Isla Ángel 
de la Guarda, representing 17.20% of all rocky reef habitat in the MIR (Table 4.6). 
However, this only coincided with the science-based approach in six rocky reef sites 
around the island and six more surrounding Isla Dátil on the southeastern side. In Isla 
Ángel de la Guarda, the two approaches heavily differed at the top tip of the island where 
six planning units for rocky reef habitat, one for seagrass, three for rhodoliths, and two 
for spawning aggregations, were largely prioritized by the science-approach but not by 
the stakeholders (Figure 4.4a). The differences in rocky reef habitat priorization occurred 
in five other locations around the island where five other spawning sites were generally 
avoided by the stakeholders. Other areas of disagreement on the western coast of the MIR 
occur near Bahía de los Ángeles, where the science-based approach selects planning units 
heavily populated by rocky reef habitat, four rhodolith sites, three spawning aggregations, 
and two planning units with seagrass beds.  
  132 
 
Figure 4.4a. Difference map of the central west coast of the MIR near Isla Ángel de la 
Guarda. Negative large numbers (blue) = high priority for A1, positive large numbers 
(red) = high priority for A2, and small numbers (neutral colors) = areas of agreement 
between A1 and A2 (beyond the 10% selection frequency for both).  
 
On the southwestern and northwestern coasts of the MIR in Baja California, areas 
of disagreement also occurred where the science-based approach heavily selected rocky 
reef sites that were virtually avoided by fishers (Figure 4.4b). Although stakeholders 
heavily selected some rocky reef areas surrounding the islands of the National Park 
Archipelago San Lorenzo, they avoided three spawning aggregations.  
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Figure 4.4b. Difference map of the northern (left) and southern (right) west coast of the 
MIR. Negative large numbers (blue) = high priority for A1, positive large numbers (red) 
= high priority for A2, and small numbers (neutral colors) = areas of agreement between 
A1 and A2 (beyond the 10% selection frequency for both).  
 
Along the northeastern coast of the MIR in Sonora, rocky reef habitat and three 
spawning aggregations (north and south of Puerto Libertad) were also frequently selected 
by the science-approach and avoided by the stakeholders in three locations (Figure 4.4c, 
left). Planning units within and surrounding the Biosphere Reserve Isla San Pedro Mártir 
were frequently selected by the science-based approach in six spawning aggregation 
areas that stakeholders avoided, including four that lay outside of the NTA (Figure 4.4c, 
right). 
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Figure 4.4c. Difference map of the northern (left) and southern (right) east coast of the 
MIR. Negative large numbers (blue) = high priority for A1, positive large numbers (red) 
= high priority for A2, and small numbers (neutral colors) = areas of agreement between 
A1 and A2 (beyond the 10% selection frequency for both). 
 
On the central east coast of the MIR in Sonora, mangrove areas were also 
frequently selected in the stakeholder-based maps, with 7.2 km2 of mangrove area within 
Estero Santa Cruz on the Sonoran mainland (representing 28.8% mangrove area in the 
MIR) but not so frequently selected in the science-based approach (with only three 
planning units of agreement between the two approaches) (Figure 4.4d). The same occurs 
with wetland habitat areas where only nine planning units were prioritized by the science-
based approach but not by the stakeholder-based approach, which frequently had a much 
larger selection of planning units harboring wetland habitat.  
Seagrass beds were frequently selected by the stakeholders more than in the 
science-based approach, especially within the Infiernillo Channel between Isla Tiburón 
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and the Sonoran mainland. Once more, spawning aggregations were frequently avoided 
by stakeholders, with three sites in the southern tip of Isla Tiburón and two south of Isla 
Dátil being generally selected in the science-based approach but not by stakeholders. The 
same occurred on the northwest (3 spawning sites), and northeastern (2 spawning sites) 
sides of Isla Tiburón. Finally, most stakeholders frequently selected the rocky reef coast 
around Isla San Esteban, but missed four spawning aggregation sites that the science-
based approach frequently selected. The similarities between the approaches can also be 
observed in the full selection frequency maps (Figure 4.5a-b). 
 
Figure 4.4d. Difference map of the central east coast of the MIR. Negative large numbers 
(blue) = high priority for A1, positive large numbers (red) = high priority for A2, and 
small numbers (neutral colors) = areas of agreement between A1 and A2 (beyond the 
10% selection frequency for both). 
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For comparison of a final ‘best’ solution, I compared the ‘best’ Marxan outputs 
from the science-based approaches (A1 and A3) with the configuration of all 194 
planning units that were selected by at least half of the fisher sample population in the 
stakeholder-based (A2) network. The stakeholder-based, science-based, and science-
stakeholder agreement approach include 1.74, 2.57 and 2.63% of the planning area, 
respectively (Table 4.5).  
 
Table 4.5. Area coverage of ‘best’ solutions for all three approaches.  
Best Marxan Solution Area (km2) 
 # NTAs Total Max Mean ± SD 
A1. Science-based 70 285 25 4.10 ± 5.10 
A2. Stakeholder-based 14 194 47 13.71 ± 15.56 
A3. Science-stakeholder agreement 97 292 22 3.01 ± 3.76 
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Figure 4.5a. Selection frequency of planning units for the A1 = Science-based approach. 
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Figure 4.5b. Selection frequency of planning units for the A2 = Stakeholder-based 
approach. 
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Figure 4.5c. Selection frequency of planning units for the A3 = Science-stakeholder 
agreement approach. 
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Table 4.6. Percent habitat included in ‘best’ solutions for all three approaches: A1 = 
Science-based; A2 = Stakeholder-based; A3 = Science-stakeholder agreement. ü = 
conservation objectives met. 
 
% 
Conservation feature A1 (all ü) A2 A3 (all ü) 
Mangrove 20.8 28.8 ü 20.2 
Rocky reef 22.6 17.2 ü 23.3 
Sargassum forest 24.8 1.0 25.3 
Seagrass beds 12.4 6.8 ü 12.5 
Wetland 20.1 6.2 20.0 
Rhodolith sites 54.8 13.5 66.7 
Spawning sites 69.1 10.3 72.8 
 
The stakeholder-based approach (A2, Figure 4.5b) yielded a network 
configuration that included fourteen of the thirty-two individual conservation features in 
a total of 33.1 km2 of habitat area. However, objectives were only met for mangrove, 
rocky reef, and seagrass bed habitat features, representing only 12.5% of all individual 
conservation features (Figure 4.6). The overall habitat coverage of these four features 
even surpassed the overall habitat conservation objectives for A2 (Table 4.6, Figure 4.7), 
with mangrove being represented by 19.6 % more than the desired objective, rocky reef 
9.5 % more, and seagrass beds being represented by 1.4 % more. The average 
representation of the conservation features within the A2 network was 10.1% (± 3.5% 
SE). Three of the ten spawning aggregation sites were included in the A2 network design, 
representing only 66.3% less of what was desired as spawning area to be protected. 
Rhodolith sites and Sargassum forest habitat were also among the least represented 
within A2 (only two out of four features of each habitat were included) compared to the 
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desired conservation objectives: Sargassum forest was represented 8.8% less than what 
was desired within the planning region, and this was 15.7% for rhodolith sites.  
 
Figure 4.6. Proportion of habitat conservation features represented in the three different 
approaches using the best solution output (e.g. 10 features within the science-based 
approach (A1) have between 30% and 40% of their spatial coverage included in the best 
design). A1 = Science-based; A2 = Stakeholder-based; A3 = Science-stakeholder 
agreement. Hatched bar represents the number of features that were not represented in the 
stakeholder-based approach.  
 
The seventeen planning units that were selected as among the A2 network 
configuration as most irreplaceable included a few mangrove, wetland, and seagrass bed 
areas in the Estero Santa Cruz near Bahía de Kino (and another seagrass bed on the 
southern tip of Isla Ángel de la Guarda), a couple of Sargassum forest sites in two islands 
north of Ángel de la Guarda, rhodolith sites north of Isla Ángel de la Guarda and near Isla 
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Dátil, and mainly shallow rocky reef sites around Isla San Dátil, Isla San Lorenzo-Las 
Ánimas, and along the northern and southern tips of Isla Ángel de la Guarda. 
 
 
Figure 4.7. Total habitat and spawning site area represented in the three different 
approaches using the best solution output. A1 = Science-based; A2 = Stakeholder-based; 
A3 = Science-stakeholder agreement. Hatched bar represents the area to be represented 
within the network as part of each habitat conservation objective. 
 
Constraining the science-based approach with the stakeholder preferences for 
irreplaceable planning units (A3) yields a network configuration that is very similar to A1 
in terms of satisfying all the conservation objectives and protecting all habitat and 
spawning site features similarly with a slight increase of habitat protection by 1.08 km2 
(Figure 4.7). The average representation of the conservation features within the A3 
network was 54.9% (± 5% SE), only slightly higher than that for A1 (51% ± 4.7% SE). 
Twenty-three individual habitat features were represented above 30 % in the A3 network 
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compared to twenty in A1 (Figure 4.6). The science-stakeholder agreement approach also 
yielded a network configuration with the largest number of individual NTAs out of all 
three approaches, which although makes the network less compact, it is only 2.5 % larger 
than the science-based approach (Table 4.6). As expected, the opportunity cost of the 
stakeholder-based network configuration was lower than all the other approaches. 
However, constraining the science-based approach with the stakeholder-based 
preferences yielded a network configuration that was only 3.3% higher in opportunity 
cost than the A1 network (Figure 4.8).  
 
 
Figure 4.8. Sum of opportunity cost for all three approaches.  A1 = Science-based; A2 = 
Stakeholder-based; A3 = Science-stakeholder agreement. 
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4.4 Discussion 
Integrating scientific guiding principles about NTA design with ecological and 
socioeconomic criteria, local knowledge, and input from stakeholders has been 
demonstrated to be critical for achieving more effective NTA networks (Fernandes et al. 
2005, Green et al. 2009, Gleason et al. 2010). However, large-scale planning of NTA 
networks requires a careful consideration of who and how stakeholders will be equally 
represented through a transparent and efficiently facilitated process that follows clear 
guidelines for participation, collaboration, communication, and problem solving (Gleason 
et al. 2010). Undertaking such detailed and early involvement of representatives from 
various communities within a large planning region while incorporating massive amounts 
of biological and socioeconomic sensitive data is not always feasible given practical, 
technical, or financial constraints. 
Methods to integrate science-based and stakeholder-based approaches within SCP 
are now proposed as means to reach consensus between stakeholders and conservation 
practitioners and improve stakeholder acceptance and support for the suggested NTA 
networks (Ban et al. 2009b, Ruiz-Frau et al. 2015). The work presented here 
demonstrates the integration process of stakeholder-selected areas can be achieved with a 
large fisher sample (n=85) from three different fishing communities within a large 
planning region (~11,100 km2 of coastal and marine areas) at a high resolution (1 km2 
planning units), and while using a novel cost layer representing opportunity cost of 
fishing (Adams et al. 2011, Álvarez-Romero et al. 2013). My results further support 
approaches that consider a systematic planning effort integrating the best available data in 
conjunction with stakeholder preferences for NTA placement without sacrificing 
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conservation objectives and with minimal increases to cost. However, given the amount 
of disagreement between stakeholder and science-based approaches, I also show there is 
a strong need to carefully appraise stakeholder preferences for NTA placement with 
science-based approaches prior to carrying out a joint priorization effort that incorporates 
said preferences.  
The stakeholder-based approach on its own resulted in a network that 
incorporated almost half of the individual conservation features being targeted by the 
science-based approach, was approximately a third smaller in total size, but decreased 
half the opportunity cost to fishers. Given the overall goal of the planning process, it is no 
surprise that fishers heavily selected areas of rocky reef habitat. The difference maps are 
represent an easy way to identify areas of major disagreement between the stakeholder-
based and science-based approach, and it allows more scrutiny for determining whether 
stakeholders have particular underlying reasons for selecting areas that are either 
genuinely beneficial for a network of NTAs, or that are not useful to them for fishing  
(e.g. seagrass beds, mangrove, and wetland habitat near the coast or within the estuary) or 
are too far and pose big risks for traveling to fish there. High priority areas for 
stakeholders that are not high priority in the science-based approach (i.e. towards the red 
end of the spectrum on the Disagreement Index) could represent sites where fishers are 
not likely to go fishing. High priority areas in the science-based approach but not for 
stakeholders (i.e. towards the blue end of the spectrum on the Disagreement Index) could 
represent areas where fishers are either unaware of the relative importance of those sites 
for a NTA network or they chose not to select them for fear of losing important fishing 
areas for them (e.g. multiple spawning aggregations). Therefore, the difference maps help 
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check the stakeholder data in terms of their usefulness for the NTA network. The 
Disagreement Index also helps identify the agreement threshold at which stakeholder-
preferred areas are included into the science-based numerical optimization approaches 
(A3) to avoid selection of planning units that do not contribute to achieving conservation 
objectives at low cost.  
On the other hand, it was also possible to identify areas already within a MPA and 
under controlled exploitation regimes such as the eastern coast of Isla Ángel de la Guarda 
as well as both northern and southern tips of the island, were heavily selected by most 
fishers as areas that are important for conservation and fisheries management, and could 
be under stricter levels of protection such as NTAs. Mangrove, seagrass bed, and wetland 
habitats in the southern part of the Sonoran coast were also highly prioritized by fishers, 
which tells us that fishers value areas well known for being nursery habitats for a myriad 
of species targeted in the MIR. Most of these areas, as well as Isla San Estéban, are also 
under further anthropogenic pressures (e.g. high levels of tourism, pollution, etc.) given 
their proximity to major touristic population centers such as Kino Nuevo in Bahía de 
Kino. The stakeholder-based approach, however, fell short at protecting some of the 
spawning aggregation sites which are of utmost importance for fish stock recovery.  
The identification of a planning-unit lock-in proportion demonstrates a pragmatic 
and replicable way to integrate stakeholder-selected relevant areas (i.e. that are also 
relevant contributors to the network in terms of achieving conservation objectives) 
through science-based approaches and thus guarantee the ecological integrity of the NTA 
network. Constraining Marxan’s optimization process resulted in a NTA network 
configuration that takes into consideration areas that have been accepted by fisher 
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representatives as preferable and/or necessary, still achieved all conservation objectives, 
did not increase by much in terms of overall area, and suffered only a mild increase in 
terms of opportunity cost. This approach can be useful to conservation practitioners and 
fisheries managers seeking to identify potential NTAs that are both likely to be accepted 
by fisher community and achieve the desired outcomes without sacrificing efficiency. 
Furthermore, although existing NTAs were established with different conservation 
objectives, they can be evaluated for further additions and/or modifications that can 
incorporate some of the recommendations for NTAs put forth in the present study to 
increase protection of commercial species. 
Several caveats should be considered in interpreting my results. First, stakeholder-
based approaches will always be as good as the data collected for them. I make the 
important assumptions that fishers have complete knowledge about the presence and 
location of important conservation features (including habitats, species distribution, and 
spawning site locations), and that they provide us with accurate information on whether 
the sites they are selecting truly contribute to the functioning of the NTA network as 
opposed to being convenient sites that will not hamper fishing activities. I attempted to 
control for the latter by spreading the participatory mapping process into three exercises 
to achieve the most accurate answer possible. In similar studies, post-interview 
stakeholder meetings are often held to evaluate stakeholder-based approaches and 
achieve consensus among the interviewed fishers with respect to selected sites. However, 
my study shows there is value in assessing individual fisher preferences and how they are 
likely to affect or bias a combined science-stakeholder agreement approach. 
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Second, not incorporating distance to ports in the opportunity cost layer could 
bias the Marxan-based approaches (A1 and A3) by frequently selecting planning units 
that may have low opportunity cost to fishers but in reality are too distant for fishers to 
risk safety and additional resources (e.g. gas money) to travel and harvest there (Smith et 
al. 2010). By this logic, Marxan may be constricting itself from selecting planning units 
of high opportunity cost in terms of foregone revenue but that fishers would be willing to 
go given the high risk factors of traveling far distances. This phenomenon could explain 
some of the lack of overlap between the A2 and A1 approaches. Finally, my study only 
assessed the effect of incorporating of stakeholder preferences on habitat feature 
selection. Future research should consider consequences of the science- stakeholder 
agreement approach on the representation of fish and invertebrate species. 
The planning exercise for the development of a full-scale network of NTAs 
presented here and in Álvarez-Romero et al. (in review) has been one of the most 
comprehensive ones in the history of the MIR in the GOC in terms of scope, data 
compilation, expert advice, and stakeholder input throughout its design. The 
incorporation of small-scale fisher preferences into the proposal for a NTA network in 
the region contributes to their efforts for increasing buy-in through the identification of: 
1) acceptance level to the establishment of a NTA network by all stakeholders (i.e. 
fishers, government agencies, non-governmental organizations); 2) strategies to increase 
buy-in and expedite implementation; 3) potential tools to strengthen fisher capacity to 
participate in decision-making (Suárez-Castillo et al. 2017).  
Key benefits of fisher involvement during the process of NTA design and 
establishment include gaining a deeper understanding of the needs and concerns of 
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people directly affected by NTA establishment while generating trust and credibility 
among resource users (Pierce et al. 2005), and identifying issues of concern early on to 
avoid conflict and subsequent delays later in the process (Gleason et al. 2010). As  Ban et 
al. (2009b) and Ruiz-Frau et al. (2015), I believe that integration of participatory design 
strategies with systematic science-based planning methods can improve, and even 
expedite, stakeholder buy-in and reduce resistance to NTA implementation as fishers feel 
empowered throughout the process and thus more likely to abide by the regulations 
implemented (Ban et al. 2009b, Gleason et al. 2010). My results emphasize the 
importance of incorporating fisher preferences as a way of engaging with the community 
early on during a large scale and complicated planning process. 
While the use of numerical optimization tools such as Marxan with SCP 
approaches continues to increase, these tools are generally recommended to 
support, and not replace, stakeholder-driven NTA design processes (Klein et al. 
2008). The importance of fisher perceptions of the pros and cons, both in the 
short- and long-term, of NTAs becomes important and will greatly influence their 
level of opposition towards their establishment. Incorporating local fishers’ input 
in the design and implementation processes of NTA regulations is essential to 
long-term stewardship of NTAs (Lundquist and Granek 2005). The method and 
results presented in this study provides a salient example of ways that cutting-
edge science can be combined with local expertise by integrating both science-
based and stakeholder-based approaches to NTA selection in a participative, 
collaborative, and exploratory process to assess alternatives for NTA networks 
and ease implementation. 
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A1. Introduction 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Leah Gerber in the 
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Arizona State University.  I am conducting a 
research study to compare across case studies of marine reserves and analyze the 
ecologic, social, economic, and institutional factors that contribute to their 
implementation and success as fisheries recovery zones. This interview is intended to get 
to know the story about the origins and trajectories of marine reserves in the Gulf of 
California, Mexico, with respect to their decree, establishment, and current functioning. 
A2. The Study 
Conservation and fisheries management efforts to establish marine reserves often 
fail to include local communities in the design and implementation of the reserves and 
their management regulations. The purpose of the study is to unpack the social, 
economic, institutional, and ecological factors that are relevant to the interactions 
between the use of marine reserves as fisheries management tools and their efficacy in 
addressing their stated objectives at both a regional and local scale by evaluating case 
studies of marine reserves in the Gulf of California (GOC) that have strikingly different 
trajectories with respect to marine reserve design, establishment, and management. I will 
carry out a qualitative analysis on 10 case studies of GOC communities that have been 
involved or affected by the establishment of a marine reserve. More specifically, I will 
address the following questions: A) What are the key vulnerabilities of marine reserves in 
the Gulf of California and what is the role of the institutional structure that governs the 
operation of marine reserves in Mexico? B) To what extent do feedbacks within these 
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systems affect the outcome of reserves that benefit humans and nature? The information 
for this analysis will come from an interview process with key informants and local 
experts (including representatives from non-profit organizations, government agencies, 
and scientific researchers well familiarized with the area) of the various communities in 
the GOC that have been associated with the establishment of marine reserves.  
A3. Methods 
I am inviting you to participate in an interview of 30 questions that will last a total 
of 1hr to 1hr & 30 minutes. I will read the questions to you and you can answer at your 
own pace while I type the answers. You have the right not to answer any question, and to 
stop participation at any time. I would also like to record the interview to make sure I 
capture all the necessary information. You can also choose to stop the recording at any 
point. 
A4. Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Your responses will be kept confidential, and your name will not be used as I am 
obligated to maintain the anonymity of all participants. In order to maintain anonymity, I 
will save the Word documents containing the interview responses and store them under 
unique code identifiers, which will be the only identifiers used to store, process, and 
analyze data. I am the only person who will have access to the electronic copies of the 
interviews in a password-protected electronic database on a secure ASU server (Gerber 
Lab server) until Summer of 2017. The data will only be analyzed and utilized for the 
purposes of scientific research.  
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A5. Participation and Information Sharing 
Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you must be 18 years or older to 
participate. You have the right not to participate or to withdraw from the study at any 
time. The results of this study may be used in reports, presentations, or publications by 
myself. Your responses to the interview will only be used for scientific research 
purposes, and although there is no direct benefit to you, possible benefits of your 
participation include a better understanding of your point of view on the topic of marine 
reserves as management tools for fisheries and biodiversity in the Gulf of California, 
Mexico. A better understanding will help us make better recommendations for 
management strategies in the future, thus your participation is very valuable for the 
success of the fisheries in the region and the conservation of its biodiversity.  
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the 
research team at: (Mar.Mancha@asu.edu, Leah.Gerber@asu.edu). If you have any 
questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you 
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional 
Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 
965-6788. Please let me know if you wish to be part of the study. 
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EXEMPTION GRANTED  
 
Leah Gerber Life Sciences, School of (SOLS)  
480/727-3109, Leah.Gerber@asu.edu  
 
Dear Leah Gerber: On 9/28/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:  
Type of Review:  Initial Study  
Title:  
Interview to identify the essential socio-ecologic 
factors for the implementation and success of a marine 
reserve in the Gulf of California, Mexico  
Investigat
or:  Leah Gerber  
IRB ID:  STUDY00005008  
Funding:  None  
Grant 
Title:  None  
Grant ID:  None  
Documents 
Reviewed: 
• Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Recruit_ENG, 
Category: Recruitment Materials; • 
Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Recruit_SPA, Category: 
Recruitment Materials;  
• Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Interview_SPA, 
Category: Translations; • 
Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Protocol, Category: IRB 
Protocol; • 
Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Interview_ENG, Category: 
Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions 
/interview guides/focus group questions); • Translation 
Certificate, Category: Translations; • 
Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Consent_SPA, Category: 
Consent Form; • 
Gerber_Mancha_Governance_Consent_ENG, Category: 
Consent Form;  
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 9/28/2016.  
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).  
Sincerely,  
IRB Administrator  
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APPENDIX B  
INTERVIEW TO IDENTIFY THE ESSENTIAL SOCIO-ECOLOGIC FACTORS FOR 
THE IMPLEMENTATION AND SUCCESS OF A MARINE RESERVE IN THE GULF 
OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
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1)   <STORYS> Let’s talk about the origins of this marine reserve, particularly about 
the history of its design and implementation. When, by who, and why did the idea 
to establish a marine reserve arise? 
 
2)   <ACTORS> ¿Who were the main actors participating in the process of 
establishing this reserve? 
 
 
3)   <SUPPOR> Which groups of actors gave the most support for its establishment? 
Which actors gave the least support for its establishment?  
 
4)   <MGMPRG> When was the Management Plan published? If there were any 
delays in publishing it, why do you think that was? Has the plan been re-
evaluated? If so, when? 
 
5)   <COMMUN> Which local communities do you think resulted most affected 
(either positively or negatively) by the establishment of the reserve?  
 
6)   <SECTOR> What are the main economic sectors in these communities? 
 
7)    <FISHER> What percentage of the population in these communities is 
exclusively engaged in fishing activities? 
 
8)   <OBJECTI> What are the main objectives of the marine reserve? 
 
9)   <OBJCHNG> Despite these objectives being described in the decree or 
management plan, do you think these have changed since the reserve was 
implemented? If so, how? 
 
10)  <OTHACT> Besides fishing, what other activities do you think need to be 
regulated or monitored in order to achieve the objectives of the marine reserve? 
Why? 
 
11)  <CONFLIC> What were the main conflicts that arose when the idea to establish 
the marine reserve was communicated to the community, particularly with the 
fishing sector (either artisanal or industrial)? Which of these conflicts do you 
think are still present? 
 
12)  <DRIVERS> At a large scale, what major local, national, and/or international 
forces you think are behind these activities in 3a <OTHACT>? 
 
13)  <POLITIC> Do you think there were any conventions or public policies at the 
federal, regional, or international level that may have influenced the 
implementation if this marine reserve? And if so, could you please describe what 
convention or public policy are you referring to? 
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14)  <EFFFACT> Why? What factors do you think impede/facilitate the effectiveness 
of the marine reserve in achieving its stated objectives? 
 
15)   <EFFECOL> Would you consider this marine reserve to have been ecologically 
effective? 
 
16)  <EFFECON> Would you consider this marine reserve to have been socio-
economically effective? 
 
17)  <LEADER> Would you say that the leadership qualities of certain key actors or 
members of the community has been an important factor for the implementation 
of this marine reserve? Why? What about for its performance? 
 
18)  <NGOCSO> Would you consider the participation of non-profit organizations 
during the design, implementation, and follow-up of the marine reserve has been 
an important factor for its official decree? What about for its performance? Are 
there any non-profit organizations in this particular area that are worth noting 
here? 
 
19)  <UNOFFI> Besides the no-fishing restrictions within the marine reserve, do you 
know of any unofficial rules or norms that are implemented in the area to prevent 
the nearby fisheries from becoming overexploited?  
 
20)  <MONCOMP> To your knowledge, are there people who act as monitors of rule 
compliance? If so, are there specific groups that do this? 
 
21)  <HHARINF> Is there any type of physical hard infrastructure (explain if needed)) 
that are lacking or needed to help achieve the reserve objectives? 
 
22)  <HSOFINF> Is there any type of soft infrastructure (explain if needed) that are 
lacking or needed to help achieve the reserve objectives? 
 
23)  <MONINFR> To your knowledge, are there people in charge of monitoring that 
these pieces of adequate infrastructure are present, functional, and effective 
towards helping achieve the marine reserve objectives? 
 
24)  <NATINF> Are there certain biophysical attributes in the area that have 
facilitated the zonification and/or monitoring of the marine reserve? 
 
25)  <CURRES> Would you consider the current state of the marine resources within 
the marine reserve to be in high abundance and/or good quality? 
 
26)  <PROCES> Are there certain biophysical/ecologic processes within or around the 
marine reserve that have contributed to its performance? 
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27)  <STIGMA> To your knowledge, is there any sort of social sanctions (or stigma) 
among those who are found not complying with the reserve regulations or 
unofficial norms? 
 
28)  <LOCKNOW> Would say that the local knowledge of the communities has 
contributed to the appropriate design and subsequent performance of the marine 
reserve? How so? 
 
29)  <HUMINF> Are there any other capacities, abilities, or levels of experience that 
you think members of the communities have and that have contributed to the 
reserve’s success? 
 
30)  <INFORM> To your knowledge, is there any information available for the direct 
resource uses with respect to the specifics of the marine reserve? If so, in what 
format? 
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ADDITIONAL FIGURES FOR CHAPTER 2  
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Figure 1C. Procedure establishing (and subsequently modifying) Natural Protected Areas 
under federal jurisdiction. 
 
 
Figure 2C. Procedure for establishing Fishing Refuge Zones. 
 
  181 
APPENDIX D 
RESEARCH PROTOCOL FOR CHAPTERS 3 & 4: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
MARINE RESERVES IN THE MIDRIFF ISLANDS REGION, GULF OF 
CALIFORNIA, MEXICO  
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A1. Introduction 
I am a graduate student under the direction of Professor Leah Gerber in the 
College of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Arizona State University.  I am conducting a 
research study among key actors of local fishing communities in the Midriff Islands 
Region of the Gulf of California in Mexico about the different levels of engagement and 
perceptions towards marine reserves as management tools for marine resources and the 
ecosystem services they provide. This interview is intended to identify the benefits and 
the costs of establishing a network of marine reserves in order to protect and restore the 
natural capital (natural resources viewed as means of production of goods and ecosystem 
services) within the Midriff Islands Region. 
A2. The Study 
The purpose of the study is to explore the different levels of engagement and 
perceptions towards marine reserves, as management tools for marine resources and the 
ecosystem services they provide, among key actors (stakeholders) that fish in the Midriff 
Islands Region in the Gulf of California, Mexico through an interview process. 
Conservation and fisheries management efforts to establish marine reserves often fail to 
include local communities in the design and implementation of the reserves and their 
management regulations. In order to analyze these interactions at a local scale, this 
empirical study will examine the following questions: A) What is the level of 
understanding and support for marine reserves among key actor groups?, and B) How 
does this support vary among these groups?  
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A3. Methods 
I am inviting your participation, which will involve an interview of 52 short 
questions that will last a total of 1hr to 1hr & 30 minutes. I will read the questions to you 
and you can answer at your own pace while I write the answers. There will be some 
spatial questions in which I will ask you to draw specific polygons in a map. I would also 
like to record the interview to make sure I capture all the necessary information. You can 
also choose to stop the recording at any point. You have the right not to answer any 
question, and to stop participation at any time.  
A4. Confidentiality and Anonymity 
Your responses will be kept confidential, and your name will not be used as I am 
obligated to maintain the anonymity of all participants. I will process the physical copies 
of the interviews into an electronic database myself, and I will assign unique code 
identifiers for each interview to maintain anonymity. The data will be stored, processed, 
analyzed, and transmitted using only the unique codes as identifiers in order to protect the 
confidentiality of the respondents’ answers and their identity. I am the only person who 
will have access to both the physical and electronic copies of the interviews in a 
password-protected electronic database on a secure ASU server (Gerber Lab server) until 
Summer of 2017. The data will only be analyzed and utilized for the purposes of 
scientific research.  
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A5. Participation and Information Sharing 
Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you have the right to refuse to 
participate before or during the research process. The results of this study may be used in 
reports, presentations, or publications by myself. Your responses to the interview will 
only be used for scientific research purposes, and although there is no direct benefit to 
you, possible benefits of your participation include a better understanding of your point 
of view on the topic of marine reserves as management tools for fisheries and 
biodiversity in the Midriff Islands Region. A better understanding will help us make 
better recommendations for management strategies in the future, thus your participation 
is very valuable for the success of the fisheries in the region and the conservation of its 
biodiversity. 
 
If you have any questions concerning the research study, please contact the 
research team at: (Mar.Mancha@asu.edu, Leah.Gerber@asu.edu). If you have any 
questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you 
have been placed at risk, you can contact the Chair of the Human Subjects Institutional 
Review Board, through the ASU Office of Research Integrity and Assurance, at (480) 
965-6788. Please let me know if you wish to be part of the study. 
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EXEMPTION GRANTED  
Leah Gerber Life Sciences, School of (SOLS) 480/727-3109 Leah.Gerber@asu.edu  
 
Dear Leah Gerber: On 4/20/2015 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:  
 
Type of Review:  Initial Study  
Title:  
Interview to identify the degree of acceptance towards 
the implementation of a network of marine reserves (no-take 
zones) in the Midriff Islands Region, Gulf of California, 
Mexico  
Investigator:  Leah Gerber  
IRB ID:  STUDY00002571  
Funding:  None  
Grant Title:  None  
Grant ID:  None  
Documents 
Reviewed:  
• Gerber_Mancha_Recruitment Script, Category: 
Recruitment Materials; • Gerber_Mancha_Recruitment Script 
ENGLISH, Category: Recruitment Materials;  
• HRP-502c - Consent Form (short), Category: Consent 
Form; • HRP-502c - Consent Form (short, ENGLISH), 
Category: Consent Form;  
• HRP-503a - Social Behavioral Protocol, Category: 
IRB Protocol; • Certificate of Translation, Category: 
Translations; • Interview, Category: Translations;  
• Interview, Category: Measures (Survey 
questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group 
questions);  
 
The IRB determined that the protocol is considered exempt pursuant to Federal 
Regulations 45CFR46 (2) Tests, surveys, interviews, or observation on 4/20/2015.  
 
In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the 
INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).  
 
Sincerely,  
 
IRB Administrator  
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APPENDIX E 
INTERVIEW TO IDENTIFY THE DEGREE OF ACCEPTANCE TOWARDS THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF A NETWORK OF MARINE RESERVES IN THE MIDRIFF 
ISLANDS REGION, GULF OF CALIFORNIA, MEXICO 
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1. General context 
1.1. What is your perception of: 
-­‐   1.1.1 - The current state of marine biodiversity (species/habitats/ecosystems) in 
the Midriff Islands Region?  
Very bad (4) - Bad (3) - Stable (2) - Good (1) – Very good (0) 
-­‐   1.1.2 - The current state of fisheries (commercially valuable species) in the 
Midriff Islands Region?  
Very bad (4) - Bad (3) - Stable (2) - Good (1) – Very good (0) 
 
1.2 - What factor(s) (or threat(s)) can affect (or are already affecting) the following: 
-­‐   1.2.1 - Marine biodiversity (species/habitats/ecosystems) in the Midriff Islands 
Region? 
-­‐   1.2.2 - Fisheries (commercially valuable species) in the Midriff Islands Region? 
 
1.3 - What methods or management tools would you suggest to: 
-­‐   1.3.1 - Achieve the protection (conservation) of natural resources (biodiversity -
species/habitats/ecosystems-) in the Midriff Islands Region? 
-­‐   1.3.2 - Achieve the maintenance of species with commercial value (sustainable 
fishing) in in the Midriff Islands Region? 
 
The answers to the following questions (1.4.1 – 1.4.3) will be written in Table 1.4 below: 
1.4.1 - Do you know which are the Marine Protected Areas in the Midriff Islands 
Region?  
1.4.2 - Do you consider them to be successful for the conservation of biodiversity? 
Yes (2) – I don’t know (1) – No (0) 
1.4.3 - Do you consider them to be successful for the maintenance of fisheries? 
Yes (2) – I don’t know (1) – No (0) 
 
Table 1.4  - Answers to be written by the interviewer: 
Marine Protected Area  
(MPA) 
1.4.1.(A-C) 
Interviewee aware 
that MPA exists 
1.4.2.(A-C) 
Biodiversity 
conservation 
1.4.3.(A-C) 
Maintaining 
fisheries 
Yes (1) – No (0) Yes (1) – I don’t know (1) – No (0) 
A - Parque Nacional 
Archipiélago de San 
Lorenzo 
   
B - Reserva de la Biosfera 
Bahía de los Ángeles y 
Canales de Ballenas y 
Salsipuedes 
   
C - Reserva de la Biósfera 
Isla San Pedro Mártir    
 
1.4.4 - Why? Explain.  
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The answers for the following questions (1.5.1 – 1.5.3) will be written in Table 1.5 
below.  
For each of the Marine Protected Areas that you know exist in the Midriff Islands 
Region: 
1.5.1 – How frequently do you fish within 1km off the border of the marine reserve? 
Never (0) – Rarely (1) – Every once in a while (2) – Often (3) – Almost always (4) 
 
1.5.2 – Do you think there is a lack of compliance with respect to the rules of marine 
reserves (no-take zones)? 
Yes (1) – No (0) 
1.5.3 – How frequently do you observe that there is a lack of compliance with respect to 
the rules of marine reserves (no-take zones)? 
Never (0) – Rarely (1) – Every once in a while (2) – Often (3) – Almost always (4) 
 
Table 1.5  - Answers to be written by the interviewer: 
Marine Protected 
Area 
1.5.1.(A-C) 
Frequency 
fishing nearby 
(0 – 4) 
1.5.2.(A-C)      
Non-compliance 
Yes (1) – No (0) 
1.5.3.(A-C) 
Frequency of 
non-compliance 
(0 – 4) 
A - Parque Nacional 
Archipiélago de San 
Lorenzo 
   
B - Reserva de la 
Biosfera Bahía de los 
Ángeles y Canales de 
Ballenas y Salsipuedes 
   
C - Reserva de la 
Biósfera Isla San 
Pedro Mártir 
   
 
1.5.4 – If the answer to question 1.5.2 is Yes, why do you think there is non-compliance 
with the rules for marine reserves (no-take zones)? 
 
1.6 – If the answer to question 1.5.2 is Yes, and considering that there are           (# of 
fishermen specific to the community being interviewed)          fishermen in the 
community of            (community where interview is taking place)          : In your 
opinion, what percentage of fishermen would you say do not comply with the rules for 
marine reserves (no-take zones)? 
 
1.7 - What do you think should be incorporated or improved so that the Marine Protected 
Areas in the Midriff Islands Region can achieve the following objectives: 
-­‐   1.7.1 - Protect (conserve) the natural resources (biodiversity – 
species/habitats/ecosystems)? 
-­‐   1.7.2 - Maintain commercially valuable species (sustainable fisheries)? 
  189 
2. Marine reserves 
2.1 - Do you know what is a marine reserve (no-take zone)? Yes (1) - No (0), define it. 
 
2.2 - Do you know what is a network of marine reserves (no-take zone)? Yes (1) - No (0), 
define it. 
 
2.3 – Considering the list of natural capital elements listed in Table 2.3, for which of 
those would you consider that a marine reserve (no-take zone) is an adequate tool for 
helping protect the natural capital (natural resources) that exist in the region you live in? 
Use Table 2.3 that has been provided to you:  
 
Table 2.3 – Natural capital 
(at the end) 
 
2.4 – Of those elements that you chose in Table 2.3 that you consider important, what 
total percentage of each one would you like to have the protection of a marine reserve? 
Uste Table 2.3. 
 
2.5.1 – If in Table 2.3 you selected “commercial species”, which are these species? 
2.5.2 – On average, how much (in kg) do you catch of each species? 
2.5.3 – What fishing gear do you use for each species? And if your boat operates with 
more than one person, how many? 
2.5.4 – What is the commercial value of each species? 
 
2.5.1 – Species                 
(or common name) 
2.5.2 – 
Catch (kg) 
2.5.3 – Fishing gear 2.5.4 – Commercial value 
    
…. 
 
2.6 - What are the benefit(s) of protecting natural capital that you consider important in 
the Midriff Islands Region? 
 
2.7.1 - Who do you think benefits from a network of marine reserves in the Midriff 
Islands Region?  
You, but not others (3) – Others, but not you (2) – You and others (1) - Nobody (0).  
2.7.2 - List the coastal communities referred to as “others”.  
2.7.3 - Please explain your answer in 2.7.1. 
 
2.8.1 - Based on the presence of natural resources that you consider important, what is or 
what are the most important sites (both with respect to biodiversity conservation as well 
as for the maintenance of fisheries in the Midriff Islands Region? Use the maps provided 
to draw the sites (there is no need to  limit the number of sites).  
2.8.2 - What is the importance (as a percentage) that you would give to these sites? Using 
the 100 seeds provided to you, assign a number of seeds to each site based on its 
importance. 
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2.9 Using the map, indicate which of those important sites (from 2.8.1) do you think 
should be protected? (there is no need to limit the number of sites). 
 
2.10 Indicate on which of those sites (from 2.9, that you think should be protected) would 
you be willing to establish a marine reserve (whether the reserve is managed voluntarily 
or through the corresponding authorities)? Use the map provided to you (there is no need 
to limit the number of sites). 
 
2.11.1 - Thinking of those sites (from 2.10) where you would be willing to establish a 
marine reserve: 
-­‐   Would you be ok with the establishment of a network of marine reserves (no-take 
zones) in the Midriff Islands Region?  
Strongly disagree (0) – Disagree (1) – Neutral (2) – Agree (3) – Strongy agree (4) 
 
-­‐   2.11.2 - Why? 
-­‐   2.11.3 - How long (in years) do you think it would take to accomplish the 
establishment of a network of marine reserves in the Midriff Islands Region? 
-­‐   2.11.4 - How long (in years) would you like this process to take (i.e. having the 
network of marine reserves in the Midriff Islands Region estblished)? 
 
2.12 - Which of these management tools do you prefer for the establishment of marine 
reserves? Higher to lower preference (2 – 1 - 0) 
2.12.1 - Marine reserves through community 
agreements 
 
2.12.2 - Marine reserves through CONAPESCA  
2.12.3 - Marine reserves through CONANP  
 
2.13.1 – From your perspective and considering the whole region of the Gulf of 
California, what are the top 5 sites for best fishing? Use the maps provided (2.13.A-F) to 
draw the sites. 
2.13.2 – What importance (in percentage) do you give to each of these sites? 
 
2.14.1 If your productive activity were to be affected (e.g. less sites for fishing) by the 
establishment of a network of marine reserves in the MIR, do you have the option of 
engaging into another way of making a living (i.e., an “alternative livlihood)?  
Yes (1) - No (0).  
2.14.2 - In case of the answer to 2.14.1 being “Yes”, What would it be? 
 
3. Social relations 
3 - List the principal organizations (government agency/academia/social civil 
organizations/non-governmental organizations) involved in the conservation of 
biodiversity and maintenance of fisheries and answer the following questions with 
respect to your relationship with such organizations:  
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(The answers to the following questions will be written by the interviewer on Tables 3.1 
and 3.2. 
 
3.1.1 – List of organizations 
3.1.2 – Would you consider that you hold a positive (1) or a negative (0) relationship with 
such organizations? 
3.1.3 – How would you characterize the intensity of collaboration between you and such 
organizations? 
Very low (0) – Low (1) – Moderate (2) – High (3) – Very high (4) 
3.1.4 - How would you characterize the reciprocity of collaboration between you and 
such organizations (i.e. do you think they help you as much as you help them)? 
Never (0) – Rarely (1) – Every once in a while (2) – Often (3) – Almost always (4) 
3.1.5 - How would you characterize the level of trust between you and such 
organizations? 
Very low (0) – Low (1) – Moderate (2) – High (3) – Very high (4) 
3.1.5 - Would you say that the objectives of such organizations are in agreement with 
your own objectives? 
Yes (1) – No (0) 
 
 
Table 3.1 - Biodiversity conservation organizations (at least 3): 
3.1.1 - Name 
3.1.2  
Type 
+ / - 
(1 / 0) 
3.1.3 
Intensity 
(0 – 4) 
3.1.4 
Reciprocity 
(0 – 4) 
3.1.5   
Trust 
(0 – 4) 
3.1.6   
Agreement 
with objectives 
Yes (1) – No 
(0) 
      
 
Table 3.2 - Maintenance of fisheries organizations (at least 3): 
3.2.1 - Name 
3.2.2  
Type 
+ / - 
(1 / 0) 
3.2.3 
Intensity 
(0 – 4) 
3.2.4 
Reciprocity 
(0 – 4) 
3.2.5  
Trust 
(0 – 4) 
3.2.6   
Agreement 
with objectives 
Yes (1) – No 
(0) 
      
 
3.3 – Have you ever participated in a capacity-building workshop sponsored by any 
conservation or fisheries management organization? Yes (1) - No (0). 
 
If the answer to question 3.3 is Yes, how has your perception / degree of understanding 
about the use of marine reserves changed for: 
3.3.1 – Conservation of marine biodiversity? 
Not at all (0) – Very little (1) - Somewhat (2) – A lot (3) - Completely (4) 
3.3.2 – Fisheries management? 
Not at all (0) – Very little (1) - Somewhat (2) – A lot (3) - Completely (4) 
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 Figure 1F. Selection frequency histogram of planning units selected by fishers in the 
stakeholder-based approach (A2). PU = hexagonal planning unit of 1 km2. For example, 1 
PU was selected by 19 fishers, 4 PUs were selected by 18 fishers, etc.  
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